中国钢铁产业规模经济研究

【作者】 楚序平；

【导师】 张岩贵；

【作者基本信息】 南开大学 ， 世界经济， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 本文共分六章。研究紧紧围绕我国钢铁企业的规模经济和钢铁产业的有效竞争问题展开。通过与美国、日本、韩国这三个最有代表性的、不同发展阶段的钢铁产业强国的对比研究分析,研究我国钢铁产业规模经济存在的问题。本文在研究中,采用了产业组织学“市场结构——市场行为——市场绩效”研究方法分析了美国、日本、韩国钢铁产业的市场结构合绩效。运用数据包络分析方法(Date EnvelopmentAnmysis)分析了44家钢铁企业样本,运用MALM模型对36家钢铁企业规模经济性进行了测试。运用博弈论方法对首钢搬迁案例进行了博弈分析,得出了很有意义的研究成果。本文认为,中国钢铁产业在产量规模和市场规模急剧快速扩张发展的同时,多数企业没有实现相应的规模经济,钢铁产业没有达到“有效竞争”(克拉克,J.M.Clark,1940)。问题的根本原因在于制度环境和参与主体激励不相容。中央政府由于有限信息和有限理性,制度设计与实现规模经济激励不相容,产业规制与钢铁规模经济具有正负双向作用;地方政府在收入激励、政治激励下,与钢铁产业发展速度正相关,与钢铁产业规模经济负相关;大型国有钢铁企业缺乏内在发展激励和动力,实现了工厂规模生产,而更庞大的组织规模部分抵消了钢铁产业的规模经济效率;非公有制钢铁企业在多方作用的柠檬市场中取得了快速发展,实现了较高的效率,但是发展的外部性严重,对实现规模经济的可持续发展具有负面的作用。中央政府、地方政府和钢铁企业的个体理性选择和行为,在总体上形成了合成谬误,导致了我国钢铁产业整体的规模不经济。不改善制度环境和规制政策,钢铁产业实现整体上的规模经济不可能;不改善中央政府宏观调控手段和方式,钢铁产业实现整体上的规模经济不可能:不进行国有钢铁企业产权、治理、管理改革,钢铁企业实现规模经济不可能;不改善非公有制钢铁企业的产权、治理、行为改革,钢铁企业实现规模经济不可能。改革的政策选择方向是,按照激励相容原则,配套推进政府规制、财税体制、企业改革,才能推动、改善我国钢铁产业的规模经济水平。本文六章的具体内容是:第一章,导论。主要介绍了研究我国钢铁工业规模经济存在的主要问题,研究钢铁工业规模经济的重要意义。介绍了我国钢铁产业规模经济研究文献综述,包括国外有关产业经济学研究和对我国钢铁产业的研究,重点介绍了国内学术界对我国钢铁产业规模经济的研究。简要介绍了本文的核心观点、研究思路、基本框架和创新之处。第二章,介绍了规模经济问题的理论观点。综述了马克思的有关理论观点,介绍了哈佛学派、芝加哥学派、新奥地利学派有关钢铁产业规模经济的观点。对钢铁工业最优规模进行了理论度量,初步提出了钢铁产业最优规模的指标。对我国钢铁产业的最优规模问题,对钢铁产业国际竞争力进行了初步评估。第三章,发达国家钢铁工业规模经济的经验研究。分别研究了美国、日本和韩国钢铁TAk规模经济特征、钢铁工业的市场结构、钢铁工业的制度环境,对发达国家钢铁产业的规模经济进行了评估,提出了钢铁产业最佳规模的市场基准、行为基准和绩效基准。第四章,对我国钢铁产业市场结构进行了实证分析。分析了我国钢铁产业的历史发展与规模特征,对我国钢铁产业的规模经济进行了测量和评价,对我国钢铁产业的市场集中度进行了新的评估。第五章,实证分析了我国钢铁产业的绩效。运用DEA模型选择44家钢铁企业2004-2007年数据,进行了测试分析。运用MALM模型,并选择有代表性的36家钢铁企业进行了MALM模型测试分析,检验我国钢铁产业的规模有效性,进而检验不同钢铁企业的规模有效性问题,得出了新的结论。对大型特大型钢铁企业规模经济不显著问题,选择劳动生产率、用工、薪酬、福利等系列数据进行了深入的分析验证,得出了规模不经济的原因。第六章,实证分析了影响我国钢铁产业规模经济的主要因素。实证分析了中央政府主管部门对钢铁产业的规制政策,验证了规制政策的有效性;实证分析了地方政府的投资行为,分析了地方政府在钢铁产业投资的激励诱因,验证了对规模经济的影响;实证分析了国有钢铁企业的行为特征,并选择首钢搬迁案例,进行了博弈分析,论证了钢铁产业规模经济的制度原因。并在博弈中通过给出制度变量,提出了帕累托改进路径。结束语。总结概述全文的基本结论。本文力求使每一个结论有所创新,主要是:对中国钢铁产业市场结构进行了新的研究,分析了我国钢铁产业市场结构的特殊现象——单体大规模企业的数量和产量比例持续上升与整体产业集中度持续下降并存;提出“产业集中度弹性系数”的指标并进行了计算分析,较好地说明了集中度下降的原因,解释了中国钢铁产业的特殊现象,改进了原有市场集中度指标,对于在中国特殊的国情下,理性、客观、全面认识钢铁产业集中度的变化提供了新的视角;提出“钢材产品集中度”的概念,对中国钢材产品集中度进行了计算,发现存在“高端产品集中度高却消耗量小、低端产品集中度低却消耗量大”的特点;对中国钢铁产业规模经济的市场绩效进行了新的研究评估,对中国重点大中型钢铁企业2005年和2007年的经营数据,进行了数据包络分析(DEA)模型效率测算分析。