食品安全供应链中核心企业的策略与激励机制研究

【作者】 许启金；

【导师】 王俊豪；

【作者基本信息】 浙江工商大学 ， 企业管理， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 食品安全问题层出不穷,严重影响了人们的生命健康,并对经济和社会造成了重大影响。为此,各国政府大力加强食品安全管制的制度建设。食品加工企业为实现可持续发展、增强企业竞争力,也越来越重视食品安全,纷纷实行食品安全供应链管理。但从国内实践情况来看,食品安全供应链管理效率较低,难以实现食品安全和企业收益双重优化目标。究其原因,主要是政府管制环境不理想,食品加工企业缺乏应对外部管制的相应策略,以及对供应链成员的协调和激励能力不足。而现有文献针对食品加工企业应对食品安全管制的生产和技术策略以及对供应链上下游成员的协调策略和激励机制的研究都较为少见。在此背景下,本文运用博弈论、管制理论、数值仿真法、案例分析法等理论和方法,开展食品安全供应链中核心企业的策略与激励机制研究,以期提高食品加工企业的食品安全供应链管理能力,实现食品安全和供应链效益双重优化目标。其中,将核心企业明确为食品加工企业,其概念是指具备核心市场资源和核心竞争力,能够吸引其它企业加盟组建食品安全供应链参与市场竞争,并对供应链事务具有控制、协调能力的企业。本文研究食品安全供应链中核心企业(即食品加工企业)应对管制的生产策略和技术创新策略、针对上下游合作成员的协调策略和激励机制等内容。全文分为以下七章内容：第一章,绪论。首先介绍了选题的产生背景和现实状况,即食品安全问题及我国食品加工企业实行食品安全供应链管理的现状,指出了本文的理论研究意义和实践应用价值。然后界定了主要概念,提出论文的分析框架和主要内容。最后,提出拟采用的研究方法、研究思路、论文结构和主要创新点。第二章,文献综述。主要分析选题的理论背景,综述了国内外开展的食品安全问题及其供应链管理理论、食品安全的影响主体等方面相关理论研究和应用情况,指出了现有文献中存在需要进一步探讨与改进之处,提出了本文研究的方向。第三章,理论基础和框架。研究了食品安全供应链内外部利益相关者及其对供应链的影响,重点分析了核心企业对其它利益相关者的策略行为与激励作用；分析了食品安全供应链的相关信息不对称问题及其影响；探讨了核心企业所面对的博弈问题及解决的应用方法；分析了食品安全政府管制理论及主要管制行为方式。在以上理论和问题分析的基础上构建出本文的理论框架,为研究食品安全供应链中核心企业的策略和激励机制研究奠定了理论基础,并提出了研究思路。第四章,核心企业应对食品安全管制的策略选择。采用演化博弈理论,探讨了纯市场条件下两个核心企业均采用生产优质食品策略或生产劣质食品策略的博弈情况,构建了核心企业的博弈矩阵及演化分析过程,并通过数值仿真论证有关结论；研究了政府管制下核心企业生产策略和技术创新策略的复制动态方程、动态趋势和稳定性情况,构建出核心企业的策略选择与政府管制行为选择的博弈矩阵,推导出核心企业选择生产策略和技术创新策略需要相应的政府管制条件。第五章,食品安全供应链中核心企业的协调策略研究。针对食品质量损坏成本分摊问题,在提出食品安全供应链整体收益最优模型的基础上,分析比较食品质量损坏成本分摊的四种策略情况,提出了在确定合理分摊系数下采取供应链内成员共同承担策略的协调策略；针对安全食品的定价问题,分别比较了合作决策和斯塔克伯格(Stackelberg)博弈下的核心企业定价模型,并基于系统最优化或帕累托改进的原则,提出了核心企业协调定价策略。第六章,食品安全供应链中核心企业的激励机制研究。探讨了在信息对称和信息不对称情况下的激励机制的规划问题、设计过程和效果,重点研究了促进上游供应商提供真实信息、提高生产和技术创新的努力水平和促进销售商提高销售努力水平的激励机制设计问题,实现食品安全和企业效益双重优化目标。第七章,结论与展望。首先对研究情况进行了简要结论,然后针对研究内容提出了需要进一步研究方向,主要有食品加工企业应对政府管制深入分析、开展核心企业与消费者、同行企业之间博弈情、核心企业构建食品安全供应链的决策以及对有关结论进行实证分析等方面内容。本文的主要创新点主要有以下四个方面：(1)构建了食品安全供应链中核心企业的策略和激励机制基本框架。现有文献食品供应链的研究主要集中在局部协调或激励问题探讨,很少从核心企业视角进行整体协调、内外部结合来研究食品供应链整体收益和资源最优配置。本文从食品安全目标与利益目标一致性、系统利益协调和激励的研究角度出发,将核心企业应对食品安全管制的生产策略和技术创新策略选择、核心企业对上下游成员企业的协调策略和激励机制等方面研究内容进行整合,构建出基本框架,提出基本分析思路,综合探讨缓解或解决信息不对称问题和协调各相关主体利益矛盾问题,实现食品安全和企业收益双重优化目标。(2)探讨了核心企业应对食品安全管制的生产策略与技术创新策略。关于政府管制和食品企业生产行为博弈的现有研究文献中,是以博弈主体(政府和企业)完全理性为前提,并只分析管制成本、罚金、企业收益等因素。本文指出政府和食品企业是有限理性的现实基础,运用演化博弈理论,讨论了核心企业与政府演化博弈过程,推导出核心企业选择不同生产食品策略和技术创新策略的相应政府管制政策；在分析过程中,综合考虑了管制成本、罚金、企业收益、企业声誉成本、政府扶持政策、执法人员廉政程度等相关影响因素,研究成果更贴近实际情况,结论可操作性较强,对政府制定管制和扶持政策更有参考价值。(3)提出并论证了食品安全供应链中核心企业的协调策略。本文采用博弈分析工具,研究了食品安全供应链中核心企业的协调定价策略和食品质量损坏成本分摊协调策略。针对安全食品定价问题,在分析合作决策下食品定价模型和Stackelberg博弈下食品定价模型的基础上,采用讨价还价理论和纳什协商模型,提出并论证了核心企业的协商定价策略,实现了成员企业收益的帕累托改进和供应链总体收益最大化；针对食品质量损坏成本分摊问题,在对食品损坏成本分摊四种策略比较分析的基础上,提出并论证了在合理确定损失分摊系数下食品损坏成本由系统成员共同分摊的协调策略,实现了食品安全供应链全局最优和链内成员企业的合理分配和促进食品安全的目标。(4)设计了食品安全供应链中核心企业的激励机制。本文根据激励理论,以核心企业为委托方,结合不同支付方式,设计出相应的核心企业激励机制,有效地缓解或解决了由信息不对称所带来的逆向选择和道德风险问题,实现食品安全和企业收益双重优化目标。在核心企业的激励机制设计中,分别采用转移支付方式和最优控制原理,成功地促进供应商提供真实信息；采用线性分成制支付方式,有效的提高了供应商的生产努力水平和技术创新努力水平；针对逆向选择和道德风险并存情况,采用线性分成制支付方式,也成功地促进销售商提高销售努力水平并成功地揭示出销售商的营销能力的真实信息状况。本文研究结论对食品加工企业实施食品安全供应链管理有较好的指导意义,对政府部门制定食品安全相关管制和扶持政策有一定参考价值,有利于推动我国食品安全的建设和促进消费者社会福利的增加,同时也丰富了食品安全管理的相关理论。更多还原

【Abstract】 The increasing food safety problems have threatened people’s health even lives, and significantly affected economies and social activities. Therefore, the governments in many countries strengthen the food safety regulations, while food manufacturers attach more importance to food safety and introduce supply chain management to achieve sustainable development and enhance competences. However, the supply chain management of food safety in China does not work efficiently, which makes difficult to attain dual goals of food safety and profitable operations. The main reasons can be summarised as immature regulation environment, lacking of responsiveness to regulations from food manufacturers and insufficient coordination and incentives for members in the supply chain. However, the existing literature focusing on production and technology strategies responsive to food safety regulations and on coordination and incentives strategies for member enterprises in supply chain are fairly rare.Based on the background mentioned above, the research on strategies and incentives mechanism for core enterprises in food supply chain is performed in this paper. The objective of the research is to find out the ways of enhancing the capability for food safety supply chain management and to achieve food safety and profitability simultaneously. In the paper, game theory, incentives theory and regulation theory are used to support the