【作者】 蔡赟；

【导师】 宋献中；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 会计学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 本文主要解释受过良好教育的上市公司高管人员实施财务舞弊行为(即“好人办坏事”)的发生机制,为更深入和全面认识财务选择行为提供微观基础,为监管机制创新提供指引。2000年以来,以美国安然和世通公司为典型代表的新一波上市公司财务舞弊行为甚嚣尘上,危害也在不断升级,引起世人的严重关切。欧美国家相应出台了严厉的法律措施进行应对,其经验和教训值得总结和借鉴。我国由于新兴转轨经济性质,财务制度建设和监管能力都较为有限,更容易发生财务舞弊行为,给我国稍显幼稚的资本市场的成长和发展带来危害。因此剖析上市公司财务舞弊行为的发生机制,进行有针对性的富有中国特色的财务监管制度建设,便有了重要的理论意义和现实意义。传统财务舞弊理论主要有冰山理论、三角论、“四因子(GONE)理论”、委托代理理论,这些理论大多假定行为主体理性,以舞弊收益大于舞弊成本作为舞弊行为发生的判定条件。在成本收益计算中,主要从行为主体的动机、贪婪等内因前提假定出发,再辅助以信息不对称等外因分析,得到财务舞弊的发生机制。相应的对策主要表现为严刑峻罚。这些理论分析的前提假设大多是直接给定的,没有基于微观基础的说明。在实践层面上,这些文献所倡导的以严刑峻罚为主要方向的对策思路实施成本巨大,难以有效遏制持续的舞弊行为。行为财务理论认为,行为主体存在各类认知偏差,因此难以完全理性地进行成本收益计算,出现一些系统性的行为偏差而难以自拔。特别地,行为财务理论认为在进行跨期财务选择时,行为主体在对跨期的成本收益进行贴现计算时,会表现出“短视”认知偏差。这种认知偏差会使得行为主体的时间偏好率即贴现率不再保持不变,而是短期贴现率高,长期贴现率低。与这种行为主体假设相对应的是双曲线贴现模型。本文将从高管人员的“短视”认知偏差及相应的时间偏好特征入手,剖析高管人员的长期理性与其短期受到的利益诱惑之间的矛盾,以及产生的过度舞弊这一不当行为的发生机制。本文的思想路线逻辑是,行为主体(上市公司高管人员)存在不同程度的“短视”认知偏差,在进行长期职业规划时较为理性,能够清晰判断财务舞弊的即期收益和未来成本(被抓判刑),但在进行短期实际财务报告决策时,由于受到短视认知偏差的影响,会低估财务舞弊的未来成本,过度实施不当行为,从而表现出时间不一致特征。这种理论可以逻辑一致地解释为什么初衷良好的上市公司高管人员会出现持续的财务舞弊行为。在对策方面,行为财务理论双曲线贴现模型中针对行为主体认知偏差导致的不当行为偏差,有一个很好的纠正措施——锁定,可用来为针对高管人员的认知偏差进行对策设计。本文通过对美国萨班斯法案中存在若干锁定技术机制进行揭示和借鉴,可相应提出中国上市公司财务监管的优化对策思路。本文的创新之处在于：1、在传统的成本收益分析基础之上,增加了对上市公司行为主体的认知偏差分析,拓展了理论分析维度；2、本文吸纳了行为财务理论非线性跨期贴现分析技术,克服了传统的静态分析缺陷,建立了一个动态的跨期财务报告选择行为分析框架,能够分析财务选择行为中“好人作恶(良好初衷与实际舞弊行为)”这一对典型的时间不一致矛盾；3、为监管当局对资本市场的会计监管提供了微观基础,并拓展了管制空间和管制技术创新思路。同样是为了增加当事人的舞弊成本,传统的监管政策以事后监管和惩罚为主,效果难以保证且负面作用大；本文提倡的以纠正当事人认知偏差为核心思想的锁定技术是事前监管,可有效抑制当事人舞弊动机,能取到四两拨千斤之效,且耗费的公共资源少,负外部性低。更多还原

【Abstract】 The aim of this thesis is to explain why advanced managers who have good education would carry out fraud behaviors, so as to give microfoundations to the deep understanding of the financial reporting choose and to guide the innovation of inspection mechanism design.The financial frauds in the listing corporations are unexceptional and become universal in the capital markets. Since 2000, the new fraud behaviors in the listing companies, represented by Enron Corp in USA, arouse a pubic clamor and bring about more and more serious dangers, which cause the public concern and put forward the severe challenge. American-European countries have issued the severe legal measures to reply correspondingly, its experiences and lessons are worth summarizing and drawing lessons from. Because of being new developing transition economy, our country lacks in ability in institutional improvement and supervising and is more likely to produce the behavior of practicing fraud in finance, which would do damage to the growth of China’s new-developing capital market. So it has key significance in theory and practice to analyze the producing mechanism of financial frauds in the listing companies and carry on the pointed financial supervision institutional improvement which is rich in the distinct Chinese characteristics.The theories about the analysis on financial fraud in the traditional literatures have such ones as iceberg theory, triangular theory, GONE theory and trust-agency theory. These theories largely presupposed that the behavior agents are rational and made the analysis of cost-benefit as their basic logic, in addition, they also regarded the benefit of financial fraud exceeding cost as the necessary condition. In the calculating of cost-benefit, they began with the presupposition of internal causes such as motivation and greedy of behavior agents, adding to external causes such as information asymmetry, so got the producing mechanism of financial fraud. In responding measures, they put forward the severe penalty, which frighten and hinder the fraud motivation of agents by means of severe penalty. These theories analyzed the internal and external