【作者】 袁聚录；

【导师】 段忠桥；

【作者基本信息】 中国人民大学 ， 马克思主义基本原理， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 作为分析的马克思主义学派的创立者和首要代表,柯亨对右翼自由至上主义者诺齐克的持有正义理论作了最为犀利的批判。诺齐克持有正义理论在社会主义与资本主义之间赋予后者以正当性,柯亨则对诺齐克持有正义理论予以反驳,证明了社会主义的正当性,并批判了资本主义的不正当。柯亨对诺齐克持有正义理论的批判,反映着当代道德哲学和政治哲学在社会主义与资本主义孰为正当问题上的流变规律,代表着社会主义阵营在道德哲学和政治哲学领域同资本主义阵营进行争辩的主流方向。系统而又逻辑地分析柯亨对诺齐克持有正义理论的批判,对于全面认识和理解当代道德哲学和政治哲学的最新发展,丰富批判资本主义与捍卫社会主义的视角,使大众充分认识到社会主义的正当与资本主义的不正当,从而消除苏东剧变以来一些人对社会主义的成见,使越来越多的人树立起社会主义信念都不无裨益。不仅如此,系统而又逻辑地分析柯亨对诺齐克持有正义理论的批判,对于社会主义运动和社会主义建设,尤其对于有中国特色社会主义和谐社会建设,具有重要的理论借鉴意义。关于柯亨对诺齐克持有正义理论的批判,国内外一些学者从多个侧面展开了相关研究,但系统性、逻辑性的分析尚未出现。有鉴于此,本文就柯亨对诺齐克持有正义理论的批判予以系统而又逻辑的分析。柯亨之所以批判诺齐克的持有正义理论,其深层动因有两个。其一,诺齐克持有正义理论为资本主义所作的辩解和对社会主义的否定亵渎了柯亨的社会主义信念。在柯亨看来,诺齐克持有正义理论从自我所有原则出发推论出持有的权利,并且声称符合持有权利要求的分配就是正义的分配。柯亨分析道,按照诺齐克持有正义理论,资本主义的不平等分配由于符合持有权利的要求,所以就是正义的,而社会主义的平等分配由于不符合持有权利的要求,所以就是不正义的。柯亨指出,从道德哲学和政治哲学上讲,诺齐克持有正义理论为资本主义所作的辩解和对社会主义的否定都堪称历史之最。对于社会主义,柯亨始终抱有坚定的信念,他从来都认为社会主义是正义的,资本主义是不正义的,社会主义终将代替资本主义,因此他决不允许任何对社会主义的攻击。故而,当诺齐克持有正义理论否定社会主义时,柯亨便奋起回击。其二,柯亨认为传统马克思主义不能有效回击诺齐克持有正义理论为资本主义所作的辩解和对社会主义的否定。依照柯亨的理解,传统马克思主义由于存在四个方面的缺陷,所以不能有效回击诺齐克持有正义理论为资本主义所作的辩解和对社会主义的否定。第一,传统马克思主义没有形成系统化、理论化的分配正义观,因而没有相应的现成理论可以用来回击诺齐克持有正义理论为资本主义所作的辩解和对社会主义的否定。第二,传统马克思主义认为,有两个历史趋势,即不断壮大的工人阶级和生产力的高度发展,会保证平等分配的实现。但是,对柯亨来说,这两个历史趋势都已不复存在,因此,传统马克思主义对平等分配的证明不再有效,也就不能给诺齐克持有正义理论所反对的社会主义平等分配提供有效证明。第三,传统马克思主义对资本主义的批判存在如下缺陷:把生产资料的初始不平等分配视为剥削赖以产生的必要条件,但没有看到,即使生产资料初始分配平等化,剥削也同样不可避免;在工人的劳动力价值是否被资本家窃取的问题上存在不一致;忽视了诸如没有劳动能力的人等非生产者的的贫困。柯亨指出,由于上述缺陷,传统马克思主义就不能针对诺齐克持有正义理论为资本主义所作的辩解展开有效回击。第四,传统马克思主义本身在对平等必然性的证明、对社会主义分配正义原则的构想、对资本主义不正义的批判等方面,都没有拒绝诺齐克持有正义理论所坚持的自我所有原则,这就造成了传统马克思主义与诺齐克持有正义理论拥有同一个前提,所以就容易受到诺齐克持有正义理论的攻击,也就谈不上有效回击诺齐克持有正义理论为资本主义所作的辩解和对社会主义的否定了。由于认为传统马克思主义不能有效回击诺齐克持有正义理论所构成的挑战,柯亨便产生一种回击诺齐克持有正义理论的责任感,并由此展开对诺齐克持有正义理论的批判。在对诺齐克持有正义理论的批判中,柯亨把批判的矛头首先指向诺齐克的转让正义理论。诺齐克转让正义理论试图佐证诺齐克持有正义理论从总体上对资本主义所作的辩解和对社会主义的否定。对此,柯亨在作了必要的理论预设后,予以透彻剖析并从两个方面来完成对诺齐克转让正义理论的驳斥。首先,在理论预设中,柯亨把自由理解为权利中立解释意义上的自由与人的本质意义上的自由。前一种意义上的自由可以表述为,“无论何时,某人干涉了我的行动,我在这种程度上就是不自由的,不管我有没有权利来实施它们,不管我的阻碍者有没有权利来干涉我”;后一种意义上的自由即传统社会主义人的本质观念意义上的自由。柯亨主张,为了更重要的权利中立解释意义上的自由,可以去限制不重要的权利中立解释意义上的自由;为了人的本质意义上的自由,可以去限制权利中立解释意义上的自由;一定条件下,为了平等,可以去限制自由。其次,在对诺齐克转让正义理论的剖析中,柯亨揭示道,诺齐克转让正义理论把资本主义社会中的自愿交易视为自由,并以自由来定义正义,断言资本主义由于允许自愿交易,所以就是自由的和正义的,而实行平等分配的社会主义则恰恰相反。再次,在对诺齐克转让正义理论的驳斥中,一方面,柯亨围绕自愿交易所导致的不正义后果、对非交易方的选择所造成的影响,就诺齐克转让正义理论为资本主义所作的辩解予以批驳。柯亨论证道,资本主义的自愿交易不仅不会总是带来正义的后果,而且还导致了非交易方的不自由;一方面,柯亨围绕诺齐克对社会主义分配正义的否定、对社会主义自由的否定,就诺齐克从转让正义角度对社会主义的否定予以批驳。柯亨论证道,诺齐克的转让正义理论不仅没有证明社会主义是不正义的,而且没有证明社会主义是与自由相对立的。通过对诺齐克转让正义理论的批判,柯亨发现,尽管诺齐克竭力标榜自由的价值优先性,但诺齐克所谓的自由只是一种权利定义意义上的自由。柯亨把这种权利定义意义上的自由描述为,“只是在某人禁止我去做我有权利所做的事情时,我才是不自由的”。柯亨注意到,由于采用了自由的权利定义,诺齐克便陷入一种定义循环:在诺齐克那里,不侵犯权利就意味着自由,当不存在对自由的限制时就存在正义,正义就是没有侵犯任何人的权利。柯亨分析道,诺齐克之所以陷入这种定义循环,就是因为坚持了自我所有原则,这个原则讲的是,“每个人对他本身和他的能力拥有完全的和唯一的控制和使用的权利,因而他不应给任何他未与之签约的人提供服务和产品”。柯亨揭示道,对诺齐克来说,自由的范围和本质就是自我所有原则的功能,而根据自我所有原则又可以推论出私有财产权,私有财产权又是正义的根据,由此,在诺齐克那里,自我所有原则就承载了解释自由、权利和正义的三重角色,构成了诺齐克持有正义理论的实质。然而,对于柯亨的这个观点,即自我所有原则构成了诺齐克持有正义理论的实质,存在康德式的以及德沃金式的反对意见。康德式的以及德沃金式的反对意见认为,由于作为概念的自我所有在组合上是不连贯的,在含义上是不确定的,所以作为概念的自我所有在逻辑上就是不成立的,而既然作为概念的自我所有在逻辑上是不成立的,也就谈不上存在自我所有原则,更谈不上自我所有原则构成了诺齐克持有正义理论的实质。针对康德式的以及德沃金式的反对意见,柯亨对作为概念的自我所有作了逻辑分析,论证了自我所有概念在组合上的连贯性与在语义上的确定性,从而断定自我所有概念在逻辑上是成立的。柯亨对自我所有概念的逻辑分析表明,既然自我所有概念在逻辑上是成立的,康德式的以及德沃金式的反对意见也就不攻自破。由于自我所有原则是诺齐克持有正义理论的实质,柯亨对诺齐克持有正义理论的批判,就成了对自我所有原则的批判。又由于自我所有原则是由自我所有命题来支撑的,所以对自我所有原则的批判又成了对自我所有命题的反驳。