【作者】 董礼洁；

【导师】 叶必丰；

【作者基本信息】 上海交通大学 ， 宪法学与行政法学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 论文主要围绕中央政府和地方政府的权限划分问题展开研究,选取土地管理领域为研究对象,对地方政府具体的土地管理权限进行细致的界定。地方政府及其职能部门主要有以下三方面土地管理权:土地征收权、规划编制和执行权、土地使用许可权。其中,有的属于地方政府,有的依法属于相关职能部门。土地征收权由中央政府和地方政府共享。划分中央和地方政府权限的标准是被征收土地的性质和面积。从历史的角度来看,地方政府的土地征收权限正在被逐步缩减,并且这种权力的行使方式和过程已受到中央政府越来越多、越来越细的控制。土地利用总体规划的编制权属于地方政府,而审批权则属于中央政府。地方政府对其辖区内土地利用的总体安排并没有绝对的权力。土地开发整理规划的编制权和审批权都不属于地方政府。行政法规将编制权直接授予地方政府职能部门,审批权则授予相应的国务院主管部门。从法律的角度而言,地方政府职能部门行使这些权力的主要依据是行政法规或者部门规章。地方政府对此没有太多的干涉空间。土地使用许可权属于地方,但已越发部门化。地方投资主管部门、规划部门和土地管理部门基于法律和行政法规的授权分享了这一权力,而它们行使这一权力主要受中央制定的法律、行政法规、部门规章和行政规定的规制,并非由地方政府控制。地方政府的职能部门尽管是地方政府的组成部门,但由于其职权来源于法律、行政法规的直接授权,而不是来自于地方政府的授权或者委托,因而其职权行为主要受法律、行政法规的直接约束。地方政府一方面不能越位代替其职能部门行使职权,另一方面也不能违反法律规定干涉地方政府土地管理部门行使职权。从这个意义上说,地方政府土地管理部门的职权并不当然等同于地方政府的土地管理权。但在权力实际运作过程中,地方政府基于所掌控的财权和人事任免权,仍能对其职能部门的行为予以有力的制约。为此,中央进行了一系列改革。这种改革主要集中在人事任免、财政管理和监督体制上。在人事任免制度上,建立国土资源部门省级以下垂直管理体制,削弱地方政府对其职能部门的控制力。在财政体制的改革上,规范了政府财政管理体制,加强了中央对地方的财政控制,削弱了地方政府干涉部门行为的动力。在监督体制上,建立了土地督察制度,打破了行政疆域的界限,加强了对地方政府的监督。但是,这些改革的效果并不是很理想。其实,中央和地方政府间博弈的根本原因,在于已经形成的地方利益在现行的制度框架内,尤其在决策程序中还缺乏表达的途径和机会。地方利益既然不能在决策程序中有效表达,那么就会在执行程序中通过各种方式表达出来,从而导致在土地管理领域中央和地方之间的纷纷扰扰。这就要求,我国应当尽快建立地方利益的表达机制,改变权力授权方式,从地方政府部门直接负责转为地方政府的概括负责。应当说,这种变化目前正在悄悄进行,中央已越来越多地把土地管理权概括授予地方政府。更多还原

【Abstract】 This article studies the division of powers between the central government and the local government. It selects the powers of local government in land management as object. Local government and its departments have three aspects of land management powers as follows: the power of land expropriation, the power of planning and enforcement, the power of authorizing administrative license of land use. Among them, some belongs to the local government, some belongs to relative department.Local government shares the power of land expropriation with the central government. The character of the land and the acreage is the standard to divide the range of the power of central government and the local government. From the historical angle, the power of government has been curtailed step by step, moreover the way and the procedure of exertion have been already controlled more and more by the central government.The power of drafting out the master plan of land use belongs to the local government, and the power of authorizing it belongs to the central government. Therefore, local government has no absolute power to arrange the land use in its popedom. The powers of drafting out and authorizing the planning of land development and regulation don’t belong to the local government. Administrative regulation empowered the department of the local government to draft out the plan, empowered the relevant departments of State Council to authorize the plan. From the legal angel, the departments of the local government exert these powers mainly according to the administrative regulations and the department rules. Local government has no more power to intervene it.The power of authorizing administrative license of land use belongs to the local government, but it gets more and more departmentalized. On ground of the authorization of the law and the administrative regulations, the department of the local government which administers the investment, the department of the local government which administers the plan, the department of the local government which administers the land management shares in the power. They exert these powers mainly according to the law, the administrative regulations and the department rules constituted by the central government.The department of the local government is a part of the local government, but its power is from the law and the administrative regulation, instead of local government. As a result, its authority action is restricted directly by the law and the administrative regulation. One side the local government can’t substitute the department to exert the power, on the other side the local government can’t intervene it illicitly. According to this perspective, the power of the department of local government isn’t certainly equal to the power of the power of local government.But in the course of operation, local government still has strong influence on the department based on its financial power and personnel power. Therefore, the central government makes a series reforms. These reforms concentrate on the personnel system, financial system and the supervisory system. On the aspect of personnel system, it creates vertical management system under province level to weaken the influence of the local government. On the financial aspect, it normalizes the financial system of the local government and controls the local finance strongly to impair the motivation of the local government intervening the department. On the supervisory system, it creates land supervisor system to break up the administrative boundary and strengthen supervise on the local government. But the effects of all these reforms are not perfect.Actually, the ultimate reason why local government has a game of chess with the central government is that local interest which has come into being lacks of approach and opportunity to express in active system, especially in the decision-making procedure. If the local interest can’t express in the decision-making procedure, it will express by diversified ways in the practical procedure, which leads to the confusion between the central government and the loval government in land management area. This request that we should create the local interest expression system as soon as possible, change the form of authorization from responsibility by the department of local government to the local government. It should be said that these changes occur quietly. The central government empowers more and more power of land management to the local government generally.更多还原