农户参与分享土地市场化收益的机制研究

【作者】 孙彬彬；

【导师】 焦必方；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 国民经济学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 要让农户参与经济成长、共享改革发展的成果,关键在于缩小城乡收入差距和促进农民增收。而在改革开放三十年后的今天,决定农户增收的关键在于土地要素的运用和新型农户与土地关系的构建。由于长期的政策倾斜和制度缺陷,导致农户对土地要素的支配权有限,土地要素对农户要素收入的配置贡献和功能贡献程度较低,从而弱化了农户参与分享土地市场化收益的能力。本文旨在尝试运用历史和现实相结合的视角,探索农户参与分享土地市场化收益的可行机制,特别是分析农地股份合作作为农户参与分享土地市场化收益机制的可行性。全文内容共九章,分为五个部分:第一部分包括第一章和第二章,是全文框架展开的基础和铺垫。第一章绪论给出论文研究的背景和动因、论文研究的切入点、技术路线和主要方法。第二章对有关农户参与分享土地市场化收益的机制研究和农地股份合作的文献进行梳理。从现实需求出发,分析农户参与分享土地市场化收益的研究背景,进而分析农户参与分享土地市场化收益的相关机制。同时,基于农户与土地关系转变和农户市场主体地位维护等现实需求的思考,笔者将农地股份合作同农户参与分享土地市场化收益相结合,而这样的结合则引发了更进一步地分析的要求。第二部分包括第三章和第四章,是全文分析的理论前提和基本框架。第三章依据小农经济的历史逻辑建立农户与土地关系的基本分析框架,同时探讨农户基本需求和行为特征,进而分析在1978年家庭联产承包改革之前,中国传统社会农户与土地关系以及农户结合土地获取收益的情况。本章在引入新古典的竞争性分析方法之前,首先厘清小农经济的内涵和历史特征,即自给自足的家庭经营方式和地权的内在封闭性。在传统社会中,市场化已经开始发生影响,但一田二主的出现意味着传统社会农户与土地关系依然复杂,安全性和稳定性仍然是农户的基本需求。遵循小农经济的行为逻辑,农户与土地关系在社会约束下的市场化进程可能是一个可以接受的次优选择。因此,在建构农户参与分享土地市场化收益机制时,仍然需要遵循这样的历史惯性。具体来说,历史传统的要求是:可以维护农户的土地使用权的安全性;能够增加对于农户的正向激励,扩大经营效益;保障农户获取相对平等的市场化收益。第四章将农户与土地关系的基本分析框架置于国家和地方利益的约束下,进一步解读农户的现实需求。明确农户在改革开放之初,其结合土地进行收入最大化的行为选择受到了国家和地方利益越来越多的约束和影响。由于土地市场化的约束,农户在获取要素收入时,采取二阶段的决策行为。因此,土地收益对于农户的影响很小。而国家出于国家利益的考量,通过补贴和土地征用等行为越来越多的影响到农户的决策和收入。地方政府则由于政绩的要求,往往会忽视农户的基本权益,忽视国家对于土地的严格政策规定,导致农户无法从土地要素的进一步开发中形成收益。国家、地方和农户三者利益关系的博弈问题成为我们分析农户参与分享土地市场化收益机制的背景和前提。第三部分即第五章,主要分析日本的经验。日本发展农村经济,并且在较短的时间内缩小城乡差距的成就,很大程度上是得益于日本农户参与分享土地市场化收益的机制。日本农户与土地关系首先追求的是所有、经营和劳动上的统一,同时稳定以家庭为主的小规模经营方式。在市场化的进程中,逐步适应经济发展需要,促进土地流转。战后日本农户经历了从自耕农到自立经营,再到农业经营体的过程,这个过程其实就是日本农户充分享受市场化收益的过程。在经济高速增长之后,日本农村开始出现高龄化、农户兼业化、农业生产者减少、过疏化、农地弃耕、规模经营和分散化并存等一系列新的趋势和问题。同时日本战后所造就的城乡差距缩小的成绩开始发生动摇。这促使日本进一步推进农地租赁、农地保有合理化法人和集落营农等举措。日本的发展经验和启示如下:农地利用方面法人化和集体化并重,同时注重法人化的非盈利性;地方政府、企业法人和农户的联合,共同推进农户与土地关系的改善;不断完善法律体系,及时调整农户与土地关系;促进土地要素市场化和保障农户市场化收益。第四部分包括第六章、第七章和第八章,是全文分析的主体。第四部分明确提出农户参与分享土地市场化收益的可行途径是农地股份合作,同时具体分析农户结合农地股份合作参与分享土地市场化收益的相关机制和实际发展情况。第六章分析了农地股份合作对于农户参与分享土地市场化收益的可行性。城乡收入差距缩小和参与经济发展的现实需求,要求扩大土地要素在农户增收中的作用,保证农户充分获取土地的全部收益,并且形成一种长效机制保障农户能够分享土地市场化的成果。笔者认为无论是从历史惯性的角度,还是国家和地方利益同现实需求的结合,农地股份合作都是农户参与分享土地市场化收益的有效途径。现实的迫切需要是增加农户财产性收入,提高农户收入结构中要素分配特别是初次分配的比重。农地股份合作正好承载了这一职能。笔者通过构建农户和农地股份合作的基本分析模型,进一步论证农地股份合作有助于农户在土地要素市场深化中实现帕累托改进。同时,笔者利用上海市1978-2008年相关数据资料实证分析农地股份合作的可行性。第七章分析了农户通过农地股份合作参与分享土地市场化收益的具体途径和机制。主要包括三个方面的内容:首先明确界定农地股份合作的集体土地权利,根据集体土地所有权落实农地股权,由农地股份合作社作为市场主体参与到土地市场化的开发中,通过股权分红落实农地收益权。同时,将地方基层的行政和经济职能分离,明确农地股份合作的集体性质,落实农地股份合作的独立性。其次,通过农地股份合作完善农地市场化机制建设,在农业领域推进农地流转的市场化;在非农领域,促进农地非农化的市场化建设。最后,笔者给出农地股份合作与土地市场化收益相结合的具体形式,以及农户参与农地股份合作的具体类型。第八章是实证分析。通过上海市和江苏省太仓市的实际案例,分析和检验农户凭借农地股份合作参与分享土地市场化收益的情况。在相对发达的苏南和上海地区,劳动力中非农就业在1993年已经开始进入到一个较为充分的状态。在这样的背景下,农户增收就主要来自于依附土地的财产性收入和进一步扩大的农业收入,即土地市场化收益。但是从实际发展情况来看,农户通过农地股份合作参与分享土地市场化收益的效果并不明显。主要原因如下:农地流转存在很强的行政干预性,农地流转的市场化程度较低;对于非农建设用地的市场化权益,农户介入程度很低;合作社仍然以能人和集体经济负责人为主进行创办,容易混淆和模糊集体经济和股份合作的界限,导致行政和经济职能不分;目前还没有一种机制介入土地征用一级市场的利益分享;农户自主性和参与度不高,特别是独立参与规模经营和农地非农化的程度偏低。第五部分即第九章,给出本文主要结论和政策建议。从长期来看,农户分享经济发展成果的机制在于土地要素市场化收益的参与。而土地要素市场化收益的最终归属主要在于农业经营收入和财产性收入方面的增加。这二者的结合恰好是目前正在大力推进的农地股份合作,所以本文的研究意义正是在此。更多还原

【Abstract】 Allow farmers to participate in economic growth and share the results of reform and opening-up, the key is to narrow the urban-rural income gap and increase peasants’ income. After 30 years’ reform and opening-up, the use of land factor and construction of novel peasant-land relationship have great importance of the peasants. Due to the long-term policy and institutional deficiencies, peasants have poor power on the possession of land. As a result, the factor’s allocative and substitutional efficiency of land are limited, and the contribution to income is weak, thus weakening the peasants’ capacity of using the land to participate