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基于终极控制权论的上市公司股权分置改革和公司治理研究

The Study of Split-Share Structure Reform and Corporate Governance Based on Ultimate Control Right

【作者】 黄雷

【导师】 王建琼;

【作者基本信息】 西南交通大学 , 企业管理, 2010, 博士

【摘要】 由于特殊的历史原因,中国股市在成立之初就形成了非流通股和流通股两类股票同股不同价、同股不同权的股权分置现象,股权分置的存在与隐性终极控制权效应的负面应用是我国证券市场许多不规范行为的重要症结所在。股权分置导致上市公司控制股东与中小投资者的利益不一致,加上终极控制股东对公司的控制具有隐秘性和复杂性,为其关联交易、内幕交易、利润转移、掏空上市公司资产等不规范运作提供了许多的便利,股权分置的诸多弊端导致中国资本市场的发展严重滞后于经济水平的发展,并最终导致了股权分置改革的诞生。股权分置改革对上市公司控制股东的行为、上市公司自身的行为及其公司业绩和价值、投资者的利益、投资理念和行为都会产生根本性影响,因此,股权分置改革对中国证券市场的影响是长期而深远的。如何对股权分置改革过程中及股权分置改革后不同终极控制股东控制的上市公司的终极控制权结构、股权分置改革对价及其对公司价值和业绩的影响等问题进行理论和实证研究既是一个亟待解决的学术性课题,又是证券监管部门判别股权分置改革成效的一个实践性问题。本文的研究对于分析股权分置改革过程中控制股东和投资者的利益博弈,探讨股权分置改革对价对股权分置改革后上市公司业绩和公司价值,及其对中小投资者利益的保护状态,进而完善公司治理机制,促使上市公司注重长远发展和正常运作,具有重要的学术价值与现实意义。本文以股权分置改革过程中和股权分置改革程序基本完成后的上市公司为研究对象,采取理论分析与实证研究相结合,以实证研究为主线的方法,运用企业治理理论、统计学、财务管理学等相关理论原理及方法对我国上市公司股权分置改革过程中的对价支付数量、类型的影响因素及对价支付数量、控制股东类型对股权分置改革后上市公司的业绩、价值和股利分配等展开研究,主要研究内容如下:(1)针对中国上市公司股权结构传统分类方法的不足,结合中国证券市场的实际情况,对股权分置改革后中国上市公司的终极控制权和控制方式进行分类,并通过实证分析绘制出上市公司终极控制权结构图谱,在此基础上与股权分置改革前进行了比较分析;(2)股权分置改革能否顺利进行的一个重要原因在于非流通股股东与流通股股东之间就对价支付的方式和数量能否达成一致,为此,本文研究了股权分置改革过程中对价支付类型和数量的影响因素;(3)对上市公司终极控制股东类型、股权分置改革对价支付与上市公司绩效之间的关系进行了研究;(4)分析了股权分置改革后上市公司现金股利分配政策及其影响因素。

【Abstract】 Because of especial history, there is a phenomenon of the split-share structure in Chinese capital market. The split-share structure and implicit ultimate control rights are the important reason of irregularity behavior in Chinese capital market. The split-share structure resulted in the differ benefits between controlling shareholders and minority investors in listed companies. Because of the secrete character and complexity about ultimate control rights. The ultimate control rights give many advantages to ultimate control shareholders to relating exchange, low-down exchange, benefits diversion, expropriate assets of listed companies and so on. The shortcoming of split-share structure resulted in development of Chinese capital market lagged the development of economy and the split-share structure reform. The split-share structure reform bring fundamentality effects to behavior of ultimate controlling shareholders in listed companies, behavior of itself in listed companies, corporate value, benefits of investors, idea and behavior of investors, therefore, Chinese capital market will be influence by the split-share structure reform during a long time.Such as theoretical and empirical research about the relation among corporate value, consideration, ultimate control structure at different ultimate controlling shareholder of listed companies controlled is an urgent problem of academic subjects, but also a practical problem. This study has great academic value and practical significance to the analysis of the split share reform process the interests of controlling shareholders and investors Game, the relation of consideration, the performance and corporate value, and on the protection of the interests of small investors, the state, improving corporate governance to promote long-term development of listed companies and the normal operation.This article regards listed company in the split-share structure reform process and procedure fulfilled as the research object, combine with criterion study and empirical research method, taking empirical research as the thread, use such relevant theory and methods as corporate governance theory, statistics, accounting, financial engineering, etc. carry on research to the number and type of consideration, the relationship of type of ultimate controlling shareholders and corporate value and divided. The main research contents are as follows: (1)Direct against the deficiency of the traditional categorised method of the ownership structure of Chinese listed company, combine the actual conditions of Chinese securities market, classify ultimate control right and control method of the Chinese listed company, and analyse through the empirical research that draws out the ultimate control right structure atlas of listed company.(2) Whether non-circulation stock shareholder and circulation stock shareholder can reach an agreement or not, the conclusion will be an important reason that the split-share structure reform can plain sailing. So, this article study the type and quantitative of consideration in the split-share structure reform.(3)To study the relationship of the type of ultimate controlling shareholders, the type and quantitative of consideration and corporate performance in listed companies.(4)To analyze the policy of cash dividend and influence factor after the split-share structure reform.

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