【作者】 王君；

【导师】 孙乃纪；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 企业管理， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 本文的研究目的是探讨具有什么特征的中国企业更适合发挥股权激励的作用,从而显著提升企业的经营业绩。即在何种类型的企业下,股权激励与企业经营业绩的敏感性(相关性)更强。以往理论研究已经证明,对企业高层经理人(代理人)实施股权激励,是解决现代企业存在的委托-代理问题的有效方法。因为经理人参与企业剩余利润的分配,可实现经理人利益与企业长期利益保持一致。同时,在国内外围绕着股权激励与企业经营业绩相关性的实证研究中,也逐渐以股权激励与企业经营业绩存在止相关性的结论居多。但理论界从细分企业类型角度,进行理论与实证相结合的深入研究并不多,本文就是从这一出发点开展研究,提出处于成长期的中国民营创新型企业类型更适合采用股权激励制度,实现企业业绩显著提升的核心观点。本文在论述中紧密围绕着两条理论线索,即超产权理论和企业生命周期理论。其中超产权理论是论证民营创新型企业股权激励与经营业绩相关性的理论基础；而企业生命周期理论是进行民营创新型企业股权激励模式设计的理论依据,也是超产权理论在股权激励制度应用上的进一步理论拓展。在理论方面,根据超产权理论的观点,企业的产权结构改善和所处行业的市场竞争程度充分是企业业绩提升的先决条件。在比较充分的竞争市场环境中,企业实现产权明晰化后的劳动效率会显著提高。本文通过对企业产权结构和竞争性两种特征进行匹配,形成了中国较典型的企业类型,即民营创新型和国有传统垄断型企业。进而提出处于非国有控股产权的、产品价值中主要体现人力资本增值的、且市场竞争较充分的民营创新型企业是更适合采用股权激励的企业类型。民营创新型企业通过实施股权激励来进一步改善产权结构,能促进其经营业绩的显著提升。在实证方面,本文以2006年1月至2008年4月公布股权激励计划的A股民营创新型上市公司为样本,采用事件研究(Event Study)方法分析股权激励对股票价格的短期效应.并进行横截面分析,研究累积超常收益率与公告发布时样本公司及其股权激励计划的特征变量之间的关系,从而得出股权激励的董事会预案对股票价格和成交量的影响。同时本文通过应用Wilcoxon秩和检验方法,研究股权激励对上市公司综合能力(偿债能力、营运能力、盈利能力、投资与收益)的影响。通过上述理论和实证研究,本文充分证明了民营创新型企业比较适合通过实施股权激励来提升企业经营业绩,即中国民营创新型企业的经营业绩与股权激励存在着较强的敏感性(相关性)。在此基础上,本文又根据企业生命周期理论,结合企业不同成长阶段的特点,提出了处于成长期的民营创新型企业比生命周期其他成长阶段更适合实施长期股权激励的观点,从而又进一步拓展了超产权理论作为支撑股权激励制度的理论基础。最后,本文按照中国民营创新型企业不同的成长阶段,并参考中兴通讯、华为技术企业的股权激励的实际案例,提出了有针对性的激励模式的设计方案。同时,结合中国上市企业股权激励实践中出现的一些问题,也提出了相应解决建议。希望上述研究对推动中国最具成长性的企业类型—民营创新型企业的发展有实际的贡献。更多还原

【Abstract】 Research on the stock incentive sensitivity of the companies in China based on the beyond property-right theoryThe purpose of this research is to explore what types of companies in China are more suitable to play the role of the stock incentive to enhance the business performance of the companies.As a long-term incentive scheme for the managers and employees in the company management, the stock incentive created in the United States in 50’s of the 20th century. The first extrusion of Pfizer’s stock option plan means the stock incentive emerged actually. In 60 years from generation of the stock incentive its theory and empirical research have got broad development. The previous theoretical studies have shown that the implementation of the stock incentive for the high-level corporate managers (agents) is to solve the modern companies’ existence of principal-agent problem in an effective manner. Meanwhile, at home and abroad, most of empirical studies on the stock-based incentive and the performance-related business shown the positive correlation between the stock incentive and the corporate performance.According to the 1049 companies’ statistical data from 1974 to 1986. Jenson and Murphy’s regression analysis results show that the effects of stock incentive are greater than those short-term incentives, such as bonus and other incentives. Through the research, Kaplan and Smith pointed out that the shareholdings of the company have incentives to improve the business performance. They found that after senior managers in the company financing the acquisition, the company will significantly improve operating results. Smith also noted that the shareholdings stimulated the senior managers’motive to create more left profit of the company, thus improved the company’s operational efficiency and business performance. In empirical study abroad, there are more conclusions to support the relativity between the stock Incentives and the business performance.In 2000 Li Zengquan found that the stock incentive may help to improve the company’s performance, but most of the companies’executive’s stakes are relatively low and can not play its due role. In the same year Yuan Guoliang and Wang Huaifang had an empirical analysis of the stock incentives of the listed companies. Their research result confirmed that the relativity between the stock incentive and the company performance is not strong. In 2003 Tong Jingjun considered that the implementation of the stock incentive have some effects to improve the performance of Chinese listed companies, but less obvious. Using the meters of the comparative analysis, Mi Haixia found that the performance of the listed companies that disclose stock incentive plan were significantly better prior to the disclosure, and better than the performance of the company who did not disclose stock incentive plans In 2008. Based on the research on the high-tech Industry Ye Jianfang and Chen Xiao found that the executive’s stock has a positive impact on the companies’stock