【作者】 罗宁；

【导师】 李萍；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 政治经济学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 随着经济体制的转型、社会结构的变迁,中国已经逐渐步入现代社会发展的高风险阶段。而劳资关系在社会经济结构变迁中扮演的关键角色以及在风险社会发展过程中的重要影响作用,使其相关主体之间的矛盾与冲突问题成为了当前最为突出的社会经济问题之一。中国在改革开放之初,由于资本要素缺乏、劳动力供给大于需求以及政策制度的倾斜等原因,使得劳资关系表现出明显的“资强劳弱”特征。这种劳资关系不同于学术界一般认为的计划经济体制下政府、企业与劳动者之间形成的“劳动关系”(笔者认为这也是一种特殊的劳资关系,本文第四章第一节对此做了专门地分析)。过去在一种“公有制+按劳分配”、实则是平均主义的“高就业、低收入”、低水平的所谓“社会公平”原则下,劳资关系相对处于一种比较平稳、和缓的状态,人为营造的、显性的劳资合作关系遮盖了潜在隐性的劳资矛盾。而体制转型在提高效率的同时,也使劳资之间的矛盾冲突凸显出来。在社会主义市场经济体制下,劳资双方开始作为独立的参与主体,基于所掌握的信息进行策略互动博弈。在要素结合的方式及产品分配比例上,双方可能存在着分歧,进而产生矛盾和冲突。随着改革的深化,中国市场经济发展过程中存在的体制遗留问题和市场主体不到位及其相关问题,使得“资强劳弱”的格局得以确立并进一步强化。在这样的过程中,劳资双方在契约关系的规则制定、乃至生产领域和分配领域等关涉利益博弈的各个方面的严重不对等,可能会使双方的冲突行为变得更加频繁,冲突升级并转化为改革发展的一项重大风险,以至于影响社会的和谐以及经济的可持续发展。不言而喻,新的形势下劳资关系已经成为了一项极富挑战性的新课题。本文坚持以马克思主义经济学揭示的经济制度本质层面的劳资关系理论为指导思想,在此前提下,综合借鉴经济学、社会学、管理学等诸多学科理论研究的有益成果,着重运用博弈论工具和比较制度分析方法,具体分析社会主义市场经济运行层面的劳资冲突与合作的博弈关系。在市场经济运行层面,将劳资关系制度作为一个不断进化且受系统内部制度关联相互约束的博弈均衡表征,以制度体系的视角解构劳资关系,进而考察劳资产权制度、组织制度这两项基础性制度在劳资冲突与合作中的关键作用,并探讨了现代劳资关系演变中产生的两级扩展:第一级扩展——劳方、资方和管理者三方关系,就管理者而言,在阐述定价、雇佣、增长目标和融资等管理政策中执行复杂任务同时,还被赋予了劳资双方合作博弈“仲裁人”的角色,充当了协调劳资之间的分配要求权冲突的中介角色(青木昌彦,2005);第二级扩展——劳方、资方、政府三方关系,政府或者通过产业政策等宏观调控、或者通过劳动用工制度等微观规制,调整劳资关系、促进劳资之间走向合作、实现共赢。围绕上述内容,论文详尽地剖析了劳资关系的运行机理、表现形式和演变规律,结合转型期中国劳资关系运行的具体实践,提出当前协调劳资关系、控制社会风险、构建和谐社会的现实选择和政策建议,具有重要的理论价值和现实意义。论文遵循提出问题、形成假说、建构框架、实证分析、解决问题的逻辑思路与技术路线,为解析转型期中国劳资关系问题建立了一个系统的研究架构,全文由六章组成。第一章为导论。介绍本文的研究背景、理论价值和现实意义,提出本文的研究思路和研究方法,以及本文研究可能的创新与不足。第二章提出理论假说及其分析。本章着重阐述了劳资关系具体内涵,将其看作一种具有双重意义的社会生产关系,进而从原初意义和现代意义来考察特殊性意义的劳资关系和一般性意义的劳资关系。在这种双重意义的劳资关系中,劳资双方在利益关系、权利关系和一定的社会经济活动中均体现出不同意义的二元特性:在利益关系中表现出劳资之间并非只存在单一的对立性、而是兼具对立与统一的二元性特征;在权利关系中表现出劳动力产权所属的二元结构;在一定的社会经济活动中表现出同时具有自然关系和社会关系二元属性。随着劳资关系主体从典型的劳资“两方”向现代劳资关系中衍生出的两级扩展、包括劳方、资方、管理者三方以及劳方、资方、政府三方的转变,这些特征变得更为复杂。但总的来说,在表现形式上仍集中体现在劳资双方的冲突与合作上。本章最后归纳总结了新古典学派、新制度学派和管理主义学派等关于劳资关系理论研究的成果,为劳资关系问题的分析提供了一个理论基础和理论平台。第三章是全文的理论核心,为劳资关系问题的解析建构了一个理论分析框架。本章从囚徒困境、重复博弈、序贯博弈三个基本模型的博弈分析入手,模拟劳资之间冲突与合作行为,对劳资关系制度系统中的关键要素做出初步的判断:博弈规则的不同,制度框架的差异往往会使得劳资关系走向不同的发展方向;劳资关系制度作为一个不断进化且受系统内部制度关联相互约束的博弈均衡表征,其制度体系的构成,特别是基础性制度的内容及特征至关重要。显然,在这里由基础性制度所决定的博弈规则、制度框架是劳资关系制度系统中的关键要素。据此判断,本文在对美国、德国、日本三种劳资关系制度的比较分析基础上,探索不同的劳资关系协调模式背后的共同基础——确立及维护权利相对平等和力量相对平衡的制度要素,进而建立以基础性制度和衍生性制度为主要结构的劳资关系制度体系。其中,劳资产权制度和劳资组织制度又是该体系的基础性制度,而集体谈判、三方协商、共同参与和利润分享机制则是在产权制度、组织制度的基础上,衍生出来调整劳资利益、缓解劳资矛盾、实现劳资合作的具体机制。在这一理论框架下,劳资产权制度平等与否、劳资组织制度平衡与否,对于劳资双方的策略博弈起着至关重要的影响和作用。而两个基础性制度之间又是一种互补关系。平等的劳资产权制度是劳资组织制度平衡的基础,而劳资组织制度平衡(即劳资力量的平衡)又是劳资产权制度平等(即双方权利平等)的保障。第四、五章是实证分析部分。第四章对转型前后中国劳资关系的发展演变作了回望比较分析。计划经济体制时期的“劳资关系”主要表现在两个方面:劳动者与用人单位在形式上的劳资合作关系、劳动者与政府实际上形成的劳资关系或行政隶属关系。在“患均不患寡”的平均主义通行原则下,这一时期的劳资关系更多地体现为显性的合作与隐性的冲突。改革开放以来,逐步获得独立主体地位的劳方与资方在市场机制作用下、以利益为主要动力和目标进行了重复博弈。经济实力、政治影响力等方面的巨大差距,使得劳资双方在契约的签订与执行、以及劳资纠纷而导致的契约解除等诸多问题上,“资强劳弱”特征日益强化。随着资方主导地位的形成与劳方的不断“弱化”,劳资矛盾逐渐凸显,显性合作向显性冲突转化。?第五章应用劳资关系制度体系理论分析框架,以基础性制度为切入点对中国转型期劳资关系由冲突走向合作进行了比较制度分析。产权制度和组织制度作为劳资关系制度系统中的基础性制度,是劳资关系问题的“概要表征(浓缩信息)”(青木昌彦,2001)产生的基础(源泉)。