柯亨把自我所有命题解释为,“每个人在道德上是他自己个人和力量的正当拥有者,并且,因此认为,倘若每个人没有用这些力量去侵略性地对付别人的话,(从道德上说)他都可以如其所愿地去自由使用这些力量”。柯亨注意到,从直觉出发,这一命题似乎具有不可抗拒的道德吸引力。因此,在随后对诺齐克持有正义理论的批判中,柯亨并没有直接反驳自我所有命题,而是采取了一种迂回式的策略,并由此进入对诺齐克获取正义理论的批判,借以削弱自我所有命题的道德吸引力。首先,柯亨否证了诺齐克为资本主义初始不平等分配所作的论证,证明即使承认自我所有命题所支撑的自我所有原则,也不能由此证明私人占有意义上的资本主义初始分配的正当性。其次,柯亨求证了在承认自我所有原则的前提下,实现联合所有意义上的社会主义初始分配的正当性。柯亨的求证表明,在初始分配上,理性的行为主体会选择联合所有而非私人占有,而通过联合所有又可以进一步实现社会主义的条件平等。但是,柯亨发现,在初始分配实行联合所有的情况下,自我所有原则就仅仅是形式上的自我所有原则,并没有任何实际的意义。由此,柯亨得出结论:实现社会主义平等分配就意味着必须摒弃自我所有原则。在柯亨看来,摒弃自我所有原则是实现社会主义平等分配的必要条件,而要摒弃自我所有原则,必须首先驳倒自我所有原则赖以确立的自我所有命题。因此,柯亨又把对诺齐克持有正义理论的批判深入到对自我所有命题的反驳。柯亨通过反驳诺齐克为这个命题所提供的道德依据来反驳这个命题本身。柯亨在直觉和理论两个层面理解诺齐克为这个命题所提供的道德依据。就直觉层面而言,柯亨认为,第一,诺齐克利用道德主体厌恶奴隶制这种道德直觉,断言拒绝自我所有命题就意味着对奴隶制的认可;第二,诺齐克利用人们决不允许他人强制使用自己身体的任一部分这种道德直觉,断言拒绝自我所有命题就等于承认对身体器官的强制再分配。就理论层面而言,柯亨认为,第一,诺齐克把自我所有命题与“康德的手段—目的原则”联系起来,声称拒绝自我所有命题就意味着以手段而不是以目的来对待人们;第二,诺齐克把自我所有命题与人类的自主联系起来,声称拒绝自我所有命题就意味着对人类自主的限制。对于诺齐克为自我所有命题所提供的两层面道德依据,柯亨分别予以反驳。就自我所有命题在直觉层面的道德依据,柯亨论证道,厌恶奴隶制这种道德直觉本无可厚非,但并不能据此得出拒绝自我所有命题就意味着对奴隶制的认可这个结论,而不允许他人强制使用自己身体的任一部分这种道德直觉,也不足以使道德主体去认同自我所有命题;就自我所有命题在理论层面的道德依据,柯亨论证道,拒绝自我所有命题不仅不意味着以手段而非目的来对待人们,而且也不意味着对人类自主的限制。柯亨是第一位在道德哲学和政治哲学纬度上系统批判诺齐克所维护的资本主义,并捍卫社会主义正当性的学者,在社会主义与资本主义孰优孰劣的问题上做出了重要的理论贡献,这尤其表现在以下三个方面:首先,柯亨从转让正义角度和获取正义角度反驳了诺齐克为资本主义所作的辩解,证明诺齐克所维护的资本主义无论是从其自愿交易来看,还是从其初始分配来看,都是不自由和不正义的;其次,柯亨从对资本主义的现实批判上升到了对资本主义的理论批判,证明诺齐克所宣扬的资本主义自由并不是主流意义上的自由,而只是自我所有原则意义上的自由,这种自由只保护私有财产者的利益,这样柯亨就揭露并批判了资本主义自由的本质;再次,柯亨从基本道德依据角度反诘了诺齐克为资本主义所作的辩解,彻底批驳了诺齐克所维护的资本主义的道德依据。总的来看,柯亨批判了诺齐克所维护的资本主义的不正当,并捍卫了以平等为特征的社会主义的正当性。但同时,毋庸讳言,柯亨在批判诺齐克所维护的资本主义,并捍卫社会主义的正当性上,也存在两个主要缺陷。第一,柯亨较为注重对诺齐克所维护的资本主义批判本身,但在建构用于批判的道德依据上并未给予足够的重视。由于这个缘故,柯亨对诺齐克所维护的资本主义的批判多少表现出一些不一致,相应地,在社会主义因何才是正当的这个问题上,也没能给出更为确切的解释。第二,柯亨批判诺齐克所维护的资本主义时,背离或误读了传统马克思主义关于资本主义和社会主义的一些观点。一是背离了传统马克思主义关于社会发展基本动力的观点,试图以道德革命来代替社会革命;二是误读了传统马克思主义关于自我所有原则的观点,没有看到传统马克思主义对自我所有原则是持反对态度的;三是误读了传统马克思主义在批判资本主义生产资料不平等分配时的观点,认为传统马克思主义主张将生产资料平均分配给社会成员。更多还原

【Abstract】 Cohen is the founder and major representative of Analytic Marxism. He makes the sharpest criticism of Nozick who is a right-wing libertarian. Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings justifies capitalism rather than socialism. However, Cohen refutes Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings, and justifies socialism, and criticizes capitalism for being unjust. Cohen’s criticism of Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings reflects the developing laws of modern moral and political philosophy on the justification of socialism and capitalism, and it also reflects the main direction of the socialist camp’s dispute against the capitalist camp in the field of moral and political philosophy. It will be helpful for us to gain a comprehensive perception and understanding of the new findings in modern moral and political philosophy, and to enrich our points of views of criticizing capitalism and defending socialism, and to make masses fully realize justice of socialism and injustice of capitalism, thereby to eliminate some peoples’prejudice against socialism since the Upheaval in Soviet Union and East Europe, and to help more and more people build belief in socialism if we systematically and logically reconstruct and comment on Cohen’s criticism of Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings. Moreover, it is an important reference for the socialist movement and