【作者】 俞冬来；

【导师】 马骁；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 财政学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 1997年亚洲金融危机给不少国家和地区的政治、经济稳定带来了巨大的冲击,促使我国政府对金融风险问题提高警觉性,并采取了积极的救助措施,使金融领域的风险得到了有效的控制。如通过降低金融业营业税率、加大呆账核销力度、发行2700亿特别国债用于补充国有商业银行资本金、成立四家资产管理公司剥离国有商业银行不良资产等措施,使国有商业银行的经营状况出现了明显的好转。根据加入WTO的承诺,从2006年底起我国的金融市场全面对外开放,国有商业银行也遭遇前所未有的冲击和挑战。为了尽快解决国有商业银行的问题,提高其市场竞争力,政府通过汇金公司于2003年底动用450亿美元外汇储备注资中国银行和中国建设银行,并实施股份制试点改革,标志着国有商业银行的改革全面加速。2005年4月,政府动用150亿美元对工商银行进行注资,2008年政府再次动用190亿美元对中国农业银行进行注资。因此由政府救助支持国有商业银行改革已经成为国家的一项重要经济政策。本论文从银行脆弱性理论和问题银行外部性理论入手,分析了政府救助问题银行的一般理论,为我国政府救助国有商业银行提供理论支持。在此基础上,论文提出了我国政府救助国有商业银行的特殊原因,分析了我国政府救助国有商业银行的手段及其有效性,对美国政府在金融危机期间救助金融机构的过程及其启示进行研究,并对今后我国政府完善救助国有商业银行政策提出了具体的建议。除导论外,本论文主要由五部分构成,各部分主要内容如下:第一部分,政府救助问题银行的理论基础。银行业的高风险性和存款人的挤兑行为决定了银行的脆弱性,而传染性则使得脆弱性进一步加剧。问题银行具有负外部性,表现为问题银行的存在影响整个银行体系的稳健运行、不利于经济的发展、造成财政政策扭曲、加大货币政策的实施成本、可能会引发经济危机。因此,问题银行的负外部性引起私人风险向公共风险转化,市场出现失灵,这说明政府救助问题银行的必要性。政府救助问题银行较为普遍的做法包括剥离不良资产、注资、注入流动性和税制改革等。政府救助问题银行应当遵守一些基本原则,如保护债权人利益的原则、维护银行体系稳定的原则、根据宏观经济金融运行环境相机抉择的原则、防范道德风险避免公共资金滥用的原则。政府救助问题银行需进行成本—收益分析,只有救助收益大于救助成本,救助行为才是有效的,在收益确定的前提下,政府应尽可能降低救助成本。本部分的主要目的是为研究我国政府救助国有商业银行提供理论基础。第二部分,我国政府救助国有商业银行的特殊原因。我国的国有商业银行制度变迁属于强制性制度变迁,新中国成立以后经历了“大一统”银行体系、国有专业银行、国有商业银行和国家控股股份制商业银行等阶段。改革开放以来,国有商业银行一方面对经济发展和体制改革进行有效的金融支持,促进了中国经济的增长和体制转轨;另一方面国有商业银行自身也经历了重大的改革和发展,在金融改革和金融发展中发挥了主体地位。国有商业银行在为体制改革和经济发展作出重大贡献的同时,其自身面临的制度风险和信用风险也越发突出。国有商业银行风险成因的特殊性决定了我国政府救助国有商业银行具有特殊原因:救助行为是政府作为所有者的义务、是政府归还历史欠账的需要、是政府隐性担保显性化的需要、也是金融体制改革的需要。第三部分,政府救助国有商业银行的方式及其效应分析。主要介绍国有商业银行商业化改革以来,政府对其进行的救助,其一是政府注入资本金,具体包括1998年发行2700亿特别国债注资、2004年以来数次外汇储备注资和通过税制方面的改革间接为国有商业银行注资;其二是处置不良资产,包括利用国有商业银行的盈利冲销不良资产、增加国有商业银行风险拨备核销不良贷款以及成立四大资产管理公司接收不良资产。本部分对各种救助行为从微观和宏观方面进行了效应分析。总体而言,政府对国有商业银行的救助成效显著,国有商业银行资本充足率提高、不良资产下降、盈利能力提升,不仅经受住2007年以来金融危机的考验,还有力支持了实体经济的发展。但是,政府救助行为仍然存在诸多不足,如救助成本过高、市场化手段运用不够、道德风险较为严重等。第四部分,美国政府救助金融机构的过程及启示。主要研究从2007年开始的次贷危机进而演变成金融危机的过程中,美国政府对出现问题的金融机构如何进行救助,并从中得出相应的启示,包括坚持“大而不倒”救助原则、体现有所取舍的原则、救助政策要适时改变、股权注资要优于其他救助方式和政府救助要把握时机并要有针对性等。第五部分,完善政府救助国有商业银行的构想。在前述分析的基础上提出相应的建议,一是国有商业银行自身要理顺关系、深化改革、加强监管,防范和控制风险;二是要改革和完善我国政府救助问题银行机制,如建立存款保险制度、完善政府救助主体、建立和完善问题银行救助机制以及建立不良资产市场化处置机制等。本研究可能的创新主要来自以下几个方面:1.专门研究国有商业银行风险或金融风险的文献很多,也有不少研究财政风险的文章涉及国有商业银行风险,但这些研究或者偏重金融领域,或者偏重财政领域,本论文则将财政和金融问题有机结合,对政府救助国有商业银行进行专门的研究,从选题到研究对象和研究内容均具有创新意义。2.本文对政府救助问题银行的理论基础进行了较为全面的分析,集中回答了政府为什么要救助问题银行、政府如何救助问题银行、如何评价政府救助问题银行效果等问题。3.本论文对国有商业银行在经济发展中的贡献和风险成因作了系统分析,并提出了政府救助国有商业银行的四大特殊原因:政府作为所有者的义务、政府归还历史欠账的需要、政府隐性担保显性化的需要和金融体制改革的需要。4.自1998年以来,我国政府对国有商业银行采取了一系列救助行为,但现有的研究多数只针对单一救助政策进行探讨,本论文则对政府救助国有商业银行的正、负效应从微观和宏观不同层面进行了全面分析。5.在分析了政府救助国有商业银行的经验和不足基础上,借鉴美国政府救助金融机构的做法,论文提出了完善政府救助国有商业银行的构想,既要从国有商业银行方面理顺关系、深化改革、加强监管,防患于未然;也要在风险既成时通过建立存款保险制度、完善政府救助主体、建立和完善问题银行救助机制以及建立不良资产市场化处置机制等途径改革和完善我国政府救助问题银行机制。但是,由于本人的知识局限性和所掌握的研究资料的有限性,本文还有很多不足之处,主要体现在:1.我国政府救助国有商业银行的效应分析中由于无法判断国有商业银行综合评价中各种指标的改善有多少是由于政府救助所导致的,有多少是由于其他原因所导致的,因此对政府救助国有商业银行的正面效应缺乏足够的、深入的分析,进而会影响对政府救助机制的完善和改进。2.在政府救助国有商业银行机制创新的研究中,作为市场化的主要举措是国有资本的退出,但在本轮金融危机期间,各国政府纷纷对金融机构进行国有化,因而在本文的研究中没有考虑国有资本退出的问题,但产权清晰的资本结构是建立市场化救助机制的重要前提。总之,本文对政府救助国有商业银行问题的研究还不够深入,所提出的政府救助机制及其相关措施还有待于实践的验证、完善和丰富。本人希望以此为起点,在今后的研究工作中,对政府救助国有商业银行问题作进一步探讨。更多还原

【Abstract】 1Based on the theories of bank fragility and problem bank externality, this thesis analyzes the general therories of government succor of problem banks, providing theoretical support for China’s succor of state-owned commercial banks. It further puts forward the special causes of our government’s bailout of state-owned commercial banks, and examines the Chinese government’s relief measures and the effectiveness thereof. The bailout of financial institutions by the US government during the financial crisis is also carefully studied with their lessons discussed. In the latter part of