【作者】 赵卿；

【导师】 刘少波；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 金融学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 随着国内固定资产投资持续高位增长,微观层面的企业“过度投资”问题逐渐成为管理层和学术界关注的热点问题。所谓“过度投资”,是指企业的投资超出或偏离了自身的能力和成长机会,投资于净现值为负的非盈利项目,从而损害企业的价值。代理问题是导致企业过度投资的重要因素之一。而公司治理就是为解决代理问题和契约的不完备性而存在的,良好的公司治理机制可以有效地约束经理人追求私利的“败德”行为。由此可见,从公司治理的视角研究企业的过度投资问题,以揭示国有控股上市公司过度投资行为发生的微观机理也就水到渠成。尽管上市公司过度投资问题的研究十分重要,但迄今为止系统性研究尚不多见,只是零散地探讨某一公司特征或者治理因素对过度投资的影响,未能形成完整适用的理论分析构架,缺乏严谨的实证研究方法和全面翔实的经验检验证据。本文立足于中国的制度背景与市场环境,率先提出了基于公司治理视角的上市公司过度投资问题研究的分析框架,并在此框架下,分析股权结构、董事会特征、经理激励、债务融资、产品市场竞争度、地区法治水平等治理机制对企业过度投资的作用机理,以我国股票市场的国有上市公司作为研究样本,检验了微观、中观和宏观三个层面公司治理机制对国有控股上市公司过度投资问题的影响。研究表明：(1)股权集中与过度投资之间存在U形关系,股权制衡没有对过度投资发挥积极作用,董事会规模与过度投资存在U形关系,独立董事对国有上市公司的过度投资程度没有产生显著影响,两职合一显著地提高了国有上市公司的过度投资程度,而国有上市公司较低的货币薪酬是引发经理过度投资的原因之一,在债务治理和过度投资之间,银行债务显著地提高了国有控股上市公司过度投资水平。(2)关于产品市场竞争与过度投资的关系,产品市场竞争越弱,国有控股上市公司过度投资问题越严重。外部竞争与公司内部治理机制之间产生了一定的交互影响。外部市场的竞争压力弱化了大股东的合谋动机,增强了独立董事监督功能和薪酬契约的激励功能,但却加重了短期债务的代理问题, (3)外部制度环境也是影响国有上市过度投资的重要因素,研究发现,对于政府控制的国有上市公司,政府干预越强,上市公司的过度投资越严重,而地区法治水平的增强会显著减少上市公司过度投资水平。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the continued growth of domestic investment in fixed asset, Micro-level enterprises "over-investment" problem has become the focus of attention of management and academic problems. The so-called "over-investment" refers that a company Invests in negative net present value of the non-profit project regardless of its own capabilities and growth opportunities, Leading to decline in enterprise value (Jensen,1976).It is agency problems that leads to over-investment enterprises(Jensen,1976,1986). Corporate governance is to solve the agency problems and Contract incompleteness. Good corporate governance can be effectively constrained managers to pursue self-interest of "moral hazard" behavior (Hart,1995; Ghose,2005;Philippon,2005).It is a corollary that the author reserchs over-investment problem from the perspective of corporate governance, to reveal Enterprise over-investment behavior of the microscopic mechanism.Studying over-investment study is important, While systematic research is still rare to date, only exploring a Characteristics of Corporations or institutions of factors on the impact of over-investment, Lacking of rigorous empirical research methods and comprehensive examination of evidence.Basing on the background of China and the market environment, The author proposeing fistly a Analysis Framework of studying the problem of over-investment on perspective of corporate governance. And in this framework, the author Analysis mechanism of Various governance mechanisms Affecting over-investment. To China’s state-owned listed companies as samples, the author tests the corporate governance of state-owned listed companies in over-investment problems from micro, meso and macro levels.The results show:(1) Ownership concentration and over-investment in U-shaped relationship; Equity balance and independent Director do not play an active role in over-investment. One of two staff significantly increased the degree of over-investment in listed companies. Low pay is One of the reasons to cause excessive investment manager. Bank debt increased significantly level of over investment of state-owned listed companies.On product market competition and over-investment relations, Weaker product market competition, Over-investment of state-owned listed companies if more serious. External competition and internal oversight mechanisms have had some interaction between the effects. Competitive pressures in external markets weakened the motivation of the majority shareholder of the conspiracy, and enhanced the oversight function of independent directors and bank loans.Also it is an important factor the external institutional environment impacts over-investment. The author found that the more government intervention, the more serious over-investment. And improving the rule of law will significantly reduce the level of over-investment companies.更多还原