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中国电力产业行政垄断及其效率影响分析

An Analysis on Administrative Monopoly of Chinese Electricity Industry and Its Influence on Efficiency

【作者】 杨淑云

【导师】 于良春;

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 , 国民经济学, 2010, 博士

【摘要】 电力产业是国民经济的重要基础产业,对整个国民经济的发展起着强大的支撑和辐射作用,自从我国改革开放以来,特别是近十几年来,我国对传统上垂直一体化垄断经营的电力产业采取了一系列的市场化改革,也取得了一定成效,但是政府垄断经营的基本格局和长期存在的低效率问题并没有从根本上改观,市场作为配置资源的基础性地位远未建立,市场配置资源的基础性作用远未得到发挥,中国电力产业行政垄断包括行业性行政垄断和地区性行政垄断,二者彼此交错,对电力市场形成条块分割的行政垄断格局,对资源配置效率产生严重的危害。正确认识、客观分析中国电力产业存在的症结和问题并提出正确的改革方向,不仅关系到整个电力产业的健康发展,而且对整个国家的国民经济运行息息相关。基于上述背景,文章采用微观经济学、规制经济学和产业经济学的研究方法和判断标准,对当前我国电力产业的行政垄断及其效率影响进行了较为系统的分析和实证研究,并在研究结论的基础上提出相应的政策建议。从具体的研究内容来看,本文包括七章。第一章是导论,提出选题的背景、研究的理论意义和现实意义,对相关文献进行了梳理,并介绍了文章的研究方法、主要内容和创新点。第二章是中国电力产业行政垄断测度指标体系。在理论分析的基础上,介绍了中国电力产业行政垄断ISCP三级评价指标体系的构建。根据第二章的指标体系,本文在第三章对中国电力产业行政垄断进行了测度,得出如下结论:一是中国电力产业呈现明显的行政垄断特征,中国电力产业的垄断本质上是行政垄断。二是中国电力产业不同的环节行政垄断表现和程度不同。发电环节的行政垄断表现为行业性行政垄断与地区性行政垄断交织并存,行业性行政垄断具体表现为发电项目审批制下的国有产权寡头垄断以及电价审批制下的电价行政垄断,地区性行政垄断具体表现为地方保护导致的“省间壁垒”。输电、配电环节具有自然垄断性质,同时存在行政垄断,行政垄断与自然垄断交织在一起,表现为电力专营制度下行业性行政垄断,具体表现为输电和配电专营制度下的国有产权完全垄断以及电价审批制下的电价行政垄断。我国售电环节技术上不具有自然垄断性,是电力专营制度下行业性行政垄断,具体表现为以国有产权为主体的完全垄断以及电价审批制下的电价行政垄断。相对于输电、配电和售电环节,发电环节的行业性行政垄断程度较弱,而输电、配电和售电环节维持着高度的行政垄断。三是我国电力产业行政垄断程度在动态演变,随着市场化改革逐步深化,发电环节的行政垄断程度朝向减弱的方向演化,而输电、配电和售电环节一直维持高度的行政垄断。文章第四章是中国电力产业行政垄断对效率影响的理论分析。中国电力产业行政垄断通过制度性进入壁垒造成中国电力产业各环节因国有产权比重过高形成的低度竞争的政府完全垄断市场,对电力产业微观层面、产业层面和宏观层面效率产生负面影响,导致效率低下。接下来第五、六章是中国电力产业行政垄断对效率影响的实证研究。第五章实证研究了中国电力产业行政垄断在微观层面、产业层面和宏观层面上对效率的影响。