【作者】 童佳；

【导师】 关忠良；

【作者基本信息】 北京交通大学 ， 管理科学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 随着我国经济体制改革的不断深化,市场经济呈现出繁荣发展趋势,以汽车工业产业政策的实施和汽车流通体制的改革为契机和机遇,我国机动车保有量逐年来不断上升,新车销售市场异常活跃,由此也带来了二手车交易市场的繁荣。然而,我国的二手车交易市场目前尚处起步阶段,有关二手车交易的体制和制度均不完善,例如,二手车交易缺乏统一标准、规范的交易模式和评估体系,以及二手车交易市场信息网络系统和先进的售后服务理念。在这种背景环境下,使得我国的二手车市场存在着严重的信息不对称问题,不仅挫伤了二手车消费者的积极性,同时也影响了二手车市场持续、稳定、快速的发展。因此,无论是站在我国汽车产业发展的角度,还是站在满足我国二手车的需求上,解决我国目前二手车市场严重信息不对称性有着重要的现实意义。本文在分析相关问题研究现状的基础上,对二手车交易风险分析所运用到的基础理论进行了综述,介绍了信息不对称理论以及逆向选择,博弈论与信息经济学的研究成果,重点详细介绍了首先利用经典二手车模型来阐述信息经济学相关问题的“柠檬市场”理论。在以上理论分析的基础上,本文主要研究了以下几个方面的问题：1.二手车交易行为风险分析。引入了二手车交易主体行为风险的概念,在分析信息不对称与二手车交易行为风险关系的基础上,指出了研究二手车交易主体行为风险的重要意义；之后建立了二手车交易行为风险评价指标体系,并运用蒙特卡罗模拟和模糊综合评价两种方法对二手车交易行为的风险指标体系进行了评价以及实证研究；同时,运用风险效应机制与效用理论对决策者风险态度与风险效应平衡之间的关系进行了重点研究,这就为信息不对称条件下管理者进行风险决策提供了理论依据。2.信息不对称理论下二手车交易各方主体行为的博弈分析。首先对二手车交易买卖双方在议价过程以及成交后的履约行为进行了博弈分析；其次,就二手车交易买方与二手车价格评估机构之间的博弈行为进行了分析。最后在二手车交易两两博弈分析的基础上,分别建立了非政府行为和政府行为(寻租行为)下,二手车买方、卖方和评估机构三者之间的行为博弈模型,通过博弈混合策略纳什均衡解,对三方之间的博弈关系进行了分析,并提出了相应治理寻租活动的措施。3.信息不对称条件下防范二手车交易风险的方法。本文根据委托代理理论,分别建立了针对道德风险和逆向选择的风险防范模型。在道德风险防范模型中进一步分析了委托代理关系中激励机制与监控机制发挥的作用,并建立了信息不对称条件下的最优激励与监控模型。在逆向选择风险防范模型中建立了信号传递模型和信息甄别模型。4.对目前国、内外GRC风险管理的研究和实施现状进行了分析,提出了将GRC风险管理理念运用于政府等相关部门参与下的二手车交易风险管理的思路。从GRC风险管理目标、组织、信息系统、方法等方面探讨了基于信息不对称的二手车交易GRC风险管理,重点介绍了解决逆向选择和道德风险的基本方法。从加强制度建议、内部合规管理、建立激励与约束机制、加强信息及信息平台建设、建立GRC风险内控管理预警机制等几个方面提出了加强二手车风险管理、化解二手车交易风险的方法和策略。论文采用了数据案例调研、理论分析、数据模型计算法、定量法和实证检验等研究方法,主要创新点体现在以下几方面：1.在二手车交易风险管理中将博弈论和信息不对称理论引入进来不仅拓宽了理论的应用领域,也进一步丰富了二手车风险管理理论；针对目前二手车风险管理大多只从客观风险研究入手这一现实情况,本文提出了二手车交易主体行为风险概念,从根本上探讨了二手车风险的本质。2.系统分析了二手车交易买方与卖方、买方与二手车评估机构、卖方与二手车评估机构之间的博弈关系,并在此基础上建立了二手车交易主体的三方行为博弈模型,通过博弈混合策略纳什均衡解,分析了三方之间的博弈关系。3.针对道德风险和逆向选择分别建立了信息不对称条件下二手车交易各方主体的最优激励与监控模型,信号传递模型和信息甄别模型,提出了二手车风险防范与化解的方法；4.将GRC内控风险管理理念运用于二手车交易风险管理当中,建立了基于信息不对称的二手车交易GRC风险内控管理系统框架。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the continuous economic mechanism reform deepened and the development of market economy, the number of Motor Vehicles has increased rapidly, which is pushed forward by the implementation of automobile Industry policies and the deepening of automobile distribution system. The growth of new vehicle sale certainly will lead to prosperous second-hand vehicle market. However, China’s second-hand vehicle market is till in the initial stage, lacking related standards, normative trade modal and evaluation system. Besides, the information network system and service concept of national second-hand vehicle trade market also need further improvement. Under this background, the information of national second-hand vehicle trade market is seriously asymmetrical, which not only dampens the enthusiasm of second-hand vehicle consumers but also impacts the sustainable, steady and rapid development of national second-hand vehicle trade market. Therefore, it is significant to solve the problems of asymmetrical information in national second-vehicle trade market from the perspective of ensuring the healthy development of China’s automobile Industry as well as from the perspective of satisfying the demand of national second-vehicle trade market.On the basis of analyzing the present situation of related problems, this paper first reviews the basic theory applied in second-hand vehicle trade risk research, including asymmetrical information theory and adverse choice, game theory and the research of information economy. This part puts emphasis on the "Lemons market theory", which explains information economy problems by classic second-hand vehicle modal. Based on the theoretical analysis above, this paper mainly investigates the following issues:First, it studies the risk of second-hand vehicle trade. After analyzing the relationship between asymmetrical information and second-hand vehicle trade behavior, it discusses the importance of researching the risk of second-hand vehicle trade subject. Then it builds the risk evaluation indicator system of second-hand vehicle trade behavior, and then evaluates the system by using Fuzzy Evaluation Method and Monte Carlo Stochastic Modeling Method and makes empirical study; meanwhile, it