research, combined with a number of techniques and approaches, such as numerical simulation method, case analysis, etc. In this paper, core enterprises are defined as the food manufacturers who possess core market resources and core competences, and can attract other enterprises to join in the supply chain. They play a central role in controlling and coordinating the supply chain. This paper has been structured in the way that focuses on the production and technology innovation strategies for core enterprises (food manufacturers) responding to food safety regulations, and the coordination strategies and incentives mechanism for all up-and down-stream members in the supply chain. The main contents are organised into following 7 chapters.Chapter 1, introduction. This chapter discusses the background of the research, and the theoretical and practical values. The key terms are defined, and the strucure of the paper is proposed. Then the research questions, the methodology and some innovative contributions are presented.Chapter 2, literature review. It aims to provide an overview of the research that has been undertaken in the areas of food safety, supply chain management, and the stakeholders in the food safety. Then the shortages in existing literature are pointed out for further discussion.Chapter 3, the theoretical basis and framework. Firstly, this section presents the stakeholders of the food safety supply chain and their impacts, particularly focusing on the core enterprises and their strategic activities and incentives. The issue of information asymmetry pertaining to the food safety supply chain is then discussed. Thirdly, the game theory is applied to argue the core enterprises’strategic choices under regulation circumstance, and their coordination strategies and incentives mechanism. The food safety regulation theory is presented afterwards, including regulation behaviours and methods. Finally, an analytical framework is proposed to provide a comprehensive model for analysing the core enterprises’strategies and incentives mechanism in the food safety supply chain.Chapter 4, strategic choices for core enterprises responding to food safety regulations. In this chapter, the evolutionary game theory is adopted to argue that under perfect market condition two core enterprises simultaneously choose strategies of producing quality or poor food, and a game matrix and the evolutionary analysis are demonstrated. Then it is concluded that it is impossible for core enterprises to voluntarily choose strategies of producing quality food under perfect market condition, after applying the numerical simulation method. In the section, the duplicated dynamic equation, dynamic trends and stability of production and technology innovation strategies are discussed, and the game matrix of core enterprises’strategic choices and governments’regulatory choices is formulated. Finally, it comes to the conclusion that core enterprises’choices of production and technology innovation strategies appeal for corresponding regulation policies.Chapter 5, the research on coordination strategies for core enterprises in food safety supply chain. Firstly, based on the total profit optimising model of the food safety supply chain, an analysis and comparison of four damage cost sharing strategies is conducted. The best strategy of determining a reasonable sharing coefficient for supply chain members is worked out, which optimises the total profit of the supply chain and reconciles interests among diverse chain members. Secondly, by comparing the cooperative decision-making pricing model and Stackelberg game pricing model, the coordinated pricing strategies for core enterprises are generated, according to system optimization or Pareto Principle.Chapter 6, the research on incentives mechanism for core enterprises in food safety supply chain. The impact of’adverse selection’and’moral hazard’is imposed on the food safety supply chain management of core enterprises. Thus, regarding core enterprises as principals, the plan, design and outcomes of the incentives mechanism are discussed in this section under the conditions of information symmetry and asymmetry respectively. Particularly, this section aims to explore incentives mechanism from two perspectives to achieve the dual goals of food safety and profitability. One concerns how to encourage suppliers to provide true information, increase production and technological innovation