【作者】 王守坤；

【导师】 王忠民；

【作者基本信息】 西北大学 ， 西方经济学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 中文摘要：对于正处于经济转型与体制转轨双重过程中的中国来讲,由各级政府充当经济与社会发展变化的初始发动机,几乎成为一个根深蒂固的思维传统。因为自1978年改革开放至今已30余年,由中国各级政府驱动改革进程仍然是绝大多数改革领域的主流推动力。这种政府作用全面体现在基础设施建设、扶持本地企业发展、吸引外来投资,甚至在改革早期阶段直接参与企业投资和管理等各个方面。可以说,中国地方政府的那种寻求一切可能的来源进行投资、采取各种手段推动地方经济的发展的热情在世界范围内都是不多见的。对于政府行为研究而言,除了法治建设、宪政改革、权力制衡等方面之外,中央与地方政府间的关系一直是政治与经济等社会科学研究的重要课题,其中最有影响力的是财政分权理论。依托现有的分权理论与经验研究文献,本文立足于对中国式分权性质的判断,从政府竞争视角来阐释中国式分权与宏观经济绩效之间的内在关联,并在认清中国地方政府间竞争关系的表现形式以及中国分权式改革得失的基础上,尝试构建一个能够将中国式分权收益与成本进行统一分析的逻辑自洽的经济学模型,以努力寻找能够使地方公共服务走向均等化的力量,从而使地方政府间的竞争均衡能够避免出现"race to bottom"式的囚徒困境状态。本文对以上问题的研究对于深刻理解中国财政体制改革的历史以及辨别未来财政体制变革的基本方向具有重要意义。为了有效达到研究目标,本文在研究过程中始终秉承了历史分析与逻辑分析相统一、理论研究与经验研究相结合的研究范式,其中,在参数估计方法选择方面,根据研究内容的具体需要使用到了广义矩估计法(GMM)、工具变量法(2SLS)等。除了以上参数估计方法之外,本文还采用了一些其他数理方法,如数值模拟、核密度估计、基尼系数以及泰尔指数指标测算等。本文所得出的关键结论有：(1)改革开放之后中国中央政府与地方政府间的分权性质更接近于分权一端,即归属于财政联邦主义理论框架。在这种框架中,地方政府的行为特征是倾向于通过经济增长竞争来尽量增加预算外收入以提升与中央政府讨价还价的力量,并实施地方保护政策追求地方财政利益最大化。同时,为了尽量较少地受到中央财政体制的限制,在财政收支安排上地方政府会倾向于减少财政收支差额比例。(2)中国中央与地方之间以及地方政府之间都存在显著的财政策略性行为。对于地方政府间的财政竞争效应而言,其策略性反应函数向右上方倾斜。具体来讲,除了在全国层面上呈现出显著的空间依赖性之外,中国东中西部省份之间存在着不同的性质的财政策略性反应,呈现出跨区差异与俱乐部效应。进一步，中国省级政府间的财政策略性行为显著表现为争夺流动性税基的税收竞争,而没有发现存在“自上而下的标尺竞争”的证据。(3)通过构建一个分权体制下地方政府资源配置的基准模型,本文刻画了地方政府依据代表性消费者效用函数对非生产性资本投入与生产性资本投入进行均衡配置的基本情形。在此基础上,通过具体设定生产函数与效用函数的经典形式,并采用数值模拟方法得出,随着生产函数曲率的下降以及地方政府公共偏好异质性的增强,伴随分权所产生的社会效用损失越来越大,即分权及其所带来的政府竞争行为负面成本也就越来越明显。依据中国改革开放以后30余年的发展现实,本文对数值模拟的结论进行了中国化解读,强调了中国式分权相伴随的社会成本,即城乡以及区域间收入差距的不断扩大、地区间的市场分割与结构趋同、地方政府的财政支出结构出现扭曲等三个方面成本对社会福利的损害。(4)在1985-1994年与1997-2006年两个时段中,中国各省份公共交通基础设施服务、公共卫生服务以及公共教育服务等三种社会公共服务提供水平虽然都在一定程度上实现了提升,但是省份间的差异却随着时间推移越来越大了。这种情形出现的原因仍然根植于独特的中国式分权体制。在认识到中央转移支付没有能够承载地方政府公共服务均等化职能的前提下,本文指出由于中央政府与中国式分权体制下利益相对独立化的地方政府之间天然存在着信息不对称、信息不完善与巨大的监督成本问题,中央政府在通过政治晋升机制对地方政府加以约束之外,也同样可能有着通过塑造并维持地方政府财政收支缺口来对其施加约束的政治考虑。从这个角度我们也可以更深刻地理解分税制改革没有涉及地方财政支出安排的内在逻辑。从政策内涵层面讲,如果说我国改革开放的前30年中央政府已经实现了对地方政府的“做对激励”,从而充分实现了中国式分权的收益,那么,在改革开放以后的第二个30年以及更远的未来,如何缓解并最终消除伴随着分权而逐渐暴露的社会成本,就成为一个亟待解决的问题。本文认为,在“做对激励”之后,现阶段中央政府在进一步“做对激励”的前提下,应该更加重视“做对协调”与“做对考核”。对于“做对协调”而言,主要是指中央政府应该逐步打破财政分权体制下的各省份既得利益,真正发挥中央政府对经济发展全局的调控与平衡职能；而对于“做对考核”而言,逐步改变对地方政府的基于GDP增长率的一元化考核机制是关键的变革环节。更多还原