产权制度和组织制度发生改变,会使人们形成新的“共有信念”,进而产生新的劳资关系制度。因此,要实现转型期中国劳资关系由冲突走向合作,就必须具备两项制度基础:一是相对于劳资双方各自拥有的要素享有相应的、平等的产权制度,二是要有劳资力量相对平衡的组织制度。“《劳动合同法》与华为辞职事件”和“山西矿难事件”两个案例表明,不平等的产权制度与不平衡的组织制度是当前我国构建和谐劳资关系进程中亟需解决的问题。而对企业制度发展阶段与劳资关系变迁的考察指出,在三十年来的改革与转型中,我国企业迅速经历了一个由原计划经济体制下非企业的行政附属单位向现代企业的制度变迁过程。这种嵌入式、后发性的企业生发的背后,潜隐着劳资产权制度、组织制度发育的滞后。“单腿改制”使得“资强劳弱”不仅没有缓解,反而在制度上进一步得以强化。第六章先后引入了现代劳资关系两级扩展的分析。首先,分析了第一级扩展中三方主体之一的管理者,结合青木昌彦在企业制度理论中提出的法人管理主义模式,展望了在未来的企业制度下新型劳资关系的运行模式。同时,针对我国转型期“强资本,弱劳工”的劳资关系格局,提出建立劳资权利相对平等的双产权制度、劳资力量相对平衡的双组织制度以及多方协调机制,通过合作博弈,实现劳资双方平等对话,促进劳资关系和谐发展。其次,分析了第二级扩展中三方主体之一的政府,具体探讨了政府在促进劳资合作博弈过程中应扮演的角色和发挥的作用,并进一步分析和评估了政府在构建和谐劳资关系进程中的绩效,同时针对目前尚存在的不足提出相应的政策建议。?更多还原

【Abstract】 With the transition of the economy and social structure, China has stepped gradually into the risky stage in the development of modern society. Due to the important role of relationship between labor and capital in the process of the development, the contradiction and conflict between market participants has become one of the most outstanding problems in the contemporary society. At the beginning of reform in China, the capital obtains a more advantageous position than labor because of the scarcity of supply in the market and the preferential policy by the government. With the promotion of the reform, the? inequality between capital and labor has been exacerbated. The owner of capital has the right to make rules of the contract, control the process of production and take possession of the profit, while the owner of labor just becomes the rule-taker. The conflict caused by the inequality might become so serious that the stabilization of the society and the development of the economy could be faced with high risk.This dissertation proceeds its study on the industrial relationship in China based on the research achievements in Economics, Sociology and Management, emphatically using Game Theory and Comparative Institutional Analysis tools. Through constructing a theory explanation frame of industrial relationship institutional system, the institutions of property right and organization are considered as the most important parts of the system. Besides, other participants such as the enterprise’s administrator and the government are taken into consideration when figuring the way to achieve the goal of cooperation.This dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter one is the introduction, which explains the background of this dissertation and the theoretical and realistic value of this research, summarizes studies implemented by domestic, international scholars, introduces the author’s approach towards the problems, and points out the innovation and deficiency of this dissertation as well.Chapter two comes up with the theoretical hypothesis. This chapter defines the industrial relationship with dual significance, making a survey of the special