construction, especially for constructing a harmonious society of socialism with Chinese characteristics to systematically and logically reconstruct and comment on Cohen’s criticism of Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings. Some scholars both from home and abroad have done some related researches on Cohen’s criticism of Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings, but there has been no systematic and logical analysis and comment on it. In view of this, this article aims at systematically and logically analysing Cohen’s criticism of Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings.There are two deep motivations why Cohen criticizes Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings. Firstly, Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings’allegations for capitalism and denial of socialism violates Cohen’s faith in socialism. Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings, in Cohen’s views, obeys the principle of self-ownership and deduces entitlement of holdings from the rights of self-ownership, and claims that any distribution meeting the requirements of entitlement of holdings is a just distribution. Cohen analyses that, the capitalist unequal distribution, according to Nozick, meets the requirements of entitlement of holdings, but the socialist equal distribution doesn’t. Therefore, the capitalist distribution is just but the socialist distribution is not. Cohen points out that, in the history of dispute between the socialist camp and the capitalist camp, Nozick has made the strongest justification of capitalism as well as the strongest denial of socialism in the sense of moral and political philosophy. Cohen always holds a strong faith in socialism, and he always considers socialism to be just and capitalism unjust. He believes that socialism will finally replace capitalism, so he will never allow any attacks on socialism. So when Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings negates socialism, Cohen tries his best to refute it. Secondly, Cohen holds that the traditional Marxism is unable to refute Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings’allegations for capitalism and denial of socialism effectively. According to Cohen, Marxism is unable to refute Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings’allegations for capitalism and denial of socialism effectively due to four limitations. First, the traditional Marxism doesn’t have a systematic and theoretical conception of distributive justice, so it has no relevant ready-formed theory to refute Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings’allegations for capitalism and denial of socialism. Second, the traditional Marxism believes that there are two historical trends, the expanding working class and the high development of the productive force, which will guarantee the realization of equal distribution. But according to Cohen, these two historical trends haven’t been in existence. Therefore, the traditional Marxism’s argument for equal distribution is no longer effective, so it cannot give an effective proof to the socialist equal distribution which is opposed by Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings. Third, there are several flaws in the traditional Marxism’s criticism