【作者】 高培涛；

【导师】 杨蕙馨；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 企业管理， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 机构投资者参与公司治理并不是机构投资者的本质属性,而是其发展到一定阶段的产物,肇始于20世纪八、九十年代美国以CALPERS(美国加州公共雇员退休基金)为代表的机构股东积极主义运动。随后,机构投资者作为一种公司治理创新被世界很多国家所借鉴用以改善原有公司治理体系中的缺陷,这不仅包括一些老牌的发达国家,如日本以及许多欧洲大陆法系国家,还随着全球资本市场自由化程度的加深在新兴市场得到推广。从世界公司治理的实践看,机构投资者参与公司治理的范围从最初的代理投票、股东建议等方式逐渐发展到对资本市场环境的改善、促进公司控制权的争夺等方面,领域非常广泛。在比较、分析不同公司治理模式变迁的基础上,本研究提出了机构投资者参与公司治理的一般模型,认为机构投资者参与公司治理是在制度适应下对监督成本与收益比较的结果：机构投资者的策略行为选择首先是对其所处制度环境的一种适应,在既定的制度约束下,机构投资者能否积极参与公司治理取决于其对监督成本和收益的比较,而监督成本和收益的大小视机构股权的影响力而定。由于机构股权的影响力既可能来自市场上的机构整体,也可能来自某些较大型的机构或机构联合,因此可以把这种影响力归结为机构投资者的“综合博弈能力”：既有机构总体同公司“内部人”的博弈,也有大型机构同中小型机构和个人投资者的博弈甚至机构同政府的博弈等。由于资本市场是机构投资者发挥作用的平台,而机构投资者作为资本市场上的重要主体往往也受到很多法律制度(如公司法、金融法等)的约束,所以在影响机构参与公司治理的外部环境中,资本市场和法律制度是最主要的。在公司治理问题上,机构投资者与资本市场往往具有相互促进的关系：资本市场越成熟,机构投资者越倾向于长期投资和价值投资,越倾向于对公司治理的参与；而机构投资者的发展也会通过交易或治理行为对资本市场的功效产生重要影响,如通过“信息传递”减轻上市公司和外部投资者的信息不对称、优化投资者结构、诱导中小投资者的长期投资和价值投资理念等。由于我国资本市场发展的历史还较短,处于无效或弱式有效阶段,许多制度缺陷尚待完善,这给机构投资者功能的发挥带来了不小的负面影响,如明显的“噪声交易”以及市场操纵等。法律制度是否配套也是影响机构投资者参与公司治理积极性的重要因素,这不仅体现在法律对机构入市规模、持股比例以及行为方式的管制等方面,还体现在资本市场相关交易制度的完善以及法律对股东权利的保护等方面。尽管我国政府大力倡导发展机构投资者,重视机构投资者的作用,但是,在相关的制度供给方面还有很多工作要做。代理问题是公司治理的逻辑起点。虽然我国股权分置改革已经完成,但是上市公司股权较为集中、控股股东大量存在的现象短时间难以改变,代理问题仍然较为复杂和严重：既有控股股东对中小股东掠夺的代理冲突,也有国有上市公司中的“内部人控制”问题。针对大股东的“掠夺”行为,机构投资者作为众多分散中小投资者的集合和代表,随着其持股份额的增加,可以改变上市公司的股权结构,利用其股权影响力对控股股东进行“制衡”；而对于国有上市公司中的“内部人控制”问题,随着国有股减持的逐步推进以及机构持股份额的相应增加,拥有明晰产权的机构投资者可以在国有股东“缺位”的情况下进行“补位”,以实现对“内部人”的监督和控制。在理论分析的基础上,本研究通过实证研究发现：第一,从机构持股特征对高管报酬的回归结果来看,机构投资者的持股权重不仅显著降低了高管报酬的绝对水平,而且显著增强了高管报酬对公司绩效的敏感性；机构持股差异度、集中度显著降低了高管报酬的绝对水平,但减弱了其对公司绩效的敏感性,这意味着大型机构投资者由于限制了高管报酬的绝对水平而使其波动维持在一个较小的范围内；从机构投资者整体来看,其总体持股比例、持股家数以及前五大机构的持股比例都显著促进了高管报酬水平的上升,同时也显著增强了高管报酬对绩效的敏感性,这说明机构总体持股有助于上市公司高管报酬水平的提高,但这种提高要以公司绩效水平的上升为前提。从机构持股的不同特征对高管报酬作用的效果来看,机构的持股权重要大于其持股集中度、差异度,而持股集中度和差异度要大于其总体持股水平,这种顺序在一定程度上体现了不同持股特征涉及的机构投资者利益大小问题,同时也说明机构投资者对上市公司的监督是基于对监督成本和收益比较的结果。第二,从机构投资者类型对高管报酬的回归结果来看,前五大积极型机构中证券投资基金的持股集中度显著抑制了高管报酬水平的上升,其持股比例显著增强了高管报酬对公司绩效的敏感性以及高管报酬水平的上升；社保基金的持股集中度显著抑制了高管报酬水平的上升；QFⅡ的持股比例和持股集中度显著增强了高管报酬对公司绩效的敏感性,其持股比例显著促进了高管报酬水平的上升。这一方面说明积极型机构的持股集中度更有利于抑制高管报酬水平的上升,持股比例更有利于增强高管报酬对公司绩效的敏感性而不利于对高管报酬水平的抑制,另一方面说明积极型机构投资者,特别是证券投资基金和QFⅡ确实对我国上市公司的高管报酬起到了有效的监督作用。前五大消极型机构中信托公司的持股集中度显著促进了高管报酬水平的上升,券商的持股比例降低了高管报酬-绩效的敏感性,说明它们为维护其与公司的商业利益关系而与公司管理者保持一致的立场；保险公司的持股集中度显著抑制了高管水平的上升,说明其在一定程度上发挥了积极型机构投资者的作用。第三,从机构投资者对关联交易的实证结果来看,机构投资者的整体持股比例、持股家数与关联交易呈现显著的负相关关系,而体现机构投资者之间博弈状态的持股集中度和差异度不仅没有抑制、反而显著提高了上市公司的关联交易水平。这一方面说明,相对于中小股东来说,大型机构投资者虽然具有监督上市公司的成本优势和动力,但与强大的控股股东相比,较小的股权力量使其在“发言”无效的情况下,转而与控股股东保持一致,从而不仅没有有效地监督、反而支持了控股股东的关联交易行为；另一方面说明,虽然少数大型机构投资者目前很难与控股股东相抗衡,但在受到控股股东的利益侵占时,机构投资者更倾向于运用整体的力量对控股股东进行制衡,从而获得比单个或少数机构投资者单独行动更好的效果。另外,机构投资者对控股股东的制衡度未能显著地抑制上市公司的关联交易,说明机构投资者与控股股东的股权力量对比还存在很大的差距,机构投资者要想有效地发挥其“制衡”功能,就需要在政府的支持下,逐渐改变它们同控股股东不利的股权对比状况。第四,从机构投资者对国有和非国有控股公司关联交易的回归结果看,机构投资者作为一个整体显著降低了非国有控股公司的关联交易水平,但对国有控股公司关联交易水平的抑制作用较小。这说明,在我国国有股权较为集中、政府干预较重的公司里,国有上市公司的代理问题比非国有上市公司的代理问题更严重,而这也减弱了机构投资者有效制衡国有大股东(及其代表)代理行为的能力。同样,单个或少数大型机构投资者的存在对国有或非国有控股公司的关联交易也都没有产生显著的影响。第五,从机构持股与公司价值的实证研究结果来看,我国的机构投资者基本上都承担了一种“交易者”的角色,奉行基于“价值发现”、以短期业绩为导向的投资模式,代表上市公司长期价值投资行为的研发支出并没有显著影响机构投资者的投资水平。此外,机构投资者的短期导向在一定程度上促进了公司决策者进行盈余管理的动机,其持股水平显著增强了公司的短期绩效,而本文的实证结果表明,虽然各种机构持股变量与都与研发支出水平呈正相关,但没有通过显著性检验,这应该与我国资本市场不成熟(比如“政策市”的特点以及长期单边做多的交易制度缺陷很难使股价反映上市公司的真实价值等)有很大关系。本研究的创新点可以归结为以下三点：第一,提出了机构投资者参与公司治理除了受外部治理环境及其总体持股规模影响外,还受持股集中度、持股差异度、持股稳定性以及机构类型等因素的影响,这些因素反映了机构投资者在参与公司治理方面与不同利益相关者(如公司“内部人”、机构投资者之间、机构与中小股东以及政府等)的博弈状态和能力,并将其归纳为机构投资者的“综合博弈能力”。第二,针对我国上市公司的代理问题,本研究提出我国机构投资者的治理功能应是对控股股东的“制衡”以及对国有股东进行“补位”以实现对“内部人控制”的监督,弥补了国外同类研究主要关注机构投资者对管理者的监督作用,而对第二类代理问题(即大股东对中小股东的利益侵占)研究较少的不足。第三,通过增加新的解释变量(机构持股集中度、持股差异度以及机构对控股股东的制衡等),并对机构投资者进行功能分类,扩展并改善了机构投资者参与公司治理的实证模型,克服了仅以机构总体持股作为解释变量,将机构投资者同质化的缺陷；同时,以体现公司长期价值投资行为的研发支出作为因变量,研究了我国机构投资者的“价值发现”和“价值创造”功能,克服了机构持股与短期绩效指标之间可能存在的内生性。更多还原