研究显示,从微观层面来看,行政垄断下的电力企业经营无效率,冗员严重,发电企业获得了超额利润,电网企业的盈利能力低下。从产业层面来看,电力产业由于行政垄断造成的产业效率损失是非常大的,从2001年到2006产业效率损失分别占当年GDP比重的2.48%—3.74%之间。从宏观层面来看,行政垄断造成电价涨幅高;电力产业职工工资和福利收入水平长期高于社会平均水平,造成社会收入分配不公平;电力产业投资结构扭曲,电网建设滞后,水电发展滞后,而同时火电又盲目发展,投资资源配置无效率,资本配置效率低下;电力产业内能源效率低下;电力资源配置效率低下;电力短缺给国民经济造成巨大损失;从动态效率来看,电力产业创新和技术进步速度缓慢,动态效率低下。得出的结论是,经济转轨时期,电力产业行政垄断对微观层面、产业层面和宏观层面效率产生负面影响,导致效率低下。第六章实证研究了行政垄断电价对中国地区能源效率的影响。研究发现,电力产业行政垄断电价及由地区性行政垄断导致的电力产业地方保护和“省间壁垒”是导致地区能源效率差异的重要原因,行政垄断阻碍了电力资源在地区间的优化配置。最后,在政策研究方面,文章认为行政垄断是造成电力产业资源配置效率低下的制度性原因,行政垄断不仅以牺牲电力产业微观效率和产业效率为代价,而且长远来看,不利于整个国民经济的持续健康发展。要打破行政垄断,在减少政府干预、规范监管权力的同时,需要深化电力产业的市场化改革和制度创新,具体政策建议如下:1、为打破电力产业的地区性行政垄断,迫切需要推进售电环节的市场化改革,放开售电环节的市场准入、实现售电环节的市场化是打破电力产业地区性行政垄断的关键。阻碍电力资源跨省跨区优化配置的制度性因素是地区性行政垄断,这是通过电网企业对售电权的垄断来实现的,推进售电环节的市场化改革,实现零售竞争,使得电力消费者可以自由选择售电商和发电企业,电力产业的地区性行政垄断也就失去了生存的土壤。具体措施如大力促进“大用户直购电”的推广,降低“直购电”门槛等等。2、尽快推行售电环节和输电、配电环节分开的市场化改革,确定输电、配电电价形成机制,这是实现售电市场公平竞争的前提和保证。3、深化上网电价市场化改革,逐步消除上网电价中水电对火电的补贴,促进水电和火电“同网同价”,“同质同价”,甚至“优质优价”,以促进水电的开发和水电产业的发展。4、打破行政定价,推行终端销售电价的市场化改革,逐步消除终端销售电价中工业对居民的交叉补贴,以提高电力资源配置效率。5、放松民营资本在电力产业各环节的市场准入,促进投资主体和产权多元化,以提高投资效率和解决资金不足问题。特别是对民营资本放开输电和配电环节的投资,以促进电网发展,实现更大范围的电力资源优化配置。6、在自然垄断环节,可以引入间接竞争(competition for markets,对市场的竞争)和激励性规制,如标尺竞争、特许投标、价格(或收益)上限规制等,切断企业的成本和收益的直接联系,给各个经济主体提高效率的激励,世界上其他国家的改革经验已经表明,组合使用这些激励性规制工具并随时间适当调整可以取得较好的产业绩效。7、从产权结构入手,引入现代企业制度,通过对国有电力企业实行股份制改造,形成有效的公司治理结构,使国有电力企业成为适应市场经济的现代企业。按照建立现代企业制度“产权明晰、权责明确、政企分开、管理科学”的要求,使之真正成为治理结构完善、运行机制健全、经营目标明确、财务状况良好、具有较强国际竞争力的市场竞争的主体,提高其效率。8、加强和完善电力监管委员会的职能,增强其权威与独立性,使其成为真正的意义上的电力规制机构。