of capitalism as follows: the traditional Marxism takes initial unequal distribution of productive resourses as the necessary condition to generate exploitation, but it doesn’t realize that even though initial distribution of productive resourses equalizes, it will be probably unavoidable for exploitation. Moreover, there are inconsistent opinions within the traditional Marxism on whether workers’value of labour power is stolen by capitalists. In addition, the traditional Marxism neglects the poverty of non-producer such as those unable to work. Cohen points out that, due to the flaws above, the traditional Marxism cannot give an effective refutation to Nozick’s justification of capitalism. Fourthly, according to Cohen, the traditional Marxism resorts to the principle of self-ownership held by Nozick when it tries to prove the necessity of equality and to vision the socialist principle of distributive justice as well as to criticize the injustice of capitalism. Thus the traditional Marxism holds the same premise with Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings, so it’s easy to be attacked by Nozick, let alone an effective refutation to Nozick. Considering that the traditional Marxism cannot give an effective refutation to Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings’challenge to socialism, Cohen takes the responsibility to refute Nozick and begin to criticize Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings.In Cohen’s criticism of Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings, he points his finger to Nozick’s theory of justice in transfer at first. Nozick’s theory of justice in transfer tries to defend Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings’allegations for capitalism and denial of socialism as a whole. After necessary theoretical presupposition, Cohen intensively analyses this point and fulfills the refution of Nozick’s theory of justice in transfer from two respects. Firstly, according to his theoretical presupposition, Cohen perceives freedom both in the sense of the rights neutral account of freedom and in the sense of human nature. In the former sense, freedom can be stated as follows: I am pro tanto unfree whenever someone interferes with my actions, whether or not I have a right to perform them, and whether or not my obstructor has a right to interfere with me. In the latter sense, freedom can be interpreted in the sense of traditional socialist conception of human nature. Cohen claims that, for the sake of more important freedom, the freedom in the sense of rights neutral account can be restricted, and for the sake of freedom in the sense of human nature, the freedom in the sense of rights neutral account can be restricted, and also, freedom can be restricted for the sake of equality on some conditions. Secondly, in his analysis of Nozick’s theory of justice in transfer, Cohen reveals that Nozick’s theory of justice in transfer regards voluntary transactions in capitalist society as freedom, and then defines justice with freedom, and then declares capitalism to be free and just because it allows voluntary transactions, and socialism to be unjust because it carries out equal distribution. Thirdly, Cohen criticizes Nozick’s justification of capitalism in his theory of justice in