【作者】 杨馥；

【导师】 孙蓉；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 保险学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 在现代保险业“三支柱”监管体系中,保险公司治理监管是保护保单持有者利益、防范风险和确保整个保险市场平稳运行的根本所在。20世纪90年代中后期,国际保险监督官协会、经合组织等国际组织和各国、地区的金融保险监管机构逐步认识到完备的保险公司治理结构和有效的治理机制对保险公司乃至整个金融保险体系稳定性的重要影响,随即颁布了一系列旨在推动保险公司治理制度建设的规范和指导性文件。改革开放以来,中国保险业取得了令人瞩目的成绩,经营体制改革、国有保险公司股份制改革等全方位、多层次的保险业改革成为推动我国保险业持续快速发展的原动力。在继续推进我国保险业改革进程和对外开放的背景下,保险公司治理制度建设成为建立和完善现代保险企业制度,提高我国保险业整体竞争实力,确保其健康持续发展的迫切要求。因此,如何优化保险公司治理结构框架,并促进治理机制发挥监督制衡和激励约束的作用,是现阶段我国保险监管机构面临的现实挑战。近年来,保险公司治理监管的内容和途径得到了国内外保险监管实践的不断检验和修正。然而,保险公司治理监管不仅是实践性很强的监管政策命题,也是具有理论和实践意义的重要课题。目前,国内外鲜有对这一命题的系统研究。本文在梳理公司治理和保险监管相关研究成果的基础上,搭建保险公司治理监管制度的经济学分析框架,从理论上论证保险公司治理监管的逻辑起点,对保险公司治理监管的演进路径以及监管的特殊性、基础地位和核心内容进行一般分析,比较借鉴国外保险公司治理监管的有益经验,剖析我国保险公司治理监管的现状与问题,并采用多元回归分析、成本收益分析和博弈分析方法探讨、验证保险公司治理监管的效应和影响,最终根据上述理论和实证分析结果尝试进行我国保险公司治理监管的制度设计。本文的主要内容由八大部分构成。第一部分是导论。这部分对论文的研究目的和意义,文献综述及研究现状、论文结构框架及研究方法,研究的创新与不足进行了阐述。第二部分是保险公司治理监管制度的理论透视。这一部分回顾了公司治理和保险监管的相关理论,着重讨论了利益相关者理论和公共利益理论对保险公司治理监管研究的重要意义,并以此为基础论证了保险公司治理监管的逻辑起点。第三部分是保险公司治理监管制度的一般分析。这一部分就保险公司治理及其监管的演进路径、监管的特殊性和核心内容进行了分析。第四部分是保险公司治理监管制度的国际比较与借鉴。这部分对英美、德日等代表性国家的保险公司治理及监管进行横向比较,结合IAIS“保险公司治理结构监管”的相关内容进行分析,旨在为我国保险公司治理监管的制度建设提供有益的借鉴。第五部分是我国保险公司治理及其监管的历史演进与现状分析。这部分回顾了我国保险公司治理及其监管的演进历程,着重分析了现阶段国内保险公司的治理理念、股权结构等方面存在的问题,评述和探讨了我国保险公司治理监管的现状与问题,重点剖析了新华人寿和中国平安两则国内保险公司治理典型案例及其对我国保险公司治理监管的启示。第六部分是保险公司治理监管的效应分析。这一部分首先对国内保险公司治理进行简要评价,其次从两个方面探讨保险公司治理监管的效应:以保险公司治理评价为基础建立多元回归模型,旨在考察保险公司治理监管与保险公司治理水平的相关关系;应用成本收益分析方法,从理论上探讨保险公司治理监管的效率和最优监管边界,并借鉴英国金融监管局(FSA)成本收益分析框架和方法,尝试对我国保险公司治理监管政策进行简要评价。第七部分是保险公司治理监管的博弈分析。这一部分应用博弈论构建了三种不同的委托代理模型,分别探讨保单持有人参与治理和保险监管者介入的情形下,在经理人激励过程中各方的最优行为选择,旨在检验保单持有人和保险监管者对保险公司治理其他参与方行为决策的实际影响。最后是我国保险公司治理监管的制度设计。这一部分根据保险公司治理监管制度一般分析的结论,基于国外保险公司治理监管比较研究的启示和我国保险公司治理及其监管的现状与问题,并结合前文中的实证分析结果,明确了我国保险公司治理的监管目标和原则,并提出了法律法规体系建设、行政监管优化和市场环境培育等政策主张和建议。本文的主要创新之处包括以下几个方面:第一,以公司治理理论和保险监管理论为基础,初步构建了中国保险公司治理监管制度的分析框架。在该框架中系统阐述了保险公司治理监管的特殊性、核心内容和目标原则等,对保险公司治理监管的效应和影响进行了理论分析和实证检验,并得到了相应的经济学解释。以上述定性和定量分析的结论为基础,尝试性的设计了符合我国国情的保险公司治理监管制度。第二,论文首次将共同治理模型应用于保单持有人和保险监管者参与治理情形下的保险公司经理人激励问题研究,着重分析了不同情形下各方的最优行为选择。在保险公司的委托代理关系中,经理人激励是作为内部委托人的股东和保单持有人及外部监管者共同关注的问题。为使共同治理模型更加吻合现实情形,在股东与保单持有人共同治理模型和保险监管者与股东共同治理模型中,分别考虑了高风险投资的期望收益和期望损失在股东、经理人和保单持有人之间进行分配,以及经理人谋取控制权私人收益则可能受到监管者处罚两种情形。第三,论文通过计算保险公司治理指数,对样本保险公司治理状况进行了简要评价。在此基础上利用样本公司的面板数据构造多元回归模型,证实了我国保险公司治理监管与保险公司治理水平呈显著正相关关系。另外,论文尝试性地将成本收益分析法运用于保险公司治理的监管效率和最优监管边界的理论分析,并借鉴英国FSA成本收益分析框架,尝试对我国保险公司治理监管进行简要评价。第四,论文还提出了一些新的观点。笔者认为,在保险公司这一多契约的集合体中,经理人、股东和保单持有人之间存在固有的利益分歧,因此应赋予保单持有人这一弱势群体参与公司治理的平等地位;保险公司治理是包含治理结构和治理机制的一整套制度安排,保险公司治理监管不应局限于监督、规制保险公司治理结构,还应注重促进公司内外部治理机制的形成,着力培育有利于保险公司治理的外部市场;在继续推进国内保险公司整体治理水平提高的过程中,需要进一步增强中小保险公司的治理需求,并强化股权集中度较高的公司中大股东的治理作用。更多还原

【Abstract】 The supervision on insurers’corporate governance is the foundation of three-pillar insurance supervisory system. It is the key to protecting the interests of policyholders, to guarding against business risks and to the robust performance of insurance system. In the middle and latter half of the 1990s, several international institutions as IAIS, OECD and insurance supervision associations of many countries and regions were awaking to the significant influence of sound insurers’corporate governance structure and effective governance mechanism on financial stability. Therefore, they issued