【作者】 董方军；

【导师】 袁伦渠；

【作者基本信息】 北京交通大学 ， 产业经济学， 2010， 博士

【摘要】 近年来,中国在国际铁矿石谈判中屡屡受挫,国内铁矿石价格飞速上涨,国民经济受到重大影响。面对这一经济现象,不少文章试图分析其原因与对策,但均因缺乏坚实的理论基础而缺乏解释力。笔者认为,要分析与铁矿石价格相关的经济现象,就必须深入分析国际铁矿石市场独特的价格机制,而国际铁矿石市场的价格机制是多种定价方式并存且相互之间密切联系的复杂价格机制,需要创新的价格理论对其加以剖析、解释。本文在融合契约理论与多元价格理论的基础上,从契约安排的全新视角审视铁矿石定价方式,提出国际铁矿石市场契约安排频谱的概念,构建了铁矿石市场主体通过选择契约安排实现市场整体均衡的价格机制模型。基于本模型,笔者分析了各类铁矿石定价方式(内部转移定价、长期合同定价和现货定价)的价格决定机制与内在联系,从而为铁矿石价格问题的经济解释提供了理论依据。在第一章导论之后,第二章回顾了与本文论点相关的理论基础——多元价格理论、契约理论以及和各类基本定价方式(内部转移定价、长期合同定价和现货定价)相关的价格理论,同时基于研究对象的相似性,笔者同时回顾了国内外学者对铁矿石市场的研究成果。笔者系统论述了这些文献对本文的借鉴意义和不足之处。第三章奠定了铁矿石市场价格机制的基本原理。笔者认为,铁矿石市场上各种与定价方式直接相关的契约安排可被串联成一条连续渐变的契约安排频谱,这使得契约安排成为一个连续变量。从频谱的左端到右端,买卖双方的关系逐渐趋于市场化,价格刚性逐渐减弱。由于铁矿石市场主体的利润是外部环境和契约安排的函数,针对既定的外部环境,铁矿石买卖双方在利润最大化的动机驱使下围绕契约安排进行讨价还价。由于契约安排即价格决定方式,故当这种讨价还价达到纳什均衡状态时,均衡价格、交易数量及其他相关经济变量同时被决定,铁矿石市场随即达到均衡状态。按照铁矿石买卖双方的关系及其价格决定方式的本质性不同,笔者将契约安排频谱分为三段:纵向一体化区间、长期合同区间和现货交易区间,它们分别对应现实中铁矿石的三类基本定价方式。利用上述基本原理,笔者在第四、五、六章分别分析了三段区间各自对应的定价方式的内在机理与相互联系。其中第四章依照现有的内部转移定价理论,沿契约安排频谱区分了弱激励机制、次弱激励机制、次强激励机制和强激励机制下的价格决定机制,并分析了股权结构对相应价格决定机制的影响;第五章依照轮流出价讨价还价模型,分析了贴现率、外部选择利润、契约安排、产业集中度和战略行为对均衡谈判价格的影响,对解释我国在铁矿石谈判中“屡战屡败”的表现得出诸多有益启示;第六章应用传统微观经济学理论分析了现货价格决定机制,重点分析了战略行为、进口资质和转卖限制对现货价格的影响,这对分析我国铁矿石现货价格与长期合同价格的交替上涨很有应用价值。第七章为实证研究部分,笔者应用第三至六章的理论,分析了国际铁矿石市场的热点经济现象,包括战后国际铁矿石市场主流契约安排的变化趋势及近年来我国铁矿石价格的飞速上涨。相比于同类文献,本文构建了更加贴近现实的铁矿石市场微观价格模型,而市场与其它初级产品市场的相似性使得本文的理论模型具备更大的适用性。此外,本文还通过对契约理论和多元价格理论的融合与发展实现了经济学理论创新。更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years, China failed the international negotiation on iron ore importing price, the importing and domestic iron ore prices skyrocket in China, and the national economy is severely influenced. As regards to the economic phenomenon, many scholars have tried to give analysis and Countermeasures, but their articles have insufficient explanation capabilities because of the lack of theretical basis. The author asserts that there must be special price theory innovated to explain the phenomenon relating to the iron ore price since the price mechanism of iron ore market is highly complicated, in which various pricing formation methods exist and they react to each other.By combing the contract theory and multiple price theory, the author interprets the price formation of iron ore from the perspective of contractual arrangement. The author creats the contractual spectrum of iron ore market, and formulates the conceptual model in which the iron ore market reaches equilibrium resulting from the players’ choosing the contractual arrangement from the spectrum. Based on this model, the author deeply formulates the internal mechanism of different basic pricing methods and their inter relationships, so as to provide theoretical basis for explaining the phenomenons relating to iron ore prices.Chapter 2 reviews the relative basic theories, namely, multiple prices theory, contract theory and the price theory related to each basic kind of price formation (internal transfer price, long-term contract price and spot price). Furthermore, based on the similarity of the research objective, the chapter also briefly reviews the research on iron ore market by domestic and foreign scholars. In this chapter, the author analyzes the current theories’ advantages to be used and weaknesses to be improved.Chapter 3 founds the basic rules of price mechanism of iron ore market. The author asserts that all the contractual arrangements in the iron ore market can be connected into a continous and incrementally chaning spectrum, which makes the contractual arrangement a continuous variable. Form the left end to the right end, the commitement between the sellers and the buyers is becoming looser and the price rigidity is becoming lighter. Because the players’ profit is a function of the contractual arrangement and external environment, the player will bargain with the rival in order to reach the contractual arrangement closest to the optimized one which maximize its profit. Since contractual arrangement is synonym for price formation method, the equilibrium price, quantity, transaction cast and all other profit related variables are determined at the same time when the contractual arrangement is determined, and hence the whole market reach the equilibrium. Accoring to the substantial difference in price formation, the author divides the spectrum into three intervals, namely the interval of vertical integration, long term contract and spot transaction, respectively.Based on the rules above, the author analyzes the internal mechanism of the three basic pricing methods and their inter relationships in chapter 4, 5 and 6 respectively. Chapter 4 formalutes price formation of different incentive system along the contractual spectrum within the vertical integration interval based on existed internal pricing theories, and impacts of equity holding struacture. Chapter 5 formulates price formation in the long-term contract interval using the bargaining theory, and analyzes impacts on the equilibrium negotiated price form outside options, discount rates, industrial concentration and strategic behaviours, etc., which can explain why China always fails the international iron ore negotiation. Chapter 6 formulates the price formation of spot market based on traditional micro economics theories, and focues on the impact of import credentialing and selling restriction, which can explain the alternative rising of long-term contract price and spot price.Chapter 7 is empirical research. Based on what has been got from chapter 3 to 6, the author explains the focal phenomenons including the changing trend of mainstream contractual arrangements in the iron ore market and the skyrocketing price of the importing and domestic iron ore price in China.Compared to other literatures in this field, the author establishes a microscopic price theory which is much closer to the reality, and the similarity between the iron ore market and other primary product markets, the dissertation has much wider applicability. Furthermore, the author realizes theoretical innovation by combining the contract theory and the multiple price theory.更多还原