【作者】 黄良杰；

【导师】 刘国常；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 会计学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 提高投资效率是公司治理一个重要研究问题。本文从公司外部治理着手,基于地方政府治理视角,对国有上市公司的非效率投资问题进行研究。我们以代理理论、契约理论、信息不对称理论及地方政府竞争等理论为指导,分析地方政府治理行为对地方国有上市公司非效率投资的影响,通过地方政府治理与地方国有企业非效率投资理论分析和实证模型构建,并以2005-2008年间的地方国有上市公司数据进行检验,得出以下几点结论：第一,在分权体制下,由于地方政府间的标尺竞争和官员晋升激励等因素影响,地方政府治理目标表现为多重性；由于地方政府之间竞争日趋激烈,以及地区间经济禀赋和地方政府利益差异的存在,地方政府治理行为对地方国有企业投资决策产生较大的影响。受地方政府治理目标的影响,地方国有企业行为目标也表现出多重性。其投资决策除了考虑资产保值增值之外,在特定情况下还要考虑地方政府治理的政治绩效实现,这种考虑很可能会对单纯的企业盈利目标产生负面影响,从而导致地方国有企业存在非效率投资行为。第二,地方政府治理行为影响地方国有上市公司非效率投资的具体路径表现在三个方面：一是通过控制权或股东地位施加影响；二是通过地方政府政策制定与执行来施加影响；三是通过行政手段来施加影响。第三,实证结果表明：地方国有上市公司普遍存在非效率投资行为,且我国地方国有上市公司在进行投资决策时,较多地考虑的是规模效应,而对投资盈利能力因素的考虑则相对较少。因为企业规模的扩大,可以增加地方国有企业在当地的战略地位,有利于地方经济增长和就业岗位增加,有利于地方政府治理目标的实现；另一方面,企业规模扩大也有利于地方国有企业管理层晋升。第四,在我国地方国有上市公司的投资中,现金流量对决策具有敏感性,可能是由于地方国有企业普遍面临预算软约束,所以对负债率的高低并不敏感。且本期投资支出与上期投资支出显著正相关,说明我国地方国有企业投资具有持续性,由于地方国有企业改制后,规模越大的企业与地方政府讨价还价能力越强,其管理者为了提升自身利益和对政治激励的追求,投资追求政治绩效的可能性更大,因此这也是导致地方国有企业非效率投资的动因。第五,实证表明：由于地方政府为了实现政治绩效而采取不适当的行政手段,我国地方国有上市公司的非效率投资与地方政府治理的这些治理行为是正相关的,地方政府治理影响与地方国有企业投资不足显著相关,而地方国有上市公司投资过度行为与地方政府治理相关性不显著。第六,由于地区间经济禀赋差异和地方政府利益差异的存在,地方政府治理影响地方国有企业非效率投资也出现区域差异,而这种差异主要表现为地方政府治理对地方国有企业投资影响的路径差异。具体差异是：在市场化进程相对落后地区,地方政府治理的行政手段是影响地方国有上市公司非效率投资的主因；在市场化进程较高的地区,地方政府治理的行政手段和地方国有上市公司治理机制均有可能导致非效率投资。更多还原

【Abstract】 To improve the efficiency of business investment is an important research issue of corporate governance. The paper started from the external corporate governance, perspective on the governance of local government, to study the inefficient investment of local state-owned listed companies. We are guided by agency theory, contract theory, asymmetric information theory and local government competition theory, Analyzed the affect of the governance of local governments to the inefficient investment of local state-owned listed companies. Through the theoretical analysis of the governance of local governments and inefficient investment of local state-owned listed companies and empirical modeling and the data of local state-owned listed company between 2005-2008, the conclusions are made as the followings:Firstly, under the decentralized system, the objective of the governance of local government is multiple as the influence of the yardstick competition among local governments and officials of promotion incentives and other factors. Due to the increasing competition of the local government as well as regional and local economic endowment and differences of interests, the governance of local governments has a greater influence on the investment decision of the local state-owned enterprises. Influenced by the objective of governance of local government, the objective of the local state-owned enterprises also demonstrates multiplicity. Their investment decisions are not only from the value maximization, in the particular circumstances, they may consider the realization of political achievements primarily, this consideration is likely to have a negative impact on simple earning goal of corporate, and leading to the emergency of inefficient investment in the state-owned enterprises. Secondly, there are three ways to for the local government to influence the inefficient investment of the state-owned listed companies. First, through the control or the influence of the majority shareholder; second, through the policy formulation and implementation of local government; third, through the administrative means.Thirdly, the demonstration indicates that inefficient investments exist universally in the local state-owned listed companies. And when our local state-owned enterprises make capital investment decision, it is the scale effect that overweighs the consideration and the investment profitability takes the second place by comparison. According to previous inference, the local state-owned enterprises might be influenced by the governance of local government and the interests of their governors, because the enlargement of the enterprise scale can strengthen the local strategic status of state-owned enterprises, promote the local economy and increase the jobs, and lead to realization of the management goal of local government. Meanwhile, the enlargement of enterprise scale is beneficial for the promotion of local state-owned enterprise management level.Forth, in investment of local state-owned listed companies, cash flow is sensitive to make the decision. That is because it is common the local state-owned enterprises encounter soft budget constraints, so they are not sensitive to the debt ratio. And the positively correlation between the current investment expenditure and the historical investment expenditure indicate that it has a sustainable growth of the investment by local state-owned listed companies. As the reformation of local state-owned enterprises, enterprises with a large scale have more power to bargain with the local government and their governors are much inclined to pursue the political achievements in order to increase their own interests and get more political encouragement, which are also the reasons why local state-owned enterprises make inefficient investments.Fifth, the empirical evidence demonstrates that the inefficient investment of our state-owned listed enterprises is positively correlated to the governance of local government, when the local government applied inappropriate administrative measures in order to achieve the political performance. The governance of local government affects significantly the insufficient investment of local state-owned listed companies and that over-investment of local state-owned listed enterprises has no significant relation with the governance of local government.Sixth, due to regional differences of economical endowments and the existence of the differences of interests of local governments, the governance of local government affects the inefficient investment of local state-owned enterprises differently, that is, the governance of local governments affects the inefficient investment of local state-owned enterprises in different ways. For example:in areas with a less developed marketization comparatively, the administrative means of local government is the main factor that influences greatly the inefficient investment of local state-owned enterprises, while in areas with a higher developed marketization, both the administrative means of local government and the governance of the local state-owned enterprises are possible to cause the inefficient investments.更多还原