【Abstract】 Institutional investors would participate in corporate governance only after they had developed to a certain stage, which started from "Institutional Activism" represented by CALPERS from1980s to1990s. As a kind of mechanism innovation in corporate governance, institutional investor was subsequently drawn lessons by many countries to perfect the original corporate governance system, which include Japanese, Europe continents and many emerging-market countries. In practice, institutional investor’s intervention in corporate governance has a large range all over the world, from proxy voting, shareholder proposals, and private negotiations to improving the environment of the capital market, initiating takeover, etc.A conceptual framework of institutional investor’s intervention in corporate governance was built after comparing the vicissitude of different corporate governance models. The conceptual model implies that it is a result for institutional investor to decide whether to participate in corporate governance or not by comparing monitoring benefits and costs. According to "rational person" hypothesis, institutional investor must adapt to the institutional environments which it lives in first, and then it will compare the monitoring benefits and costs based on the established institutional constraint. However, the monitoring benefits and costs are determined by institutional investor’s influence of shareholding. Institutional investor’s influence may come from the entirety, large institutional investor or institutional coalition, so it can be seemed as "synthetic game ability".Capital market and laws are the most important factors in outside environments which affect institutional investor’s intervention in corporate governance. As an exchange platform, capital market’s developing level will influence institutional investor’s function. The more mature capital market is, the better institutional investor will develop and function. In turn, institutional investor’s development will promote capital market’s function by stock exchange and corporate governance. For example, institutional investor can improve the market’s efficiency by "information transmission", mitigating "information asymmetry" between investors and corporations. Chinese capital market has a short history with many imperfect regulations, which has a great deal of negative influence on institutional investor, such as "noisy transaction", manipulation of market, etc. Besides, institutional investor is restricted by laws and regulations very much. For example, laws will limit institutional investor’s developing scale, shareholding proportion and transaction activities. Institutional investor’s governance function is also influenced by transaction regulation, shareholder protection, etc. The legal system is still imperfect in china, and the government has a lot of work to do in regulation provision.The aim of corporate governance is to resolve "agency problem". Although nontradable shares reform has been finished in China, the equity concentration of listed companies is very high, and controlling shareholders exist commonly. The agency problems are very serious in Chinese listed companies, which include not only controlling shareholder’s tunneling, but also "insider controlling" in state-controlled listed companies. As representative of dispersing small and medium investors, institutional investors can change the equity structure of listed companies with enlargement of their shareholdings, which means that institutional investors own "balancing" ability to controlling shareholders only if they have enough shareholdings. To resolve the agency problem of "insider controlling", institutional investors can replace the state to monitor the "insiders" when they get more and more shareholdings, which will be possible in the process of SOEs reform and institutional investor’s development.The main research results are shown below after the empirical analysis:First, institutional investor’s investing weight has a significant negative impact on executive pay and positive impact on sensitivity of pay to performance. Shareholding concentration and difference have a significant impact on both executive pay