【作者】 黄波；

【导师】 孟卫东；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 研发(R&D)是企业核心竞争力的源泉与持续发展的动力。企业研发主要包括企业内部独立研发,外部技术市场购买以及结成研发联盟进行合作研发等三种形式。随着技术变革的加快、产品生命周期的缩短以及市场竞争的加剧,仅仅依靠企业内部有限的技术和资源进行研发变得日益困难,越来越多的企业倾向于采用联盟的方式进行研发活动,合作研发已成为企业技术创新的重要组织模式。合作研发的优势在于能共享资源,分担成本和风险,形成协同优势,了解或控制合作方的技术、市场和产品,影响市场的竞争态势,获得政府的资金和政策支持等。但联盟关系在建立6个月内即宣告失败的比率高达60%,我国以往建立的企业联盟成功率也只有50%左右,而道德风险和利益分配则是导致研发联盟不稳定的两个最主要因素,若能通过选择合理的利益分配方式,设计出一种激励机制,促使联盟成员自愿放弃投机行为,将大大提高研发联盟的效率和竞争力。针对道德风险和利益分配不合理导致我国研发联盟效率低下、失败率高企的现状,论文研究了如何通过合理的利益分配方式和联盟结构选择,设计出切实可行的激励机制,防范研发联盟道德风险,促使联盟成员如实揭示其私人信息、提高研发投入或付出应有努力,促进合作研发的成功,为企业、高校、科研机构以及政府科研管理部门的策略或政策制定提供理论指导。论文主要研究内容如下:①产业内研发联盟激励机制设计这部分研究由第3章“基于技术风险的产业内研发联盟激励机制设计”和第4章“基于溢出效应的产业内研发联盟激励机制设计”组成。研究了研发存在技术风险或投资溢出效应时,研发联盟成员在不同市场环境、联盟结构(并行研发联盟和集中研发联盟)以及利益分配方式下(平均分配和按投入比例分配收益)的投资策略,并分析了投资溢出、联盟结构和利益分配方式对联盟成员投资策略的影响,找出了不同外部环境下的最优利益分配方式和联盟结构,以此作为研发联盟激励机制防范联盟成员道德风险。②研发外包激励机制设计这部分研究由第5章“基于技术风险的研发外包激励机制设计”和第6章“不对称信息下研发外包激励机制设计”组成。第5章研究了在研发存在技术风险且成功概率与承包方研发投入相关,产品市场收益与发包方市场导入投资相关的研发外包合作中,如何利用利益分配方式作为激励机制,防范合作中承包方的道德风险。分析了固定支付方式、产出分享方式和混合方式等分配方式下,发包方和承包方的合作意愿和投资策略,并对混合方式进行了改进。通过理论分析找出了不同外部环境下的最优利益分配方式,以此激励承包方投入更多研发资源,促进研发外包成功,最后通过算例分析讨论了市场收益和分配比例对最优利益分配方式、双方的投资策略和利润的影响。第6章研究了如何利用利益分配方式作为激励机制,促使研发外包合作双方如实告知其私人信息并付出应有努力或投入足够研发资源。证明了在固定支付、产出分享和混合支付等三种传统利润分配方式下,研发外包合作双方均存在告知虚假私人信息并降低努力程度的道德风险。在此基础上提出将研发外包中的固定投入残值作为对承包方的一种补偿或有偿商品转移给承包方,设计出一种产出分享加固定转移支付(包括现金和固定投入残值)的新混合分配方式,确定了双方的分配比例和转移支付量,并证明了该分配方式可以规避研发外包中的双边道德风险,激励合作双方如实告知其私人信息并提供应有努力程度。③研发联盟激励机制实验经济学研究这部分是第7章研究内容。主要是运用实验经济学理论,按照存在溢出效应的条件下,采用平分收益的并行研发联盟投资博弈模型的假设构建实验条件,设计并实施实验,检验在与理论模型一致的环境下,真实人类的行为是否符合理论预测的行为结果,从而判断理论模型的可靠度和有效性。论文具有以下理论和方法上的创新:①有别于现有委托代理理论在道德风险情形下最优契约设计方面的研究,只是给出了最优合约应满足的一般特征,本文则是在解答为什么现实中在相似背景下会存在不同契约方式,是否还有更好的契约等问题的基础上,对现实中实际存在的合作模式(包括利益分配方式和联盟结构)的改进和对比分析,通过优选合作模式,设计出切实可行的激励机制,促进合作研发成功;②区别于现有研发外包激励机制设计多是从单边道德风险的角度研究承包方的道德风险及激励问题,本文考虑发包方和承包方均会采取降低研发资源投入或努力程度的投机行为,研究双边道德风险下基于技术风险的研发外包激励机制设计,同时激励发包方和承包方均放弃投机行为;③区别于现有研发外包激励机制设计研究的是道德风险或逆向选择问题,本文考虑发包方和承包方均不仅存在“隐藏行动”的道德风险问题,还存在“隐藏信息”的逆向选择问题,研究了如何在不对称信息下的研发外包中通过合理的利益分配设计来同时防范发包方和承包方的“隐藏行动”和“隐藏信息”,即同时解决双边道德风险和双边逆向选择问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 Research and development (R&D) is an enterprise’s key source for obtaining core competitiveness and sustainable development. There are three R&D modes, including independent R&D, acquiring from external technology market, and R&D alliance. With the acceleration of technological change, shortening of product life cycle and intensification of market competition, it is becoming increasingly difficult that an enterprise does R&D relying solely on its limited internal resources, as a result, R&D alliance has become more and more enterprises’preferred approach to do R&D.Cooperative R&D has the advantage of being able to share resources, costs and risks, form synergies, know or control partners’technology, market and product, influence market competition, obtain funding and policy support from government. However, 60% of alliances ended in failure within 6 months after establishment. In China, the success rate of alliances is only about 50%. As moral hazard and profit sharing are the key factor causing the instability of R&D alliances, if we can design and incentive mechanism, through choosing a reasonable profit-sharing arrangement to motivate members of R&D alliance, to voluntarily give up opportunism, the efficiency and competitiveness of R&D alliances will be greatly enhance.In view of existing situation that moral hazard and unfair profit sharing cause low efficiency and high failure rate of R&D alliance in China, this paper studies how to design a practical incentive mechanism, through choosing a reasonable profit-sharing arrangement and alliance structure, to prevent moral hazard in R&D alliance, stimulate members of alliance to reveal their private information truthfully and enhance R&D investment or commit enough efforts, as a result, the cooperative R&D becomes successful. The conclusions of this paper are supposed to be a theoretical guidance for the strategy- or policy-making of enterprises, universities, research institutions and government.The main research contents of this paper are as follows.①Incentive mechanism design for intra-industry R&D allianceThis part is composed of Chapter 3, incentive mechanism design for intra-industry R&D alliance with technological uncertainty, and Chapter 4, incentive mechanism design for intra-industry R&D alliance with spillover effect. It is studied that the members’investment polices under different market conditions, alliance structures, including parallel R&D alliance and jointed R&D alliance, and profit-sharing arrangements, including equal profit-sharing arrangement and proportional profit-sharing arrangement, under the condition of technology uncertainty and spillover effect in R&D, as well as the effect of input spillover, alliance structure and profit-sharing arrangement on members’investment policies. The optimal profit-sharing arrangement and alliance structure for different external condition are found, which can be used as an incentive mechanism to prevent moral hazard.