中国国有企业控制权的权能配置研究

【作者】 潘清；

【导师】 何大安；

【作者基本信息】 浙江工商大学 ， 企业管理学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 在现有关于制度赖以存在的微观机制的研究中,企业控制权配置研究尚未引起学人的高度关注。本文首先沿着“技术”与“制度”这两根脉络,分别就企业性质、企业的一般模型和企业规模的动态调整及其边界的确定进行解析,认为企业是一个“技术”与“制度”的框架,具有“物质”与“社会”两重性；企业规模的动态调整及其边界的确定,是由企业之间的效率差异和资产互补性状况所决定的。国有企业具有一般企业的基本属性,在给定技术条件下,企业绩效在很大程度上取决于企业的制度安排。其次,本文在归纳现有企业控制权的各种学术观点的基础上,对现实中的企业控制权的多层次与结构化现象进行了剖析,认为企业控制权实际是为了满足控制、治理和经营管理企业的需要,对企业可支配资源和财产做出相应决策的权利。围绕这一研究主题,笔者认为不仅要从企业控制权的权利来源多样性、权利配置可分割性及权利状态依存性等方面进行分析,更要从权利功能与作用的视角对企业控制权展开探究。作为权利配置的核心,企业控制权权能在本研究中被视为基本分析单元,并通过构建企业控制权的三级权能结构,以实现与经典的公司治理理论在企业控制权配置研究上的对接。继之,本研究把企业控制权配置解说成企业控制权的权能配置,并对此概念展开了联系实际的分析。基于该解说,笔者根据权利来源、行权逻辑、权利分工、权利界区的划分及行权集中性的特征,将企业控制权视为三级权能结构的框架,在联系公司治理的内在逻辑的基础上,对控制权权能的有效分配与组合,及彼此关联、相互制衡的层级结构体系进行理论考察；在对企业控制权权能配置状态及其模式进行度量和表征的同时,应用企业生命周期与成长理论,基于企业成长的一般路径,对企业控制权权能配置的内在机理展开了分析。本文把“生产技术”与“市场条件”看成企业控制权权能配置的两个外生变量,将“股权结构”和“经营管理人力资本”看作控制权权能配置的两个内生变量。在给定“生产技术”与“市场条件”的前提下,分别就企业控制权权能配置取决于“股权结构”与“经营管理人力资本”,以及企业控制权权能配置模式由内外部机制和初始配置与动态调整相结合的复杂情形做出论证,并把该论证作为研究中国国有企业控制权权能配置的理论基础和分析依据。本文从外部市场环境、委托代理结构和企业目标效用与行为的视角,对国有企业与私有企业的差异进行分析,对国有企业控制权权能配置的现状及其存在的问题进行了描述与评价；并针对经济转型与“后赶超战略”双重约束背景下的准公共产品、自然垄断、高新技术和竞争性行业的国有企业控制权权能配置进行研究,认为不同类型的国有企业控制权的权能配置应该遵循不同的路径,其分析结论如下：1、准公共产品部门国有企业的国有持股比例与企业绩效正相关,因该类企业很难同时兼顾公益性与赢利性目标,因此,首先应从技术或产品供应主体对公益性与可竞争赢利性作出严格区分,再针对不同类型国有企业控制权权能进行最优的配置。2、自然垄断行业国有企业的第一大股东持股比例与企业绩效显著正相关,其他股权集中度与企业绩效也呈正相关关系；在其他股东构成中,法人股与机构股均与企业绩效显著正相关,自然人股与企业绩效负相关；而在高管形成机制方面,市场配置优于行政配置方式,“两职分离”将给企业绩效带来积极的正面效应。3、在高新技术产业的国有企业中,人力资本具有内生性特征,高管持股作为一种有效的激励手段,其持股比例与企业绩效显著正相关,但这种相关性关系在自然垄断行业国有企业中却不成立,这说明人力资本产权主体地位的实现是与产业特征相关联的。4、在竞争性行业,国有企业的第一大股东持股比例与企业绩效负相关,其他股东的持股比例则与企业绩效正相关。据此,我们认为上述诸种相关性关系是研究国有企业控制权权能配置的分析基点。在实证研究方面,本文结合国有经济布局与结构调整战略取向,根据产业的生产技术与市场条件的基本特征,对应上市公司的行业分类,在国有企业总样本组的基础上,将国有企业划分为自然垄断、高新技术与竞争性行业三个细分样本组,通过构建线性多元回归模型,采用最小二乘法,分别对上述样本组进行检验和考察。研究结果表明,经验分析对上述相关性关系的检验具有一定的置信度,根据这一分析结果,我们针对国有企业控制权权能配置模式的改进与优化展开了进一步的研究,并在政策建议、对策和措施方面,走向有实证研究支撑的规范性分析。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the existing micro-mechanism study for institution, the research on control rights allocation of enterprise has not yet drawn the great attention from scholar. First of all, this paper along with the two contexts of "institution" and "technology", analyses the nature of enterprise, enterprise’s general model, and the dynamic adjustment of enterprise-scale and the identification of enterprise’s boundary, and describe that enterprise is a framework of "institution" and "technology", with "material" and "social" duality; the dynamic adjustment of size and determination of the boundary of the enterprise are determined by the difference in efficiency between enterprises and asset complementarily condition. State-owned enterprises have general enterprise’s basic characteristics, in a given technical conditions, the performance of enterprise depends largely on the firm’s institutional arrangement.Secondly, on the basis of induction of the existing various academic perspectives about the research on control rights of enterprise, this paper analyzes the phenomenon of multi-level and structured of control rights of enterprise, considers that control rights of enterprise actually is a right to make the appropriate decision-making to disposable resources and property of enterprise to meet the needs of control, governance and management enterprise. Around the theme of study, the author believes that we should expand research on control rights of enterprise not only from the diversity of right sources, the divisibility of rights allocation and the dependence of right state and so on, but also from the function and effect of rights, power and function of the control right of enterprise which is as the core of the rights allocation should be the basic analysis unit of the study, and implement linking up with the classical theory of corporate governance on the study of control rights of enterprise by building three-tier power and function structure of control rights of enterprise.Then, the control rights allocation of enterprise is explained as powers and functions allocation of the enterprise’s control right in the paper, and this concept is analysed contacting with reality, based on the interpretation, author makes the control rights of enterprise as a structural framework with three-tier power and function, according to the right sources, the logic of exercise of right, division labor of rights, dipartition of the right boundary region and the concentration characteristic of exercise of rights, contacting the internal logic of corporate governance, investigates the effective distribution and composition of powers and functions of the control right and interrelated hierarchical structure. At the same time, this paper is based on the measurement of powers and functions allocation of the enterprise’s control right and characterization of its models, applying life cycle and growth theory of