【Abstract】 It is just in a dual-process of economic restructuring and transition for China. In this progress, each level of governments acts as an initial engine for economic and social development, and it almost becomes a deep-rooted thinking tradition to turn to governments for help. Since 1978, Chinese governments of all levels are the main driving force for most areas of reform during more than 30 years of reform and opening-up. We can find much evidence to reflect the important role of Chinese governments, such as local infrastructure construction, local business development and policy supporting, attracting foreign direct investment, and even directly involving in state business investment and management. It can be said that the enthusiasm of Chinese local governments to seek all possible sources for promoting GDP growth is seldom seen in the world.For the research of government behavior, scholars often refer to building the rule of law, constitutional reform, and the balance of government power and so on. Besides those above-mention aspects, the relationship between central and local governments has always been an important issue for economic or political science, and the most influential theory is fiscal decentralization. On the base of existing decentralization theories and positive literatures, this dissertation gives a basic judgment about the essence of Chinese fiscal decentralization which is characterized by the interaction of fiscal decentralization and political centralization, and then it illustrates the internal relationship between decentralization of Chinese style and its macroeconomic performance. It’s certainly very important to recognize the concrete manifestation of the remarkable interaction between Chinese local governments. This reorganization is imperative to go a step further to understand the advantages and disadvantages of Chinese decentralization. It’s a pity for me to point out that we have not a bridge to ferry from decentralization gains to decentralization losses, and there is no doubt that to build a self-consistent economic framework between decentralization gains and losses is an urgent task. This dissertation tries to do this task mentioned before initially. One purpose of establishing the self-consistent economic framework is try to find the equalization power of local public services in China, and then to avoid the prisoner’s dilemma when Chinese local governments race to bottom driving by radical economic and political competition. In a word, this dissertation will help us to understand the history and basic direction of Chinese financial reform deeply.In order to achieve research objective of this dissertation, it always insists on two research paradigms, and they are the unity of historical analysis with logical analysis and the combination of theoretical research with empirical research. What deserves to indicate specially is that this dissertation adopts some fashionable parameter estimation method nowadays, such as Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), two-stage least-squares estimation (2SLS) and so on. Apart from the above estimation methods, this dissertation also uses a number of other mathematical methods, such as numerical simulation method, kernel density estimation, the Gini coefficient calculation, Theil index calculation and so on.The key conclusions drawn from this dissertation are as follows:(1) After bring the reform and opening-up policy into force, the intrinsic relationship between Chinese central and local governments is much closer to extreme point of decentralization than the period of planning economy, at least in the public financial area. With the condition of political centralism in China, we can group this kind of decentralized relationship under the jurisdiction of fiscal federalism. This dissertation gives the judgment mentioned above after strict econometric analysis. Under this judgment, we can give a reasonable comprehension for the phenomenon as follows:In China, the local governments are always inclined to increase the proportion of extra-budget revenues through GDP growth competition, and then they will implement local protectionism to protect the interests of their own jurisdiction. At the same time, the local governments have to scale the gap between public expenditures and local revenues down, and only by this they can avoid the constraint power coming from the central transfer payments system. The ultimate purpose of local governments to do like an independent kingdom is to enhance the bargaining power with central government.(2) There exists remarkable strategic interactions between central and local governments, and what’s more, the similar strategic behaviors appear among the Chinese provincial governments. At the same time, the strategic interactions of east, middle and west regions display different characteristics, namely cross-region effect and club effect. As two manifestations of strategic fiscal interaction, tax competition and yardstick competition have different policy connotation, so this dissertation also tries to recognize the concrete manifestation of the remarkable interaction by proposing two tentative hypotheses. The empirical results show that tax competition for the fluid tax base among Chinese provincial governments is the main manifestation of fiscal interaction, and it isn’t remarkable that there exists top-down yardstick competition.(3) By constructing a benchmark model about the balanced allocation for financial resources of local governments in a decentralized institutional environment, this dissertation gives an optimal equilibrium solution when the financial resources are classified into non-productive and productive investment. On the base of the benchmark model, this dissertation sets up the classical forms of production function and utility function, and then by making use of numerical simulation, it concludes that with the declining curvature of the production function and the increasing public preference heterogeneity of local governments, social utility function will suffer more and more losses, which means that the costs brought by extravagant competition among local governments become increasingly obvious. According to the economic reality after China’s reform and opening-up policy, as well as the conclusions of numerical simulation, this dissertation stresses those social costs of Chinese fiscal decentralization, such as the income gap between urban and rural areas, the segmentation and structural similarity of regional market, and the structural distortion of local government’s fiscal expenditure.(4) This dissertation investigates the distribution characteristics of the three fundamental categories of local public services in two periods including 1985-1994 and 1997-2006, and it tells us that even though the public transport infrastructure services, public health services and public education services of Chinese provinces have achieved upgrade relatively to some extent, but the discrepancy of those three categories of local public services is increasing over time. This situation originates from the unique Chinese-style decentralization. The following question is that if the central transfer payments system of China can not able to endure the function of public services’equalization, so what is its real intention behind the scenes. According to the theory of asymmetric and imperfect information, this dissertation points out that the Chinese central government may have some kind of political consideration to tame the local governments when they need financial resources to fill in the gap between local revenue and expenditure.About the policy implication, this dissertation indicates that the Chinese central government has established an effective motivation mechanism on the local governments during the first 30 years after the reform and opening-up policy, which we call "getting the incentive right". However, the problem deserving more attention at present is to eliminate the social costs accompanied with decentralization benefits. When referring to the Chinese central government, the connotation of this problem lies in the urgency to getting the coordination right when getting the incentive right, and only by this way it can break the vested interests of each province in China. In other words, the central government of China has no choice but to bring the overall regulation into the economic development. What’s more, it has to get the assessment right if we want to rectify the structural distortion of fiscal function existing among the local governments, and the key step to do this is to change the singular assessment criterion of GDP growth to the local governments gradually.更多还原