【Abstract】 The electric power industry is an important basis for the national economy and is playing a powerful role in propping up and radiation to development of the entire national economy since China’s reform and opening up, especially the recent 10 years,, Chinese government has adopted a series of market-oriented reform measures to reformThe traditionally vertically integrated monopoly electricity industry,and has achieved some success, but the basic pattern of government administrative monopoly and long-standing problem of low efficiency had not fundamentally changed, the role of market allocation of resources is far from being brought into play so far. Analysis the question objectively and proposing correct reform policies of electric power industry, arae both important to the healthy work of the electric power industry and the entire economical system. This paper attempts to use the economic methodology and economic judgment to analyse the administrative monopoly of China’s electric power industry theoretically and emprically, and proposes the policies of anti-administrative monopoly of electric power industry in China in the transition economy on the basis of research.Firstly, in the aspect of measurement, this paper defines the concept of administrative monopoly in the electric power industry, and adopts the ISCP index system to assess the degree of administrative monopoly in China’s electric power industry based on electric power industry’s general characteristic. Through assessment, this paper draws the following conclusions:(1)China’s electric power industry presents an obvious characteristic of administrative monopoly, that is, the monopoly is the administrative monopoly essentially, rather than the natural monopoly. (2) The Chinese electric power industry has different type and degree administrative monopoly in different sector. The industrial administrative monopoly and the local administrative monopoly are interweaved and coexisting in the electricity generation sector. The industrial administrative monopoly is shown as the electricity generation project examination system under state-owned property right monopoly, and the local administrative monopoly is shown as the barrier between the province. The power transmission sector and the distribution sector display natural monopoly nature in technology,but simultaneously have the administrative monopoly feature, and the administrative monopoly and the natural monopoly are interweaved in the same place. The electricity selling sector only appears to be the industrial administrative monopoly. Compared to the power transmission sector, the distribution sector, the electricity selling sector, and the electricity generation sector show weaker degree of administrative monopoly. (3) The degree of administration monopoly in electric power industry of China is in dynamic evolution. With the reform deepens gradually, the degree of administrative monopoly in the electricity generation sector is getting weaker, but the power transmission sector, the distribution sector, and the electricity selling sector still maintain high degree of administrative monopoly.Next, in the aspect of theoretical analysis, this paper analyzed the conduction mechanism of administrative monopoly of electric power industry influencing the efficiency of resource allocation. The administrative monopoly has dictated the electric power industry’s market structure and the property right structure, and have the important influence to the enterprise behavior.Through the market structure, the property right structure, and the enterprise behavior, the administrative monopoly has dictated the industrial performance, and then caused the low efficiency of resource allocation.Thirdly, from the microscopic aspec,the empirical analysis demonstrates that high concentration degree of state-owned stockholder has had the negative influence on the electric power industry microscopic efficiency. From the industrial aspect,the electric power industry electricity price increases much higher than the industrial product producer price,and the electricity price structure is in distortion, moreover the electric power industry obtained monopoly profit. From the macroscopic aspect,the electric power industry staff earns high income, causing the income differential among different industries to expand unceasingly. The electric power industry investment efficiency is low, and the government investment is insufficient, so that the electric power supply in long-term is inadequate, which has hindered the electric power industry healthy development, and also has the serious negative influence to the national economy. From the aspect of dynamic efficiency aspect, the electric power industry innovation and the technology advancement speed is slow, and the dynamic efficiency is low. Therefore the conclusion is that the administration monopoly of the electric power industry has the negative influence on microscopic efficiency, the industrial efficiency and the macroscopic efficiency.At last, from the aspect of policy research,in the long term, the administrative monopoly will do harm to the development of electric power industry and the whole economy. As a result, it is necessary to counter the administrative monopoly. The concrete policy suggestion is as follows:Further deepen electric power industry’s marketability reform, and build the marketability mechanism of pricing. Relax to access of privately operated capital market, and introduce competition to the market, and exert the external competition pressure to the state-owned electric power enterprises, and promote their reform. From the aspect of Corporate Governance introduce modern enterprise system, and carry on the stockholder’s rights transformation and optimize Corporate Governance. Strengthen and consummate the Regulatory committee’s function of the electric power industry.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 山东大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2010年 08期
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