【作者】 何保利；

【导师】 金维兴；

【作者基本信息】 西安建筑科技大学 ， 结构工程， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 过去30多年来,随着我国城市化的高速发展,在许多城市的城乡结合部出现了城市化的副产品—城中村。城中村生活着大量的以廉租房收入为生的村民,聚居着维系社会经济发展的大量廉价劳动力,还有众多的“草根阶层”—流动人口,是城市发展中的一个功能特殊、但建设问题、治安问题、环境问题异常严重的社区,迫切需要治理。对城中村的治理,过去一直是采用“严打”、“整治”之类的行政手段来进行的,既治表不治里又缺乏长效机制。对此,本文结合在深圳市进行城中村治理的工作实践,深入研究了城中村实施物业管理和政府激励下的村民自治管理模式,论证分析了城中村推行物业管理的意义、难点、对策和政府激励的必要性、合理性以及激励边界问题,为政府的有关决策提供了理论和实证依据以及具有可操作性的政策建议。1、系统分析了经济快速发展地区城中村的形成、特殊功能以及存续的必要性；基于“公地悲剧”理论对城中村建设状况的恶果进行了经济学分析,实证分析了城中村的社会管理状况及突出问题,提出了客观认识城中村的观点和对城中村进行治理的依据。基于此,提出了以城中村城市化为目标对城中村进行改造和实施物业管理的两个基本途径。研究结论表明：城中村改造并不是要“消灭”城中村或对城中村“一拆了之”；不管城中村改造进展到何种程度,对城中村实施物业管理都是必需的治理途径；城中村改造是城中村城市化的形象工程(硬件建设),而城中村实施物业管理则是营造城市化的软环境。2、基于物业管理的公共产品属性和“搭便车”现象的根源分析,研究并确认了城中村物业管理合同的有效性,揭示了城中村物业管理收费难的深层次原因,提出了以改变人的思想观念为核心的对策与策略。3、建立了城中村物业管理模式的博弈模型,通过对作为相关利益主体的政府、村集体和社会物业管理公司的博弈模型均衡分析,确认了社会物业管理公司与城中村村集体合作是最佳的城中村物业管理模式。4、基于物业管理效应的正外部性和政府职能的分析,研究并确认了政府激励城中村物业管理的必要性、合理性。研究成果表明,城中村物业管理效应的正外部性,造成了该市场领域的供给不足,难以达到帕累托最优,而只有政府激励(这种激励也能满足政府诉求)能使该外部效应内在化,从而实现物业管理市场资源的有效配置。进而,论文结合深圳市各区政府激励城中村实施物业管理政策措施的效果分析,提出了防止“政府失灵”、具有长效机制的、按有效建筑面积对城中村实施物业管理予以资金扶持的激励边界建议。此外,论文还基于建筑物区分所有权的相关政策法规分析,提出了实现城中村物业管理规范化的建议。论文的研究成果针对的是我国社会经济发展和城市化进程中的一个重大现实问题,具有重要的理论意义和应用价值。更多还原

【Abstract】 With China’s rapid development of urbanization, the byproduct-city villages have appeared at the combination area of city and country in many cities over the past 30 years. There are many villagers that live on the income of low rent housing, numerous cheap labor powers that maintain the socioeconomic development, as well as numerous "grassroots-layers" - ransient population in the city villages, which is a community with special features as well as severely serious construction problems, law and order problems and environmental problems that need governing urgently. Governance of the city villages was always conducted with the administrative means like "attacking severely", "punishing", etc. in the past, which could not solve the problem from the root and lack of long-term mechanism. Therefore, combined with the governance practice of city villages in Shenzhen City, this paper deeply studied the villager self-management mode under the property management and government incentives, demonstrated and analyzed the significance, difficulties and countermeasures of implementing property management in these areas, the necessity and rationality of government incentives, as well as the incentive border issues, and provided the relevant decision-making of government with theoretical and empirical evidences and workable policy recommendations.1. Systematically analyzed the formation, special functions as well as the necessity of existence of city villages in the areas with rapid economy development; conducted the economic analysis on the bad consequence of building city villages based on the "Tragedy of the Commons" theory, empirically analyzed the social management situation and outstanding problem of these villages, and proposed the views of objectively understanding these villages and the foundations to govern it. Therefore, this paper proposed two basic approaches to reform these villages and implement the property management aiming at urbanization of city villages. Research findings show that:reconstruction of these villages is not to "eliminate" them or "just dismantle" them; whatever degree the reconstruction of these villages progress to, it’s necessary governing measures to implement the property management; the reconstruction of city villages is the vanity project of these villages’ urbanization (hardware construction), while the implementation of property management is to create the soft environment of urbanization.2. Based on the public goods attribute of property management and the root analysis of "hitchhiking" phenomenon, this paper studied and analyzed the effectiveness of property management contract in the city villages, revealed the deep-seated reasons of hard property management fee charging, and proposed the countermeasures and strategies with the core of changing human concepts.3. It founded the game model of city villages’ property management mode, confirmed that the cooperation of community property management companies and city village is the best property management mode of village within the city through the equilibrium analysis of game model of the related stakeholders like government, village collective, and community property management companies.4. Based on the positive externalities of property management effectiveness and the analysis of government functions, it studied and affirmed necessity and rationality for government to encourage the property management of city villages. Research findings show that the positive externalities of these villages’ property management effects have resulted in insufficient supply of this market area, so it’s hard to achieve Pareto optimality. While only the government incentives (such incentives are also able to meet the demands of the government) can achieve the internalization of the external effects, thus achieving the effective allocation of resources in the property management market. Then, combined with the effect analysis for government to encourage these villages to implement property management policies and measures, this paper proposed the incentive border recommendations that prevented "government failure", owned long-term mechanism, and support the implementation of property management in villages with funds according to the effective building area.In addition, this paper also proposed the recommendations to achieve the standardization of property management in the city villages based on the analysis of relevant policies and regulations on building ownership distinction.The research findings of this paper aim at one of the important practical problems in China’s progress of socio-economic development and urbanization, thus having important theoretical significance and application value.更多还原