【作者】 李新武；

【导师】 王丽萍；

【作者基本信息】 华北电力大学（北京） ， 管理科学与工程， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 我国部分区域普遍存在经济发展水平不高、省间发展不平衡、省间经济差异较大的问题。在区域电力市场建设中,该问题将引起区域内省际失衡、省间分配不公平和社会整体福利损失,不利于调动相关省参与区域电力市场的积极性和区域经济社会的均衡、协调发展。本文基于经济学原理和电力市场基本理论,全面分析我国区域经济发展水平及其省间差异问题,提出基于经济发展水平及其省间差异的区域电力市场机制。取得如下主要成果：(1)评价了经济发展水平及其省间差异。以省为节点,分别从电力供给和需求两个方面进行了评价：一方面,基于成本分析法,以单位发电成本作为指标,评价了发电成本及其省间差异；另一方面,基于“投入-产出”原理的“电力费用-生产成本”分析法和BP神经网络技术,分别评价了工业和居民生活用电的电价承受能力及其省间差异。(2)分析了我国区域电力市场建设的相关问题。针对我国区域电力市场建设的现状和问题,描述了建设思路、基本原则和“路线图”,建议采取培育多元化市场主体、健全法律法规体系、转变政府职能和完善技术支持系统等对策。(3)提出了区域电力市场调节新机制。基于福利经济学和差异性电力租金理论,运用“庇古税”方案的“税收-补贴”措施对区域电力市场进行调节和修正,并分别以发电侧竞争和批发竞争两种市场模式为案例,分别建立了采取市场调节措施前后的单时段竞价上网和市场交易模型,实现了市场主体之间的“省间”公平竞争,解决了市场失灵问题。(4)提出了区域电力市场电价新机制。将经济发展水平及其省间差异的评价结果作为影响因素纳入电价制定和形成过程：一是上网电价。发电机组被征税后,税收“内部化”为机组发电成本,实现了对发电成本的“省间”折扣；二是销售电价。电网公司(或供电企业)获得补贴后,需要履行的第一项义务就是制定基于用户电价承受能力的销售电价。因此,本文以省为节点,建立了基于用户电价承受能力及其省间差异的销售电价模型,提高了电网公司(或供电企业)利润、用户效用和社会整体福利。(5)提出了区域电力市场监管新机制。电力监管机构在做好电力市场常规监管工作时,还需要运用“庇古税”方案,建立区域电力平等基金的税收和补贴机制。向低成本省的发电机组征税,向低电价承受能力省的电网公司(或供电企业)提供补贴,获得补贴后,其需要履行的第二项义务就是开展电力普遍服务。因此,本文基于机制设计理论,结合电力普遍服务的公共物品特性和信息不对称性,从电力监管机构的角度出发,考虑个人理性和激励相容约束条件,建立了一种激励相容的电力普遍服务实现机制,实现了对电网公司(或供电企业)的成本补偿和经济激励,克服了单纯成本补偿机制的激励力度不足问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 In some regions of China, there widely exist some disadvantages such as the low level of economic development, the imbalances and the different levels of the inter-provincial economic development. In the construction of regional electricity market, these problems would cause issues:the inter-provincial imbalance, inequitable distribution and the whole social welfare losses, which cannot mobilize the enthusiasm of the relevant provinces for participating into the regional electricity market and are unfavorable for inter-provincial and regional economic-social equality and coordinative development. Based on economic principles and the fundamental theory of the electricity market, this paper roundly analyzes the issues of the economic development level and the inter-provincial differences, it also establishes the regional electricity market mechanism based on the economic development level and the inter-provincial differences. Main results obtained as follows:(1) Evaluating the regional economic development levels and inter-provincial differences. Supposing the province as a node, this paper evaluates two aspects of power supply and demand:On the one hand, based on cost analysis, taking the unit cost of power generation as an index, it assesses the power cost and the differences between provinces. On the other hand, it evaluates respectively the price affordability and the inter-provincial differences of the industrial electricity consumers on the basis of "input-output" principle, "electricity costs-the cost of production" analysis and the residential ones using BP neural network technology.(2) Analyzing the issues of China’s regional electricity market construction. Based on the status and existing problems of China’s regional electricity market, this paper describes the ideas, basic principles, and the "road map", and puts forward some countermeasures, such as cultivating diverse market players, perfecting a sound legal system, transformating government functions and improving the technical support system.(3) Proposing a new adjustment mechanism in the regional electricity market. Based on welfare economics and the different power rent theory, this paper applies the "tax-subsidies" measures of "Pigou tax" program to adjust and amend the regional electricity market, sets samples of two modes of the generation-side competition and the wholesale one, and establishes the single-period bidding and electricity transaction models before and after the market regulation measures which can achieve the "inter-provincial" level playing field between market players, and solve the problem of market failure.(4) Proposing a new pricing mechanism in the regional electricity market. This paper makes the evaluated result of the economic development level and the inter-provincial differences as the impact factors and takes them into the price development and formation process:One is the internet price. After taxing in the generating units, it internalizes the taxes as the unit cost of power generation, and realizes the "inter-provincial" discount of the electricity cost; the other is the sales price. The grid corporations (or the power supply enterprises) with subsidies need to fulfill the first obligation of sales price by based on the consumers’price affordability. Taking the province as a node, this paper establishes the sales price model based on electricity consumers’price affordability and its inter-provincial differences, which improves the grid corporations’(or the power supply enterprises’) profits, the overall user’s utility and the social welfare.(5) Proposing a new regulatory mechanism in the regional electricity market. When the electricity regulatory agency does the regular monitoring work in the electricity market, it also needs to apply the "Pigou tax" program to establish taxation and subsidy mechanisms of the regional electricity equal fund:imposes tax from generating units in the low-cost province, and provides subsidies to the grid corporations (or the power supply enterprises) in low-price-affordable province, and the grid corporations (or the power supply enterprises) need to fulfill the second obligation of implementation of the universal service after obtaining subsidies. Based on the mechanism design theory, combined the universal service characteristics of public goods and information asymmetry, taking the perspective of electricity regulatory agency into account, and considering the two constraints of individual rationality and incentive compatibility, this paper proposes an incentive-compatible mechanism of an electricity universal service which realizes the cost of compensation and economic incentives to the grid corporations (or the power supply enterprises) and overcomes the problem of inadequate incentives of the pure cost compensation mechanism.更多还原