transfer on the one hand from two perspectives: the unjust results caused by voluntary transactions and its influence on the choice of non-parties. Cohen argues that voluntary transactions don’t always necessarily lead to just results and voluntary transactions results in the unfreedom of non-parties. On the other hand, Cohen refutes Nozick’s theory of justice in transfer’s denial of socialism from the angle of Nozick’s theory of justice in transfer’s condemnation of the injustice and unfreedom of socialism. Cohen’s refutation shows that Nozick’s theory of justice in transfer not only doesn’t prove that socialism is unjust, but also doesn’t prove that socialism is opposite to freedom.Cohen finds that, by way of criticism of Nozick’s theory of justice in transfer, Nozick’s so-called freedom is only the freedom in the sense of rights definition, though Nozick endeavours to boosts the priority of freedom. This kind of freedom in the sense of rights definition can be depicted as‘I am unfree only when someone prevents me from doing what I have a right to do’. Cohen observes that Nozick gets into a definitional circle as a result of adopting the rights definition of freedom. According to Nozick, no violation of rights means freedom, and there is justice when there is no restriction on freedom, and justice is no violation of anyone’s rights. Cohen analyses further that the reason for Nozick’s getting into the definitional circle is that he sticks to the principle of self-ownership which says that each person enjoys, over herself and her powers, full and exclusive rights of control and use, and therefore owes no service or product to anyone else that she has not contracted to supply. Cohen reveals that, for Nozick, the scope and nature of freedom is the function of the principle of self-ownership,and private property rights can be inferred from rights of self-ownership on the base of the principle of self-ownership, and private property rights can be made as the base of justice, thus the principle of self-ownership plays a triple role of bearing the weight of interpreting freedom, rights and justice, and forms the nature of Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings. However, the Kantian and Dworkin-style objection say that Nozick doesn’t stick to the principle of self-ownership because self-ownership as a concept can’t be logical tenable, and hasn’t the definite meaning, so there can be not the principle of self-ownership, let alone that the principle of self-ownership forms the nature of Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings. In response, Cohen logically analyses self-ownership as a concept, and argues the semantic consistency and determinacy of the concept of self-ownership, and concludes that the concept of self-ownership is logically tenable. Cohen’s logical analysis of the concept of self-ownership shows that, since the concept of self-ownership is logically tenable, the Kantian and Dworkin-style objection are not successful.Cohen’s criticism of Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings is criticism of the principle of self-ownership because the principle of self-ownership is the nature of Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings. And Cohen’s criticism of the principle of self-ownership