a series of guidelines, principles and recommendations in order to improve insurers’corporate governance.In the process of reform and opening-up for 30 year, China insurance industry has made impressive achievements. Omni-directional and multi-level form of reforms including reforms of operation system and joint-stock system are the driving force to the rapid and sustained development of China insurance industry. As the reform and opening up going into depth, establishing and improving modern insurance enterprise system as well as enhancing the competitiveness of China insurance industry is pushing for the development of insurers’coporate governance system. Thus how to optimize insurers’corporate governance structure and to strengthen the check and balance as well as incentive and restraining function of governance mechanisms , is an realistic and urgent issue for China insurance supervisors.In recent years, the contents and approaches of supervision on insurers’corporate governance have been verifed and modified by insurance supervision practice at home and abroad. However, it is a significant theoratical and practical subject more than purely a insurance regulation policy. At present, there are few systematic studies combined theory with practice on the subject. On the basis of results from the researches on corporate governance and insurance regulation, this dissertation aims at establishing economic analytical framework for supervision on insurers’corporate governance. Learning from the regulatory experience abroad, and considering the status quo and tough issues of our insurers’corporate governance, it puts forwards to necessity, particularity and core elements of supervision on insurers’corporate governance. In addition, the effect of current supervision and influence on corporate governance is tested by regression analysis, cost-benefit analysis and game analysis. In the end, the dissertation tries to design the supervision system of insurers’corporate governance in China based on the conclusions by the theoratical and empirical analysis mentioned above.This dissertation is composed by eight parts. ChapterⅠservers as an introduction which is concerned with such areas as the aim and significance of this dissertation, literature review, analytical framework, methodology, as well as contribution and deficiency. ChapterⅡi s theoretical perspective on supervisory system of insurers’corporate governance. Reviewing the related theories of corporate governance and insurance regulation, this part gives attention to the significance of public interest theory and stakeholders theory, and demonstrates the logic starting point of supervision on insurers’corporate governance. ChapterⅢis the general analysis of supervision on insurers’corporate governance. This part consists its evolution, characteristics, core elements of the supervision. ChapterⅣis the analysis of the history and status quo of Chinese insurers’corporate governance and its regulation, including lack of governance philosophy, irrational ownership structure in Chinese insurers, and deficient legal system of supervision ect. ChapterⅤis its international comparison. This part laterally compares insurer’s corporate governance and its regulation in