and the sensitivity. Institutional investor entirety has a significant positive impact on both executive pay and the sensitivity. In the light of monitoring effect, investing weight is greater than shareholding concentration and difference, shareholding concentration and difference are greater than the entirety. This kind of sequence reflects the size of institutional investor’s benefit which determines the monitoring impetus and capability.Second, the shareholding concentration of investment fund has a significant negative impact on executive pay; shareholding difference has a positive impact both on executive pay and sensitivity of pay to performance. Shareholding concentration of social security fund has a negative impact on executive pay. Shareholding and concentration of QFII have a significant positive impact on the sensitivity, but its shareholding has a positive impact on executive pay. Shareholding concentration of trust company has a positive impact on executive pay. Shareholding proportion of securities company has a negative impact on the sensitivity. Shareholding concentration of insurance company has a negative impact on executive pay.Third, institutional investor entirety has a significant negative impact on related-party transaction (RPT). Shareholding concentration and difference have a significant positive impact on RPT. These conclusions indicate that minority large institutional investors can’t balance the controlling shareholders effectively because of their weaker stock-share power. When their benefits are tunneled by the controlling shareholders, institutional investors will resist as an entirety.Fourth, institutional investor entirety has a more significant negative impact on non state-controlled companies than state-controlled companies. This indicates that state-controlled companies restrain institutional investor’s governance function because of more serious agency problem than non state-controlled companies.Fifth, ROE has a significant impact on institutional investor’s investment portfolio, but R&D expense hasn’t. R & D expense doesn’t improve institutional investor’s shareholding. These indicate that institutional investors only play a role of "trade" based on short performance in our country, which may be caused by immature capital market and regulation environments.The innovation of this research include there points which are listed below:First, make a detailed analysis on the influence factor of institutional investor’s intervention in corporate governance, taking shareholding concentration, shareholding difference, investing weight and institutional investor type into account except outside environment, institutional investor entirety. These influence factors reflect institutional investor’s game ability with different stakeholders, such as other institutional investors, small investors, corporate insiders and the government, so we name it "synthetic game ability".Second, make a theoretical analysis on institutional investor’s governance function in accordance with the agency problems in the listed companies of our country, which can be generalized as "balancing" the controlling shareholders and "replacing" the state-controlling shareholders to monitor "insiders". The analysis remedies the research deficiency on the second agency problem, namely controlling shareholder’s tunneling at the expense of smaller shareholders.Third, perfect the empirical analysis models by adding to new explanatory variables (such as shareholding concentration, shareholding difference, etc) and by classifying the institutional investors according to their function, which overcomes the shortcoming of homogenizing all the institutional investors in past research. Besides, the research makes an empirical analysis on institutional investor’s function of "value finding" and "value creation" by introducing a new independent variable, R&D expense, which overcomes endogeneity between institutional shareholding and short performance.更多还原