in economic growth. Based on the combination of historical and practical methods, this article tries to find a viable mechanism that allow the peasant use the land to participate in economic growth and to share the results of the reform, specially for the present, all the local governments are actively pursuing joint stock-cooperative system on farm land.This paper includes nine chapters divided into five parts.The first part consisting of Chapter I and Chapter II is the foundation and preparation for the whole framework. Chapter I explicates the background, the motive, the cutting point, the technology route and methodology of the research. Chapter II focuses on the researches and literatures on the mechanism of the peasants sharing the returns of land marketization and the joint stock-cooperation system of farmland. Based on the practical demand, In this chapter, the research background and the relative mechanism of the peasants sharing the benefit of the land marketization, as well as the relevant issues on the stock-cooperation system of farmland are discussed through the review.The second part is comprised of Chapter III and Chapter IV, which is the theoretical premise and the fundamental framework of the analysis of this paper. Depending on the historical logics of peasant economy, Chapter III establishes the basic analytical framework of the peasant-land relationship and discusses the basic needs and behavior characteristics of the peasants. Moreover, before the Reform in 1978, the peasant-land relationship and the condition that peasants earn the return from the land in traditional Chinese society are studied in this chapter. Before introducing the neoclassical competitive analysis method, Chapter III clarifies the connotation and historical features of peasant economy that is the self-supporting and self-sufficient household operation and the inherent closure of the land ownership. The marketization was exerting influence in the traditional society, whereas the emergence of Yi-tian-er-zhu (there are plural owners on the same land) indicates the complexity of the peasant-land relationship in the traditional society, and the security and stability are the basic needs of the peasants. According to the behavior logic of peasant economy, the process of marketization of the peasant-land relationship under the social restraint might be an acceptable second-best solution. Therefore, when constructing the mechanism of peasants sharing the benefit of land marketization, it is still necessary to follow such historical inertia. The requirements of the historical tradition on the peasant-land relationship are its capability to safeguard the security of the peasants’ land tenure, to increase the positive stimulus for peasants so as to extend the effectiveness and to guarantee relatively fair returns from marketization for peasants.Chapter IV, putting the basic analytical framework of the peasant-land relationship under the restrictions of the national and local interests, further explains the practical needs of the peasants. The peasant’ behavior choice of maximization the income based on land returns was more and more restrained and impacted by the national and local interests before the reform and opening-up. Since 1978, because of the restriction on the land marketization, when gaining the factor return, peasants took two-stage decision making behavior. So the land return has limited impact on peasants. However, out of consideration for the national interest, the state implements measures like subsidy and land expropriation which increasingly influence the decision-making and income