【作者】 张岚东；

【导师】 马骁；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 财政学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 改革开放30多年来,我国经济发展取得了举世瞩目的成就,已经进入工业化中级甚至高级阶段的过渡时期。我国市场经济改革极大地改造了农村的面貌,并且农村流动人口规模也在不断扩大。但我国城乡经济社会发展仍存在不少问题。如城乡经济联系和差距呈现波浪型模式,城乡公共产品供给水平的差距也十分明显。十六大以来,党中央提出了统筹城乡发展、构建和谐社会的战略部署,先后取消了农业税、不断加大对农村基础设施建设的投入、显著提高了农产品补贴和提升农村社区公共服务水平等。但近年来,我国城乡公共产品供给的差距整体上仍没有表现出明显缩小的趋势。那么,是什么因素促成了地方政府公共产品供给的城市偏向呢?在国家发展战略转向城乡统筹发展后,地方政府的偏好会发生什么变化,将如何统筹城乡公共产品的供给呢?这些问题构成了本文研究的主线。目前,关于城乡公共产品供给和地方官员行为的研究更多是从地方政府经济利益最大化的假设出发,在财政分权的制度框架下展开研究的。但是,作为政治组织中的代理人,我国地方官员的目标函数不同于经济组织中的代理人,他们追求的是政治地位最大化(包括职务晋升、留任或交流等),而不是单纯的经济效益最大化。因此,在认真梳理、吸收城乡一体化理论、国外地方公共产品供给理论、我国城乡公共产品供给理论、地方官员激励和行为选择理论研究的有益成果基础上,论文引入地方官员政治支持的概念,从地方官员边际政治支持优先序的角度研究了地方官员的行为偏好,构建起地方官员行为选择的政治经济学模型。接下来,运用该模型解释我国城市化进程中的地方官员城乡公共产品供给偏好和行为选择,即先后分析了二元经济条件下和城乡统筹发展进程中的地方官员城乡公共产品供给偏好,重点研究了我国从二元经济向城乡统筹发展的制度变迁过程中,地方官员的偏好变化和不同主体间的博弈行为。最后,论文从地方官员政治支持的角度,提出了统筹城乡公共产品供给的目标、实施路径,归纳了国内外激励地方官员提高城乡公共产品供给水平的经验,最后提出了政策建议。论文的主要结论是:第一、由于我国行政管理体制和地方官员治理结构等原因,上级政府、下级官员、城市居民和农村居民对地方官员的边际政治支持依次递减。在我国实施城乡统筹发展战略之前,地方官员为获得最大的政治支持,其理性选择便是实施公共产品供给的城市偏向政策,这在一定程度上造成了我国城乡公共产品供给水平形成巨大差距。第二,在中央政府的发展偏好转为实行统筹城乡发展战略后,增加农村公共产品供给可以使地方官员获得的上级政府政治支持明显上升,地方官员最终将放弃城市偏向的公共产品供给政策,转而实施统筹城乡的公共产品供给政策。不过,随着城乡统筹发展进程的不断深化,各个政治主体对地方官员的政治支持将发生变化,地方官员的城乡公共产品供给偏好也可能发生更加复杂的演变。第三、在我国统筹城乡发展战略下,从地方官员政治支持的角度看,统筹城乡公共产品供给的近期目标应当是激励地方官员增加农村公共产品供给,中期目标应当是提高地方官员城乡公共产品供给能力,远期目标应当是激励地方官员加大制度创新,提高农村公共产品供给效率。更多还原

【Abstract】 After 30 years of reform and opening up, China’s economic development has made remarkable achievements, and has entered the intermediate or advanced stage of industrialization period of transition. China’s market economic reforms have greatly transformed the face of rural areas, and the size of the floating population is also expanding. However, there are still many problems in the economic and social development of China’s urban and rural areas. The gap between urban and rural economic shows a marked wave-type model, and the level of urban-rural gap in the supply of public goods is also growing. Since the Sixteenth Congress, the CPC Central Committee put forward the strategic plan for the co-ordinate urban and rural development, and building a harmonious society. China’s central government has abolished agricultural taxes and steadily increased its investment in rural infrastructure, and significantly increased agricultural subsidies and the level of public services in rural communities. But in recent years, the gap between the supply of public goods in China’s urban and rural areas still did not show significant narrowing trend on the whole. So, what factors contribute to the local public goods supply’s urban bias then? After the national development strategies have Shift to urban and rural development, what change the local government preference will happen? how to co-ordinate the supply of public goods in the urban and rural areas ? These issues constitute the main theme of this study.At present, with regard to urban and rural public goods’ supply , the behavior of local government official has been treated as the assumption of maximizing economic interests, and studied under the framework of fiscal decentralization and the government in competition. However, as an agent of a political organization, the local government officials have the objective function which is different from the economic organization of the agents. They seek to maximize the political status (including job promotion, retention or exchange, etc.), rather than the purely economic maximum benefit. Thus, in combing and absorbing urban-rural integration theory, the local supply of public goods theory, and the local official incentives theory, the author introduces the concept of political support for local officials, and studies the marginal political support of local officials, and the priority order, and the behavioral biases, thus builds the political economy model of behavior choices. Next, the author explains China’s urbanization process in the local officials in urban and rural public goods supply preferences, and has analyzed the urban-rural dual economic conditions, focusing on the behavior of different subjects. Finally, author sums up the domestic and international urban and rural public goods supply experience, and gives policy recommendations. The main conclusions of papers are:First, In China before the implementation of urban and rural development strategy, local officials in order to obtain maximum political support, its rational choice is to implement the urban bias of public goods supply policy, which led to the level of China’s urban and rural areas pose a huge gap .Secondly, as the chance of preference to the development of the central government, the increase in the supply of public goods in rural areas will enable local officials to obtain significant increase political support for higher levels of government. So, local officials will eventually abandon the urban bias of public goods supply policy, turn to supply the public goods equally among urban and rural areas. However, the policy of urban and rural public goods supplying may occur complex evolution in the future.Thirdly, under our urban and rural development strategy, short-term objective of urban and rural public goods supply should be to encourage local officials to increase the supply of public goods in rural areas, medium-term objective should be to improve the local officials’ public product supply capacity, long-term goal should be to encourage local officials to step up institutional innovation.更多还原