and general aspects of the industrial relationship from the original meaning to the modern one. From this point of view, the industrial relationship embodies dual characteristic which becomes more complicated as the number of participants increases. Theories from Neoclassical Economics, New Institutional Economics, etc. are quoted to set a background for the next step of the research.Chapter three is the core of the research. Prison Dilemma, Repeated Game and Sequential Game are applied to imitate the conflicting and cooperative relationships between the owners of labor and capital. At the same time, a comparative study on the industrial relationship in America, Germany and Japan is taken on. Based on the research above, this chapter constructs a theory explanation frame of industrial relationship institutional system. The institutions of property right and organization are considered as the most important parts of the system while Collective Bargaining, Tripartite Consultation, Co-participating and Profits Distribution Mechanisms are derivatives from these institutions.Chapter four and chapter five are the parts of demonstration research. Chapter four analyzes the transition of the industrial relationship before and after the reform. Under the planned economic system, the industrial relationship displays in two different ways. One is the relationship between the worker and the factory; the other is the relationship between the worker and the government. The transition to the market economic system led the industrial relationship to greatly change. The owners of labor and capital act as market participants, trying to gain more profit. As the inequality between them has been exacerbated, the conflict comes up frequently.Chapter five applied the theory explanation frame of industrial relationship institutional system. The institutions of property right and organization are considered as the key parts for the industrial relationship in China from conflict to cooperation during the transition period. To achieve the goal of cooperation between the owners of labor and capital, there are two conditions: first, symmetrical property right institution; second, balanced organization institution. The analysis on the development of the Enterprise system proves this point and explains the reason for the conflicting industrial relationship in China.Chapter six discusses the third participant inside the enterprise, quotes the model put forward by Masahiko Aoki and makes a blueprint for the industrial relationship in the future. As the third participant outside the enterprise, government plays an important role in the industrial relationship. In accordance with the industrial relationship in China during the transition period caused by the inequality between the owners of labor and capital, applicable suggestions are proposed in this chapter.更多还原