【作者】 丁友刚；

【导师】 宋献中；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 会计学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 本文以我国证券市场上2000-2005年间300家政府控制的上市公司高管更换决策为例,考察了政府在部分私有化政策下对国有企业“政企分开”改革目标的落实情况。研究发现,在政府控制的内部劳动力市场上,不仅高管的升迁激励与公司的经济业绩无关,而且,高管的非升迁激励与公司经济业绩的负相关关系也只是在经济业绩比较低时才比较显著。其中,作为非经济因素的高管人员政治关系却在政府的高管更换决策发挥了显著的权力自利作用。这说明,在部分私有化公司中,公司的治理决策仍然受到了政府非经济性目标的影响。进一步的研究发现,在政府控制的公司中,高管更换决策不仅没有被市场认为是一个积极的治理行为,而且也没有给股东带来积极的市场回报和财务业绩的改进。这表明,无论是从高管更换决策过程,还是从决策结果上来看,政府的干预行为都是偏离经济效益和公司价值目标的。总的说来,在部分私有化改革过程中,尽管政府希望通过全国人大的立法、党中央的决议、国务院的政策,以及相应的各种体制改革措施来减少政府干预,保障政企分开,提高国有企业的经济效率,但是从本文的实证证据上来看,政府承诺的“政企分开”改革目标并没有得到可靠的落实。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper uses the sample of 300 government-controlled listed companies in the securities market of China from 2000 to 2005 to examine whether the commitment of the government to "separate government functions from enterprise management" in partial privatization has been kept properly. According to the results of this paper, in the government-controlled internal labor market, not only the promotion of executives is not related to economic performance of the company, but also the demotion of executives is significantly related to economic performance only when the economic performance is at a comparatively low level. Meanwhile, as noneconomic foctors, the political relationships of executives are playing a significant entrenchment role in executive turnover decisions of companies. This indicates that in these partial privatized companies, the governance decisions are still intervened by the non-economic objectives of the government. This paper further finds that in government-controlled companies, the executive turnover decisions are not considered by the market as positive governance behavior, bring no positive returns for shareholders and provide no improvement in financial performances as well. It can be concluded that from the perspectives of both the decision-making processes and the consequences of executive turnover, the government intervention in enterprise management violates the objective of economic efficiency. Therefore, in partial privatization, though the government hopes to reduce government intervention, separate government functions from enterprise management, and improve the efficiency of state-owned enterprises through the legislation of National People’s Congress (NPC), the resolution of Central Committee of the Communist party of China (CCCPC), the policy of the State Council, and various institutional reforms, the empirical evidence of this paper shows that all the commitments have not been kept credibly.更多还原