of peasants. The local government, because of the requirement on the political performance, usually ignores peasants’ basic rights and benefits, which obstructs peasants getting benefit from the land expropriation. The game problem among state, local government and peasant is the background and premise for the analysis of mechanism of peasants sharing the returns from land marketization.The third part is Chapter V, focusing on the analysis of experience and implication from Japan. The fact that Japanese rural economy narrowed rural-urban disparity in a relatively short period is greatly attributed to the mechanism that Japanese peasants participate in the process of the sharing returns form land marketization. The Japanese peasant-land relationship primarily pursues the unity of ownership, management and laboring and stabilizes the family-oriented and small-scale mode of operation. In the process of marketization, the peasant-land relationship gradually adapting to the need of economic development, promotes the land circulation. After the world war II, Japanese peasants experienced the changes from yeomen to self-management, then to agricultural operation organization. This process in fact is the process that the Japanese peasants fully enjoy the benefits of land marketization. New tendency and problems such as Population aging, farmers’ diversified economy, decrease of agricultural workers, advancing depopulation, abandonment of arable land, the coexistence of scale management and decentralization, appear in Japanese rural areas along with the rapid economical development. Also the rural-urban development disparity tends to be greater. All these changes bring about the further implementation of measures like permission for tenancy of land, corporate agricultural land holding rationalization and community supported agriculture. The implications from Japanese experience are to attach equal importance to legal personalization and collectivization meanwhile to emphasize the non-profitability of the legal personalization, to improve the peasant-land relationship under the cooperation among local government, business entity and peasants, to continuously perfect legal system, to adapt the peasant-land relationship in time, to facilitate the marketization of land and safeguard peasants’ benefit from marketization.The fourth part involves Chapter VI, Chapter VII and Chapter VIII, which is the main part of this paper. This part clearly indicates the feasible way to let peasants share the return of land marketization is joint stock-cooperation of farmland. It also analyzes the relevant mechanisms and actual development of peasants using joint stock-cooperation system to share the benefit of land marketization.Chapter VI analyzes the feasibility of joint stock-cooperation of farmland for peasants to share the benefit of land marketization. The practical demands of narrowing the rural-urban income disparity and boosting economical growth require enlarging influence of land factor for the increase of peasants’ income, to ensure peasants fully get all the benefit from the land and to form a permanent mechanism to protect peasants’ benefit from land marketization. We think that not only from the perspective of historical inertia but also from integration of the practical needs of national and local interests, the joint stock-cooperation system of farmland is the effective way to let peasants share the returns from land marketization. The urgent actual need is to increase the peasants’ property income, to raise the proportion of factor distribution especially its primary distribution in the peasants’ income structure. The joint stock cooperation system of farmland can carry out this function. This paper establishes the basic analytical framework of relationship between peasants and joint stock-cooperation system of farmland to further justify that the joint stock-cooperation system of farmland can help peasants realize the Pareto improvement in the land marketization. Also the relevant data in Shanghai 1978-2008 are referenced in the paper to demonstrate the feasibility of this system.Chapter VII analyzes the concrete ways and mechanism for peasants to share the returns from land marketization by adopting joint stock-cooperation system of farmland. This chapter mainly involves three aspects: first to identify collective land ownership of joint stock-cooperation system of farmland and carry out the equity of farmland according to the collective land ownership. And the joint stock-cooperation system of farmland as the main market subject take part in the process of land marketization and to ensure the land equity through stock dividends; meanwhile to separate the administrative and economical function of the local governments, to clarify the collective property of joint stock-cooperation system of farmland and to make sure the independence of the system; second, to perfect the mechanism of land marketization through joint stock-cooperation system of farmland so as to advance marketization of farmland circulation in the agriculture and improve the marketization of farmland conversion in the non-agriculture sector; finally this paper points out the detailed way of integrating the joint stock-cooperation system of farmland with the returns from land marketization and the specific type of peasants’ participation in joint stock-cooperation system of farmland.Chapter VIII is this paper’s empirical analysis. The cases in Shanghai and Taicang are used in the paper to analyze and examine the situation of peasants’ sharing of land marketization through joint stock-cooperation system of farmland. In the relatively developed areas like Southern Jiangsu and Shanghai, the non-agriculture employment of labor is quite full since 1993. Given this, the increment of peasants’ income comes from the property return of farmland and yields from expansion of agriculture development which is just the returns from land marketization. But in reality, it is not effective for peasants to share the returns from land marketization. There are several major reasons: the farmland circulation is so highly intervened by administration that the marketization of the land circulation is quite low; peasants’ participation and sharing of the returns from marketization of the non-agricultural construction land is very low; cooperation is mainly launched by master-hands or superintendents for collective economy, which leads to confusion and ambiguity of the distinction between collective economy and the cooperation; there is still no mechanism for the returns sharing in the primary market of land expropriation; the level of peasants’ autonomy and participation is low, especially in the independent participation in scale management and farmland conversion.The fifth part is Chapter IX, which gives out the main conclusions and policy suggestions. From the long term, the key for peasants to share the results of reform and opening-up is whether they can share the returns form land marketization. And wether peasants can gain the returns form land marketization depends on income increment from farm operating and property returns, while the joint stock-cooperation system of farmland can promote such mechanism to behave properly.更多还原