investigates the relationship between deciders risk attitude and risk effect balance so as to provide theoretical basis for risk decision in the situation of information asymmetry.Second, it makes game analysis on each subjects’behavior in second-hand vehicle trade from the perspective of asymmetrical information theory. It mainly examines the game behavior of buyers and sellers in negotiation and closing transactions as well as the game behavior between buyers and price evaluation agencies in second-hand vehicle trade. Then on the basis of two-two game in second-hand vehicle trade, it builds the behavior game modal among buyers, sellers and evaluation agencies, studies the game relationship among the three parties by using game mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and puts forward several measures to manage rent-seeking activities.Third, it researches the prevention of second-hand vehicle trade risk from the perspective of asymmetrical information theory. According to Principal-Agent theory, the risk prevention modal for moral risk and adverse choice is built. In moral risk prevention, it analyzes the effect of incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism on Principal-Agent relationship and builds the optimized incentive and supervision modal in the situation of asymmetrical information. In adverse choice risk prevention, it constructs signaling modal and information discrimination modal.Forth, it puts forward applying GRC risk management concept into second-hand vehicle trade risk management participated by related government sectors on the basis of analyzing the present situation of research and implementation of GRC risk management and control at home and abroad. From the perspective of GRC risk management’s aim, organization, information system and method, it explores the GRC risk management of second-hand vehicle trade based on asymmetrical information and introduces the basic method of solving adverse choice and moral risk. Finally, it brings forward the solution strategy for reinforcing second-hand vehicle risk management, including strengthening system suggestion and internal compliance management, building incentive and restraint mechanism, reinforcing information and information stage construction, establishing GRC risk internal control management pre-warning mechanism and so on.This paper makes use of various methods, such as data case research, theoretical analysis, data model algorithm, quantitative research and empirical study. The innovation of it mainly displays in the following aspects:First, it introduces game theory and asymmetrical information theory into second-hand vehicle trade risk management, which widening their application area and enriching second-hand vehicle risk management theory; considering most second-hand vehicle risk management research is carried out from the perspective of objective risk, it puts forward subject behavior risk concept of second-hand vehicle trade to explore the essence of second-hand vehicle risk.Second, it makes systematical analysis of both parties’behavior game in second-hand vehicle trade, namely, the game between buyers and sellers, buyers and second-hand vehicle evaluation agencies, sellers and second-hand vehicle evaluation agencies; on this basis, it builds the behavior game model among three subjects in second-hand vehicle trade, and analyzes the game relationship among three subjects through using game mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.Third, aimed at moral risk and adverse choice, it builds the optimized incentive and supervision modal, signaling modal and information discrimination modal for each subject in second-hand vehicle trade in the situation of asymmetrical information, and brings up a set of solution to prevent and reconcile trade risks of second-hand vehicle.Finally, it applies GRC risk management concept into second-hand vehicle trade risk management and constructs GRC risk internal management system framework for second-hand vehicle trade on the basis of asymmetrical information.更多还原