【作者】 严建新；

【导师】 王续琨；

【作者基本信息】 大连理工大学 ， 科学学与科学技术管理， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 科学研究已是一种高度职业化的活动。目前,中国基础研究呈数量型发展的特征比较明显。在基础研究投入与产出之间,科学家的自利行为是影响产出质量的中间变量之一,以科学研究职业化为背景探讨科学家的自利性问题将有助于认识职业科学家的行为,进而有助于改善中国的基础研究管理。职业科学家的自利性是指职业科学家在涉及科学研究的活动中,出于自身综合利益的考虑而理性地追求同行承认最大化的行为倾向。职业科学家对科研组织具有依附性,他们从事科学研究既有公益动机也有私利动机。通过分析同行承认与科学家个人综合利益之间的关系,本文认为科学发现的优先权之争实质包含了利益之争。在资源稀缺的约束下科学家倾向于理性地选择实现综合利益的最优路径。科学发展有其内在逻辑,科学家能在一定程度上把握学科的发展趋势。通过分析职业科学家基于学科发展趋势的理性选择,本文阐述了科学家自利性产生的正效应。在自上而下和自下而上相结合的遴选一资助模式中,各有侧重的遴选一资助原则引导科学家的理性选择,使基础研究体系快速反应和自适应的正效应体现社会和科学发展的需要。在作为基础研究最终委托人的社会与作为最终代理人的科学家之间,存在着多层次的委托一代理关系。职业科学家有可能利用信息的不对称,在利益的驱使下采取机会主义行动骗取研究经费和同行的承认,从而产生学术不端的背德效应。同样在利益的驱使下,职业科学家也可能会理性地追求眼前利益而产生急功近利的短期效应。中国科研组织普遍实施量化管理制度。本文分析了基于研究论文的评价方式及其对科学家行为的影响,认为诱致急功近利的制度因素是收益递减机制的缺失,并在级差较大的每一个评价级别中产生“劣币驱逐良币”的效应。本文提出“细化级差,衰减收益”的改进措施,引导科学家适时提高选题的质量,同时指出中国基础研究的急功近利问题必须自上而下地加以解决。学术不端是职业科学家违背学术道德的自利行为。科学系统有内在的防范机制和纠错机制,这两项机制的作用是很有限的,并不是所有被发现的学术不端行为都会被揭露。博弈分析的结果表明,核查强度和惩处力度的不足是诱致学术不端行为的主要制度因素。本文认为,应依法追究重大学术不端行为的刑事责任,从总体上加大学术不端行为的预期成本,以遏制学术不端行为的发生。更多还原

【Abstract】 Basic research has been a highly professionalized activity. Recently, the development of China’s basic research is characterized obviously by quantitative type. Between the input and output of basic research, the self-interest of scientists is one of the variables that could impact the quality of the output. To study the issue of self-interest of scientists under background of professionalization is helpful for understanding the scientist’s behavior and improving the scientific administration in China.The self-interest of a professional scientist is defined as the behavior trend to pursue rationally the maximization of peer recognition for his own comprehensive interest. Professional scientists adhere to research organization and the motivations of a professional scientist of doing basic research include the public interest and his own interest. Having analyzed the relationship between the recognition and the comprehensive interest, this dissertation argues that the priority disputes of scientific discovery involves the interest disputes of the scientists who involve. With constrain of resource scarcity, scientist trends to choose his optimal path rationally to obtain comprehensive interest.Science develops also by its own intrinsic logic and the development tendency of a discipline could be forecasted to a certain extend by those who research in the corresponding fields. Through the analysis of the rational choice made by scientists based on their understanding of the development tendency, this dissertation describes the positive effects caused by scientists’ self-interested decision. In the select-and -grant types of bottom-up, and top- down-and-bottom-up-mixed, the select-and-grant principles with different concentrations guide scientists’ rational choices, making the quick response effect and self adaptive effect reflect the need of social and scientific development.Between society as the final principal and professional scientist as the final agent, there are principal-agent relationships in different levels. Professional scientists driven by interest could make use of information asymmetry and take opportunistic actions to gain grant or peer recognition by cheating, resulting in immoral effect of research misconduct. Also motivated by interest, they might pursue their interest in near future and the other negative short-term effect of being eager for quick success and instant benefit should be caused.The quantitative method is widely applied in administration of China’s research institutes and universities. Based on the analysis of the way of assessing research papers and its effect on scientist’s behavior, this dissertation suggests that the lack of a mechanism in diminishing returns is the institutional reason that induces a scientist being eager for quick success and instant benefit, and the phenomenon of bad money driving good money out of circulation might happen within any assessment grade with large span. It is suggested in this dissertation that the administration could be improved by introducing attenuation coefficients into recent assessment and dividing the grades into smaller ones in order to encourage scientists to improve the quality of papers. And it is also pointed that the problem of scientists’ being eager for quick success and instant benefit must be solved top-down.Research misconduct is the self-interested behavior of scientists, which violates research morality. There are preclusive and corrective mechanisms inside scientifc system itself, but their functions are quite limited. Not all the discovered misconducts are revealed. The result of game analysis shows that the weak strength in examination and punishment is the institutional inducement for research misconducts. This dissertation holds that it is necessary to give those scientists criminal sanctions who misconduct seriously in their research activities, increasing the anticipated cost of misconduct on the whole so that the misconducts can be restrained.更多还原