②Incentvie mechanism design for R&D outsourcingThis part is composed of of Chapter 5, incentvie mechanism design for R&D outsourcing with technological uncertainty, and Chapter 6, incentvie mechanism design for R&D outsourcing under asymmetric information.In Chapter 5, under the assumption that there is technique uncertainty in R&D, and the success probability of R&D and market return is relative to individual resource committed on them, it is studied how to use profit sharing arrangement as incentive mechanism to prevent moral hazard in R&D outsourcing. The willingness to cooperate and commitment policies of both outsourcer and supplier with fixed sharing arrangement, proportional sharing arrangement, or mixed sharing arrangement are investigated, and the mix sharing arrangement is improved, furthermore, the optimal profit sharing arrangement for different condition is found out through theoretical analysis,under which the probability of R&D outsourcing and the profit of both outsourcer and supplier will be raised. Finally, a numerical example is given to analyze the effect of market returns and distribution proportion on the optimal profit sharing arrangement, as well as the commitment policies and profits of both sides.In Chapter 6, it is studied that how to use profit sharing arrangement as an incentive mechanism to stimulate both sides of R&D outsourcing to reveal their private information and make enough effort or commitment. First, it is proved that there is double-sided moral hazard in R&D outsourcing under fixed, proportional or mixed profit sharing arrangement. Subsequently, under the suggestion that the outsourcer should transfer the salvage value of R&D investment to the supplier as a payment or paid commidity, an improved mixed profit sharing arrangement is proposed, composed of a fixed transfer payment and proportional sharing, which is proved to be able to prevent double-sided moral hazard, and stimulate both sides to reveal their private information and make enough effort.③experimental study on incentive mechanism design for R&D alliance This part is Chapter7. In this part, using the theory of experimental economics, the experimental enviroment is established according to the game model of parallel R&D alliance under equal profit-sharing arrangement and spillover effect. By designing and doing laboratory experiment, and comparing the activities of human being under the condition of the model with the predictions of the model, the reliability and effectiveness of theoretical solution is tested.The theoretical and methodological innovations of this paper are as follows.①Different from the existing literature applying principal-agent theory to design the optimal contract under moral hazard, which just puts forward the general characteristics of the optimal contract, this paper answers why there are different contracts in the similar context of reality, and whether there is a better contract and suchlike questions. Under this basis, this paper designs the practical and feasible incentive mechanism to promote the success of cooperative R&D by comparing and improving those actual cooperation models in reality, including the profit sharing arrangement and alliance structure, from which choosing the optimal cooperation model.②Different from the existing literature in incentive mechanism design for R&D outsourcing, in which there just exists single-sided moral hazard form the supplier, in this paper, under the consideration that both the outsourcer and the supplier will adopt opportunism, reducing R&D investment or efforts, and reveal false private information, it is studied that the incentive mechanism for R&D outsourcing with double-sided moral hazard and technological uncertainty, which is used to stimulate both the outsourcer and the supplier to give up opportunism.③Different from the existing literature, in which it is studied how to solve moral hazard or adverse selection in R&D outsourcing, in this paper, under the consideration that both the outsourcer and the supplier will adopt not only hidden action but also hidden information, it is studied how to design a reasonable profit sharing arrangement for R&D outsourcing with asymmetric information to prevent the hidden action and hidden information from the outsourcer and the supplier, in other word, solve double-sided moral hazard and double-sided adverse selection simultaneously.更多还原