UK, US, Germany and Japan, and also summarizes IAIS corporate governance principles, in order to provide useful experience for us. ChapterⅥis the effect analysis of supervision on insurers’corporate governance. This part examines the effect of this supervision in two aspects, including: 1) testing the correlation between insurers’corporate governance and its regulation by multiple regression model, and 2) discussing theoretically optimal boundary and efficiency of this regulation by cost-benefit approach, along with trying to evaluate China supervisory policy of insurers’corporate governance within the framework of CBA in FSA. ChapterⅦis game analysis of supervision on insurers’corporate governance. This part builds three different principal-agent models, and emphasizes on the players’optimal behavior choices in the process of managerial incentive when policyholders or insurance supervisor participating in corporate governance. These models are to prove the real supervisory impact on the players. ChapterⅧis the system design of supervision on insurers’corporate governance in China. Based on these theoretical and empirical results, this part puts in the aims and principles of the supervision as well as policy suggestions on optimizing administrative supervision, improving legal environment and developing sound market conditions.The contributions of this dissertation are as following:Firstly, contribution on analysis framework in this field. It tries to establish economic analytical framework combined theory with practice for supervisory system of insurers’corporate governance in China.Secondly, contribution on research method. This dissertation tries to evaluates the level of several Chinese insurers’corporate governance by computational method of corporate governance index. Then, multiple regression model is established using panel data of the sample firms and the calculated index to verify the positive correlation between insurers’corporate governance and its regulation. And also, this dissertation uses common agency model to analyze managerial incentive in insurance companies, especially the managers optimal choices under different situations, in the case of policyholders and insurance supervisor engaging in corporate governance. The models are revised at two levels in order to make it realistic: 1)the expected return of high-risk investment distributed between shareholder and manager while its expected loss borne by policyholder, and 2)manager could risk a fine by insurance supervisor when gaining private benefits of control. In addition, cost-benefit analysis is applied to assess effectiveness of regulation on insurers’corporate governance. Besides, it tries to evaluate China supervisory policy of insurers’corporate governance within the framework of CBA in FSAThirdly, contribution on new points of view. This dissertation presents: 1) investing policyholders with equal rights in corporate governance; 2)supervision on insurers’corporate governance should emphasize the function of internal and external governance mechanisms, especially developing sound market conditions; and 3) expending the governance demand of medium-sized and small insurers, and strengthening the function of block shareholder governance.更多还原