【作者】 高峻；

【导师】 夏新平；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 企业管理， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 在股权分置改革的时代背景下,本文以2003—2007年间的上市公司为样本,采用数据挖掘技术和统计技术,从分红意愿和分红水平两个方面,对股权分置改革前后我国上市公司的现金股利政策进行了比较分析。对股权分置改革、股权结构与现金股利政策关系的实证研究表明:股权分置状态下,非流通控股股东有较强的分红偏好,现金股利政策往往成为大股东继关联交易之后另一个利益输送“隧道”;股权分置改革后,这种强烈的分红偏好,无论是在分红意愿还是分红水平上都显著下降,从而证实股权分置改革完成后,大股东利用现金股利政策进行利益输送的动机减弱。针对股权制衡度与现金股利政策关系的实证研究结果支持多个大股东相互制衡的假设,不支持多个大股东合谋假设。股权分置状态下,多个大股东制衡的股权结构有利于抑制控股股东利用现金股利政策侵占小股东利益,股权分置改革完成后,股权制衡度虽有所提高,但依然处于较低水平,制衡的股权结构尚未完全形成,其抑制现金股利侵占效应的作用有所提高,但还不够显著。针对不同股权属性主导子样本的实证研究表明:国有股权主导公司现金股利隧道效应的减弱程度强于民营股权主导公司,其中地方政府持股比例与现金股利支付率正向关系的减弱程度强于中央政府,而民营股权持股比例与现金股利支付率的正向关系在股权分置改革后虽有所减弱,但不显著。针对控股股东与现金股利政策关系的实证研究表明:股权分置改革后,存在控股股东的上市公司每股现金股利水平下降,且每股现金股利与控股股东持股比例的正相关系显著减弱,从而再次证明股权分置改革后现金股利的“隧道”效应减弱。考虑现金股利政策与成长性的关系后,进一步发现股权分置改革前,公司成长性与现金股利政策的关系不显著,而股权分置改革后,公司成长性与股权结构的交叉变量和分红水平显著负相关,说明股权分置改革后,大股东不顾企业长远发展的恶性分红行为得到有效遏制。综上所述,股权分置改革后,源于股权结构的优化、大小股东利益基础的统一、双重代理矛盾的缓解、公司治理结构的完善、资本市场各项功能的有效发挥,中国上市公司现金股利分配政策的异常现象逐步回归正常,超能力派现行为、融资派现行为明显减少;股利分配连续性增强;分红意愿上升;大股东利用现金股利政策进行利益输送的行为得到有效抑制。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the context of non-tradable share reform, this article uses the Chinese listed companies as the sample, using the data mining and the statistical technology, compares the cash dividends policy during the year of 2003-2007 from the aspects of distribution desire and distribution level to examine how the non-tradable share reform affects the cash dividends distribution behavior of Chinese listed companies.The empirical study of the relationship between non-tradable share reform, equity structure and cash dividends policy shows: under the equity split state, the controlling non-tradable shareholders have strong preference for cash dividends, cash dividends policy tend to become another benefit transportation "tunnel" following internal transactions for majority shareholders. After the reform, whether in the cash dividends distribution desire or distribution level, this strong preference has dropped significantly, thereby confirming after the reform, the "tunnel" motivation through cash dividends policy of majority shareholders is reduced.The empirical study of the relationship between the degree of equity balance and cash dividends policy supports the hypothesis of multiple large shareholders tend to restriction each other, but does not supports the collusion hypothesis. Under the equity split state, the balance equity structure with several large shareholders is helpful to curb the "tunnel" behavior through cash dividends policy of majority shareholders, after the reform, although the degree of equity balance improved, but still at a low level, the balance equity structure has not yet fully formed, its suppression effect of cash dividends expropriation has increased, but not significant.The empirical study of different equity property sub-samples indicates that: the reduced level of cash dividends "tunnel" effect for state-owned companies is stronger than private companies, of which the weakening extent of the positive relationship between local government stakes and cash dividends payout ratio is stronger than that of the central government. The positive relationship between the proportion of private equity and cash dividends payout ratio is weakened after the reform, but not significant.The empirical study of the relationship between controlling shareholder and cash dividends policy shows: the cash dividend per share drops in companies with a controlling shareholder after the non-tradable share reform. In addition, the positive correlation between the cash dividend per share and the share-holding proportion of controlling shareholder has weakened significantly, thereby confirming again "the tunnel effect" of cash dividends is weaken after the reform. When considering the relationship between cash dividends policy and company’s growth, further research found before the non-tradable share reform, the relationship was not significant, after the reform, the cross-variable of company’s growth and equity structure has a significantly negative correlation with cash dividends per share. This indicates after the reform, the malignant cash dividends distribution behavior regardless of long-term development of majority shareholders is effectively curbed.Summarizing, after the non-tradable share reform, because of the optimization of equity structure, results in: the unification of the interests basis of majority and minority shareholders; the mitigation of dual agency conflict; the improvement of corporate governance structure; a more effective capital market; and the abnormal phenomenon in cash dividends distribution behavior of Chinese listed companies gradually returns to normal, furthermore, the phenomenon of distributing cash dividends beyond companies’ capability and distributing cash dividends for further financing are significantly reduced; the continuity of cash dividends policy is enhanced; and the cash dividends distribution desire is rising. The conclusion is: after the reform, the "tunnel" behavior through cash dividends policy of majority shareholders is effectively curbed.更多还原