causes of behavior agents from the extensive angles, but the analysis presupposition of these theories are mostly directly given and short of explanation with micro foundation. So it is difficult for these theories to explain the reason why these financial frauds happen one after another even after America put into effect the severe Sarbanes’ bill. In practice, the countermeasures directed to the severe penalty, put forward by these literatures, not only spend enormously in implement cost, but also can not produce prominent effect, which are hard to hinder the lasting behavior of practicing fraud.The theory of inconsistent temporal preference in the behavior economics holds that behavior agents have myopia cognition bias. This bias makes the temporal preference rate, which is discounting rate, would not remain unchanged, but high in short term and low in long term. The model corresponding to this presupposition of behavior agents is the one of hyperbola discounting. In this model, due to the asymmetry in the discounting structure, behavior agents would underestimate the future cost and over evaluate the spot return, which causes the excessive wrongdoings. The senior executives in listed corporations, as behavior agents, still have myopia bias, and there exists the typical contradict of temporal inconsistence between the good original intentions of those senior executives and their frauds. So this paper makes use of the theoretic framework of inconsistent temporal preference. Proceeding with characteristic of temporal preference of senior executives, this method analyzes the contradict between the long term ration of senior executives and interest temptation in short term as well as the function mechanism producing this wrongdoing of excessive fraud.The thinking logic in this paper is that behavior agents, the senior executives in listing corporations, have myopia cognition bias in different degrees, so when making long-term career plan, they are rational and can judge clearly the spot benefit and future cost that is caught and sentenced if they practice financial fraud, but when making decision of short term financial report, due to the effect of myopia bias, they would underestimate the future cost of financial fraud and act undue wrongdoings, which demonstrates the inconsistent temporal characteristic. This theory can in consistent logic explain why the top managements of listing corporations with good intentions would perform continue financial frauds. In countermeasures, there is a good correcting measure aiming at the wrongdoing bias resulting from the cognition bias of behavior agents in the hyperbola discounting model, this measure is commitment and can be used to design the countermeasure aiming at the cognition bias of senior executives. This paper, by means of disclosing and referring the commitment technique mechanism in the American Sarbanes’ bill, can put forward the corresponding Optimization measures for the financial supervision of China’s listing corporations.The innovation in this paper is as follows:1, Add the cognition bias analysis of behavior agents in listing companies to the traditional research of cost-benefit, which develop the theoretic span.2, Adopt the nonlinear multi-term discounting analysis technique in behavior finance theories and correct the default of traditional static analysis, build a dynamic trans-span alternate behavior analysis framework of financial report, which can analyze the typical inconsistent temporal contradict between the good initial intention and the real fraud in the financial alternate behavior. 3, Provide the micro basis for the accounting supervision of the authority in the capital market, which develop the regulation room.更多还原