is refutation of the thesis of self-ownership because the principle of self-ownership is supported by the thesis of self-ownership. The thesis of self-ownership interpreted by Cohen as follows: each person is the morally rightful owner of his own person and power, and, consequently, that each is free(morally speaking) to use those powers as he wishes, provided that he does that deploy them aggressively against others. The thesis of self-ownership itself, in Cohen’s mind, has apparently irresistible moral appeal, so Cohen does not directly rebut the thesis of self-ownership in later criticism of Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings, instead, he takes an indirect strategy, trying to weaken appeal of the thesis and therefore enter into the criticisim of Nozick’s theory of justice in acquisition. Firstly, Cohen argues, with the falsification of Nozick’s argumentation for capitalist initial unequal distribution, that the conclusion of the rightness of appropriation can’t be drown even if the principle of self-ownership supported by the thesis of self-ownership is accepted. Secondly, Cohen proves the possibility of realizing initial equal distribution in the sense of socialist joint-ownership on the premise of accepting the principle of self-ownership. Cohen’s proving makes clear that rational agents will choose joint-ownership rather than appropriation for initial distribution and the equality of condition can be achieved through joint-ownership. But Cohen finds that the principle of self-ownership changes into a formal one and is completely insignificant in such conditions. Cohen comes to the conclusion that achieving socialist equality means that the principle of self-ownership must be spurred.Spurring the principle of self-ownership, in Cohen’s view, is the necessary condition of achieving socialist equal distribution. But the thesis of self-ownership which supports the principle of self-ownership must be firstly confuted in order to spur the principle of self-ownership. Cohen’s critism of Nozick’s theory of justice in holdings goes deep into the refution of the thesis of self-ownership from this. Cohen rebuts the thesis itself in a way of rebutting the moral grounds of the thesis. Cohen interprets the moral grounds of the thesis of self-ownership in intuitional level and theoretical level. In term of intuitional level, firstly, Nozick makes use of moral intuition of moral agent’s aversion to slavery, asserting that rejection of the thesis of self-ownership is tantamount to endorsement of slavery. Secondly, Nozick makes uses of moral intuition of people’s not permitting others’deploying any part of one’s own body by coersion, asserting that rejection of the thesis of self-ownership is tantamount to endorsement of redistribution of bodily organs. In term of theoretical level, to begin with, Nozick associates the thesis of self-ownership with Kant’s means-ends principle, claiming that rejection of the thesis of self-ownership is tantamount to endorsement of treating people as means rather than as ends. Secondly, Nozick associates the thesis of self-ownership with human autonomy, claiming that rejection of the thesis of self-ownership is tantamount to endorsement of threatening human autonomy. Cohen refutes the moral grounds in