this thesis, detailed suggestions for China’s future policies of bailout of state-owned commercial banks are provided.Apart from preface, this thesis contains five parts, each developed as follows:Part One, Rationale of Government Bailout of Problem Banks. This part firstly analyzes the necessity of government bailout of problem banks from the perspective of bank fragility and problem bank externality. Then on the theoretical basis of government intervention incurred by market failure, the concept of government bailout is discussed, with the introduction of primary means of bailout of problem banks and their costs and revenue, which determines the right time of government bailout. At the end of this part, the principles of government bailout of problem banks are studied. This part serves to provide theoretical support for the study of the Chinese government’s bailout of state-owned commercial banks.Part Two, Special Causes of the Chinese Government’s bailout of State-owned Commercial Banks. This part covers the institutional transition of state-owned commercial banks, the role of state-owned commercial banks in China’s economy and finance, the contribution of state-owned commercial banks to the economic development of our country, the system risks and credit risks confronting state-owned commercial banks, and other issues as well. Through discussion of these issues, special causes of the Chinese government’s succor of state-owned commercial banks are proposed in this part. Part Three, Analysis of Means and Effects of Government succor of State-owned Commercial Banks. This part mainly reveals the Chinese government’s bailout of state-owned commercial banks since their commercialization reform, including capital injection and disposal of non-performing assets. The positive effects and negetive effects of the two relief measures are also analyzed.Part Four, US Government’s Bailout of Financial Institutions and the Lessons Thereof. This part studies the bailout of problem financial institutions by the US government during the financial crisis developed from the subprime mortgage crisis early at 2007. Lessons are also drawn from the US government’s practices, including the adherence to the too-big-to-fail principle, the execution of the trade-off principle, the timely modification of bailout policies, the superiority of stock acquisition over other relief measures, and the significance of making targeted bailout at the right time.Part Five, Suggestions for Improvement of Government Bailout of State-owned Commercial Banks. On the basis of the previous analysis, corresponding improvements are proposed: 1. State-owned commercial banks should balance and coordinate their own functions and duties, deepen the reform, intensify the supervision, and prevent and limit risks; 2. The bailout mechanism of problem banks by the Chinese government should be reformed and improved in such ways as establishing the deposit insurance system, strengthening the subjects of government bailout, establishing and improving the succor mechanism of problem banks, and setting up the market-oriented disposal system of non-performing assets.Possible innovations in this research are:1. There is copious literature on the single topic of either risks of state-owned commercial banks or financial risks, and quite a number of researches on fiscal risks deal with risks of state-owned commercial banks. Yet such researches tend to be centered on either the financial field or the fiscal field. This research, in combination of the fiscal and financial issues with its focus on the government bailout of state-owned commercial banks, conveys a sense of innovation from the topic