value. Overall, the domestic empirical research results show that before 2006 the conclusions to support the relativity between the senior management ownership and company performance are not strong, but after 2006 most of the conclusions to support a significant positive correlation between the two are strong. This also indicates that the internal and external conditions are changed better, like the China’s corporate governance mechanisms and the shareholding reforms. The stock incentives’effect to promote enhancing of the companies’business performance has been gradually revealed.Most previous studies of the empirical research show the conclusions that there is no obvious relativity between the senior managers structure and corporate performance, or has been released by stock incentive plan (or implementation) of listed companies and not the implementation of incentive stock options the operating results of listed companies in both comparative analysis. Our researches argue for that the previous studies are lack of solid theoretical foundation, and it is difficult to conduct further in-depth analysis. Based on this, the paper aimed to seek stock incentive inherent theoretical logic point of view, Theory of Property Rights by reference view of enterprise type of breakdown. We analyzed the implementation of stock incentive options on the appropriate type of business, and through the sampling data, we did an empirical study to prove the correctness of theoretical perspectives. In this paper, we combined with theoretical and empirical research methods on the implementation of stock incentive for company types, and proved that private innovative companies in a growth stage is more suitable to stock incentive options to promote the business performance of the companies.In theory, in 90’s of the 20th century, the Australian economist Tang Lang Thai, British economist Martin and Parker made their famous the beyond property-right theory. In 1996, Thai Tang Lang analyzed more than 80 articles on the property rights and the business performance and made major industries and companies in which the degree of competition. In 1997, the British economist Martin and Parker analyzed a variety of the UK privatized companies operating results through a large number of empirical studies, and concluded that to improve the ownership structure of the companies and to be in the full competitive industrial market is the prerequisites for enhancing company performance. In this paper, we present that the non state-owned innovative company is suitable for the stock incentives. Through implementation of the stock incentives, the non state-owned innovative companies further improve the structure of property rights to promote their business performance significantly.In the empirical context, with the data of the innovative listed companies announced the stock incentive plan from January 2006 to April 2008 in A-share market as samples, we analyze the stock incentive short-term effect on stock prices, using the event study methodology. And we also use the panel data analysis to study the relationship between the cumulative abnormal returns and the characteristics variables of the stock incentives of the sample companies when the announcement is published. After that we analyze the effects of the board of directors announced stock incentive plans to the stock prices and trading volume. We also analyze the effect of the stock incentives to the comprehensive ability of listed companies. Through the theoretical and empirical research, this paper has fully proved that the non state-owned innovative companies are more suitable for the stock incentives to improve business performance.Under the corporate life cycle theory, we put forward the point of view that the non state-owned innovative companies at the growth stage are more suitable for the stock incentives, thus expanding further the super-property rights theory as the theoretical support of the stock incentive scheme.Finally, according to the different stages of growth of the non state-owned innovative companies and Combining with the actual situation of ZTE and Huawei Technologies’stock incentive and the experience of Microsoft’s stock incentive, we proposed the incentive model. And hope that the above study on the promotion of development of the non state-owned innovative companies-China’s most-growth businesses types can have a real contribution.更多还原