the two-level of the thesis of self-ownership respectively. For the moral grounds of the thesis of self-ownership in intuitional level, Cohen argues that the moral intuition of aversion to slavery gives no cause for more criticism, but it can’t follow that rejection of the thesis of self-ownership is tantamount to endorsement of slavery. And the moral intuition of not permitting others’deploying any part of one’s own body by coersion can’t motivate moral agents to identify the thesis of self-ownership. For the moral grounds of the thesis of self-ownership in theoretical level, Cohen argues that rejection of the thesis of self-ownership is neither tantamount to endorsement of treating people as means rather than as ends, nor tantamount to endorsement of threatening human autonomy.Cohen is the first scholar that criticizes capitalism defended by Nozick and justifies socialism from the angle of moral philosophy and political philosophy and he makes improtant theoretical contribution on the question of which is better and which is worse between socialism and capitialism in three aspects: In the first place, Cohen rebuts Nozick’s allegations for capitalism from the angle of justice in transfer and justice in acquisition and proves that the capitalist society has no liberty and justice from its origin to its present. In the second place, Cohen develops from criticizing actual aspects of capitalism to making theroetical criticism of capitalism, and proves that the liberty called by Nozick was not the liberty generally accepted but one in the sense of the principle of self-ownership, which only protects interests of private property owners, in this way, Cohen uncovers and criticizes the nature of capitalist liberty. Once more, Cohen rebuts Nozicks’s allegations for capitalism from the perspective of fundamental moral standards and criticizes the moral reference of capitalism defended by Nozick from both intuitional level and theroetical level. On the whole, Cohen criticizes the capitalism defended by Nozick and safeguards the justice of socialism featured in equality. While we have to say that Cohen also has two defects when criticizing capitalism defended by Nozick and safeguarding justice of socialism. One is that, when criticizing capitalism defended by Nozick, Cohen places stress on the process of criticism while paying less attention to constructing the moral grounds used for criticism. For this reason, Cohen fails to achieve consistent criticism of capitalism in specific aspects and also fails to exactly explain why socialism is justified. The other is that, when criticizing capitalism defended by Nozick, Cohen deviates from or misreads some views on capitalism and socialism in traditional Marxism. First, he deviates from traditional Marxist theory on fundamental force driving social development and tries to replace social revolution with moral revolution; second, he misreads traditional Marxist views on the principle of self-ownership and fails to notice that traditional Marxism is against this principle; third, he misreads traditional Marxist views on criticizing unequal distribution of production materials in capitalist society and thinks that traditional Marxism advocates equal distribution of productive materials among all social members.更多还原