selection to the study object and research question.2. With a comprehensive discussion on the rationale of government bailout of problem banks, this thesis systematically answers such questions as why to grant government bailout to problem banks, how to relieve the physical problems, and how to evaluate the effectiveness of the bailout.3. This thesis conducts a systematic analysis over the contribution of state-owned commercial banks to China’s economic development and their risk causes, and further proposes the four special causes of government bailout of state-owned commercial banks—the obligations of the government as the owner, the need for the government to repay the historical debts, the necessity to explicitize the tacit government warranty, and the call for financial restructuring.4. Though the Chinese government has exercised a succession of relief measures on state-owned commercial banks since 1998, most present researches deal with one single bailout policy only. This thesis, however, develops an all-round demonstration of the positive and negative effects of government bailout of state-owned commercial banks from the perspectives of both microeconomy and macroeconomy.5. Based on the analysis of the experience and limit of government bailout of state-owned commercial banks, this thesis draws a lesson from the US government’s bailout of financial institutions and puts forward suggestions for improving China’s government bailout of State-owned commercial banks: state-owned commercial banks are to prevent possible risks by balancing and coordinating their own functions and duties, deepening the reform and intensifying the supervision, while the government is to reform and perfect its bailout mechanism of problem banks in the face of existing risks by the way of establishing the deposit insurance system, strengthening the subjects of government bailout, establishing and improving the bailout mechanism of problem banks, and setting up the market-oriented disposal system of non-performing assets.Nevertheless, subject to my own narrow knowledge and limited research data at hand, this thesis does carry quite a few weaknesses as stated below:1.In the effect analysis of China’s government bailout of state-owned commercial banks, it fails to distinguish the extent to which the government bailout and other forces respectively influence over the rising indexes of the overall assessment of state-owned commericial banks. Therefore the analysis of the positive effects of government bailout of state-owned commercial banks is in need of a more in-depth and complete demonstration, and this imperfection exerts certain impact over the proposal of the government bailout mechanism.2. In the discussion of innovation of government bailout mechanism of state-owned commercial banks, exit of state-owned capital is supposed to constitute a prime measure of marketization, yet the nationalization of financial institutions is proceeding in many countries during the US financial crisis. Therefore this research does not consider the issue of exit of state-owned capital, but lays particular stress on building a capital structure with clearly-established ownership as the prerequisite for the set-up of a market-oriented bailout mechanism.In brief, for this thesis on the government bailout of state-owned commercial banks, there is still room for carrying out a more penetrative research, and the proposal of the bailout mechanism and relevant measures still needs verification, perfection and enrichment. I sincerely hope to make further investigation into the government bailout of state-owned commercial banks in my future research with this study as a start.更多还原