enterprise, investigating internal mechanism of the powers and functions allocation of the enterprise’s control right along with the general growth path of enterprise. This study make "production technology" and "market conditions" as two exogenous variables, take "ownership structure" and "management of human capital" as two endogenous variables, under the premise of given the "production technology" and "market conditions", respectively demonstrate that the powers and functions allocation of the enterprise’s control right depending on the variables of "ownership structure" and "management of human capital" and the models of powers and functions allocation of the control right depending on the variables of internal and external mechanism and initial allocation combine with the dynamic adjustment, and make this argument as theoretical foundation and basis for analysis of the study of powers and functions allocation of Chinese state-owned enterprise’s control right.Author analyzes the differences between state-owned and private enterprise respectively from three perspectives of the external market environment, agency structure and target utility and behavior of the enterprise, describes and evaluates the present situation and problems of powers and functions allocation of state-owned enterprise’s control right, and expands the research on the powers and functions allocation of state-owned enterprise’s control right in the sectors of quasi-public goods, natural monopolies, high-tech and competitive industries under the dual constraints of the economic transformation and "after-catch up strategy", and thinks that the powers and function allocations of control right of different types of state-owned enterprises should follow different paths, the analysis of the conclusions as following: 1.The proportion of state ownership of state-owned enterprises and corporate performance are positive correlated in Quasi-public goods sector, because these enterprises have difficulties in taking into account the public interest and profit goals, so we should make a strict distinction from technology or the main body of product supply between the public interest and profitability which can be competitive, then find the optimal model of the powers and functions allocation of control right to different types of state-owned enterprises.2.The proportion of the largest shareholder of state-owned enterprises and firm performance are significant positive correlated in natural monopoly industry, other ownership concentration and firm performance are also positively correlated; in the composition of the other shareholders, corporate shares and institutional shares are significantly and positively related to firm performance, it is a negative correlation between natural stocks and corporate performance; in the formation mechanism of executives, market allocation model is superior to administrative allocation mode, the separation of chairman of the board and CEO will bring about the positive performance effects to enterprise.3. The human capital of state-owned enterprises in high-tech industry has endogenous characteristic; executive ownership as an effective incentive, its proportion is significantly positively related to corporate performance, but this relativity is not set up to state-owned enterprises in natural monopoly industry, this shows that the realization of the status of human capital property rights associate with the industrial characteristics.4. In competitive industry, the largest state-owned shareholding ratio is negatively correlated with firm performan-ce, and other shareholders equity ratio is positively correlated with corporate performance. Accordingly, we believe that the relationship of the various relevant is the analysis point of the study of powers and functions allocation of state-owned enterprise’s control right.On empirical research, according to the characteristics of production technology and market conditions in industry, corresponding to industry classification of listed companies, this paper combines the strategic orientation of layout and structural adjustment of the state-owned economy further to divide it as three sub-sample groups of natural monopolies, high-tech and competitive industries on the basis of the total sample group of state-owned enterprises, by constructing multiple linear regression model, using the least squares method, we were tested and inspected the four sample groups, the results show that empirical analysis has a certain confidence level on the relationship between the relevant test, according to the analysis conclusion, we further study on improvement and optimization powers and functions allocation model of state-owned enterprise’s control right, and in the policy recommendations, strategies and measures, there is empirical support to the normative analysis.更多还原