competence, while the other considers how to promote sales efforts of distributors.Chapter 7, conclusions and research prospects. This final section contains implications of the research results, some recommendations, and the areas for further research.The paper may have following innovative contributions.1. Establishing the basic analytical framework of strategies and incentives mechanism for core enterprises in food safety supply chain. The existing literatures mainly concern limited coordination or incentives, and rarely cover the area of total profit and resources allocation of food supply chain from the perspective of core enterprises. In the paper, an integrated analytical framework is proposed based on a variety of relevant theoretical basis. Thus, the research is broken down into production and technology innovation strategies responsive to food safety regulations and coordination and incentives strategies for member enterprises in supply chain. Then by applying the framework, the problems of information asymmetry and interest conflicts among stakeholders of supply chain are fully discussed.2. Exploring the production and technology innovation strategies for core enterprises responsive to food safety regulations. Given the full rationality of game players (governments and enterprises) in most existing literatures about game theory, only regulation costs, fines, corporate earnings and a few other factors are considered. This study proposes the limited rationality of game players and focuses on analyzing the evolutionary game process of production and technology innovation strategies of core enterprises, and works out the specific regulatory constraints that force core enterprises to choose quality food production and technology innovation strategies. A number of other factors are taken into account in the research, such as corporate reputation costs, government support policies, and the independent level of officers, etc. Therefore, the conclusions and recommendations set forth in the paper are more realistic and feasible and may provide references for government policy making.3. Proposing and demonstrating the coordination strategies of core enterprises in food safety supply chain. In the paper, the game analysis tool is applied to discuss the coordinated pricing strategies and damage cost sharing strategies of core enterprises in food safety supply chain. Based on the cooperative strategies, Stackelberg game pricing model and Nash bargaining solution, negotiation strategies are proposed and demonstrated, which makes it possible to realize the Pareto improvement and maximize the overall profits of supply chain. By analysing and comparing the four damage cost sharing strategies, the coordinated strategies of determining a reasonable sharing coefficient for supply chain members are generated, which optimises the total profit of the supply chain and reconciles interests among diverse chain members.4. Designing the incentives mechanism of core enterprises in food safety supply chain. In the paper, the incentives theory and different methods of payment are used, and the incentives mechanism of core enterprises is worked out to effectively solve the problems of’adverse selection’and’moral hazard’arising from information asymmetry in the supply chain. Particularly, the transfer payment method and optimal control principles are adopted in designing the incentives mechanism of encouraging true information from suppliers. A linear payment approach is also used in designing the incentives mechanism of effectively stimulating the suppliers’efforts of production and technological innovation. In the existing literature, few researches cover the area of core enterprises’incentives mechanism under the coexistence of adverse selection and moral hazard. The research in the paper attempts to use the linear payment approach to design the incentives mechanism to effectively promote sales efforts of distributors and reveal their real marketing situation.The conclusions and recommendations set forth in the paper may provide theoretical and practical guide for food safety supply chain management and governments’regulation policy-making. The research results may also contribute to enrich the theory of food safety supply chain management. It is expected that some analysis and findings can provide efficient implications for promoting food safety in China and increasing consumer welfare.更多还原