【作者】 陈树桢；

【导师】 熊中楷；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 技术经济及管理， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 在全球化竞争的网络经济时代,电子商务成为制造企业的发展平台与生存方式,为中国制造企业的发展带来了新的契机;但在传统零售与网上直销并存的双渠道供应链中,制造商既是传统零售商的供应商同时又是其直接竞争者,致使渠道冲突成为关注的焦点问题;不仅如此,电子商务环境下营销渠道的选择与协调又在很大程度上决定着供应链的成功与否。鉴于此,本文在渠道和谐与利润最大化的双重要求下,以制造商为核心,运用博弈论、运筹学、市场学及产业经济学等学科的理论和方法,研究了在传统零售渠道基础上引入网上直销渠道时,制造商的策略性定价与补偿激励和营销渠道选择之间的内在关系;在传统零售与在线直销并存的双渠道供应链中,研究了如何设计合同以实现供应链协调并保证渠道成员双赢从而在全球化竞争的网络经济时代提升供应链整体竞争优势。首先,在传统零售价高于网上直销价的假设下,构建了以制造商为核心的双渠道供应链模型。以单个传统零售渠道的定价策略为基础,研究了为缓解渠道冲突,制造商如何调整网上直销价与批发价使零售商逐渐适应双渠道供应链环境并使自己从这两种渠道获取的总收益最大;分析了双渠道市场上基于维持批发价不变、维持传统零售价不变和制定批发价与网上直销价最大化制造商利润的三种策略性定价与营销渠道选择之间的内在关系;揭示了双渠道供应链下,制造商与供应链的利润总是增加而零售商的利润总是减少这一现象。其次,上述双渠道市场的定价策略中,均未考虑渠道服务差异与补偿策略,致使渠道价格竞争激烈而侵蚀了零售商的利润。鉴于此,综合考虑了制造商广告投入、零售商为产品提供增值服务投入且制造商补偿零售商的增值服务投入对双渠道供应链的影响;分析了基于两种竞争博弈(三阶段博弈与两阶段博弈)的增值服务补偿策略选择(成本补偿策略与水平补偿策略)和营销渠道选择之间的内在关系;揭示了在一定条件下,双渠道市场能实现制造商与零售商收益的Pareto改进。然后,在传统零售与网上直销渠道价格竞争下,构建了零售商以创新投入降低其物流、库存等分销成本以扩展其利润空间、制造商投资以补偿零售商创新投入成本的双渠道供应链模型。研究发现,创新投入及其补偿投资能够实现渠道成员收益的Pareto改进,但不能达到供应链整体最优,设计了使供应链达到协调的降价补偿合同与两部定价合同。结果表明,降价补偿合同不能实现双渠道供应链协调,而通过合理设置参数,两部定价合同能够达到双渠道供应链协调并保证渠道成员双赢。最后,在传统零售与网上直销并存的双渠道供应链下,构建了零售商进行促销投入以提升零售渠道的销售量、制造商投资补偿零售商促销投入成本的双渠道供应链模型。分析、比较了集中式与分散式决策下供应链的利润。结果表明,分散式决策无法实现供应链整体利益最大化,渠道需要协调;设计了两部定价合同、两部定价与促销水平补偿的组合合同以实现供应链协调。研究发现,单独的两部定价合同不能协调双渠道供应链,而两部定价与促销水平补偿的组合合同能够实现供应链协调并保证渠道成员双赢,且满足这种条件的组合合同有无穷多个。更多还原

【Abstract】 The e-commerce has been both as a development platform and a means of survival and has brought new opportunities for the manufacturer in the global competition of network economy era. However, with the coexistence of the traditional retail channel and the online direct channel in a dual-channel supply chain, the manufacturer both as a supplier and a direct competitor to the retailer leading to channel conflict is a core focus of the supply chain management. Moreover, the marketing channel choice and the coordination mechanisms have a significant effect on the success of the supply chain management. Therefore, by adopting theories and methods of Game Theory,Operations Research,Marketing Science and Industrial Economics,this paper based on the channels harmony and the profit maximization, focuses on the intrinsic relationship between the strategic pricing and the a strategic compensation and the choice of marketing channels with addition an online channel to the traditional retail channel. At the same time this paper also has studied how to design contracts so as to achieve the coordination and realize the win-win situation both for the manufacturer and the retailer in the dual-channel supply chain and to enhance the competitive advantage of the supply chain in the era of global economy of the network.Firstly, we develop a model in the dual-channel supply chain under the assumption of the retailer’s price greater than the manufacturer’s online price.We consider in order to mitigate the channel conflict the manufacturer, who acts as a Stackelberg leader, selects wholesale and direct price to acclimatize the retailer to the dual channel scenario gradually and to maximize his profit by the direct online channel and the retailer channel. And we identify the intrinsic relationship between the manufacturer’s strategic pricing and the marketing channel choice in the dual-channel supply chain based on the pricing strategy in the single traditional channel. These pricing strategies are①keeping wholesale prices as they were before,②keeping retail prices as they were before,③selecting wholesale and retail prices that optimize profits for the manufacturer himself. Within these strategies, we also reveal some phenomena that the profits for the manufacturer as well as the supply chain always improve while the profits for retailer always decline under some conditions in the dual–channel supply chain. Secondly, the above mentioned pricing strategies in the dual-channel supply chain have not taken into consideration the service differences between the traditional channel and the direct Internet channel which result in intense price competition between them and erode the retailers’ profit in turn. Therefore, we first take into comprehensive consideration that the manufacturer has invested in brand name and the retailer provide value-adding service for the customer in the traditional channel and then the manufacturer compensated the value-adding investment for the retailer in the dual-channel supply chain. Next, we analyze the intrinsic relationship between the manufacturer’s strategic compensatiton choice based on Stackelberg game and three -stage game and the marketing channel choice in the dual-channel supply chain.And we also resolve phenomenon that the profits can be improved both for the manufacturer and the retailer under certain condition in the dual-channel supply chain.Thirdly, we develop a model that the retailer makes investment in innovation to reduce its logistic cost or its inventory operating cost and the manufacturer makes investment to compensate for the retailer investment in innovation based on the coexistence of the traditional retail and the direct online channel. It demonstrates that the strategic incentive subsidy investment in innovation can realize the profits Pareto improvement both for the retailer and the manufacturer. But the incentive subsidy investment in innovation alone cannot maximize the profits for the dual-channel supply chain under decentralized. Therefore, a price–markdown contract (or a price-markup contract) and a two-part tariffs contract have been designed for coordinating the dual-channel supply chain. It turns out that the price–markdown contract cannot coordinate the dual-channel supply chain while the two-part tariffs contract can do and achieve a win-win situation both for the manufacturer and the retailer.Finally, we set up a model that the retailer advertises locally to increase his own sales and the manufacturer makes investment to compensate the advertisement cost for the retailer based on the coexistence of the traditional retail channel and the Internet direct channel .By comparing and analyzing the optimal promotion investment, incentive compensation investment and pricing strategies between the integrated and decentralized in the dual-channel supply chain, we found that the profit in the dual-channel supply chain under the decentralized is less than the integrated. So we study the two-part tariff contract to coordinated the dual-channel supply chain and draw a conclusion that that the two-part tariff alone cannot achieve the dual-channel supply chain coordination while the suitable two-part tariff contract combined with a promotion-level subsidy contract can do and a“win- win”situation can be realized and then the manufacturer can provide infinite such combined contracts for coordination of dual- channel supply chain.更多还原