发现、总结、归纳出中国大部分钢铁企业是规模有效或接近于规模有效、大型和特大型钢铁企业在与中小钢铁企业比较中没有显示出显著的效率优势、重点大中型钢铁联合企业之间的效率差异非常大等8项结论;运用MALM模型对有代表性的36家钢铁企业进行了MALM模型测试分析,得出影响M指标的主要因素是管理因素,钢铁企业管理水平低,是影响我国钢铁产业总体竞争力的关键;进而对国有大型特大型钢铁企业规模经济不显著问题进行分析,选择劳动生产率、用工、薪酬、福利等系列数据进行了深入的分析验证,得出了国有大型特大型钢铁企业内部存在X-非效率问题;对影响我国钢铁产业规模经济的政府行为进行了实证分析,并对首钢搬迁典型案例进行了博弈分析,证明:中国钢铁产业规模的不经济,是局中人中央政府、地方政府、钢铁企业博弈的均衡结果,局中人的个体理性选择,产生了集体谬误,导致了整个钢铁产业的规模不经济;在博弈分析中加入制度变量,分析了钢铁产业规模经济的帕累托改善路径。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper consists of 6 chapters. It focuses on the scale economy of steel manufacture in ChinaBased on the comparative study and analysis of different development stages among American、Japan、Korea whose steel industry is strong and representative ,the paper studies problems involved in the scale economy of steel manufacture in China This paper adopts industrial organization technology, which includes "market structure—market behavior - market performance", to analyze the market structure and performance of steel industry in America、China and Korea .The study technology also consists of the date envelopment analysis, which is used to analyze samples of 44 steel enterprises, the MALM model which is taken to test the scale economy of 36 steel enterprises, and the game theory which is applied to analyze the case of Shougang Group relocation and arrives to beneficial conclusions.The paper considers that Chinese steel industry fails to achieve corresponding scale economy and effective competition when it rapidly expands in the volume of production and market scale(J.M.Clark, 1940).The ultimate reason is the incompatibility between the institutional environment and body motivation. Limited information and bounded rationality induces central government’s incompatibility between system design and scale economy achievement, and bidirectional effect of industry regulation and steel scale economy .Local government has positive correlation with the development speed of steel industry and has negative relationship with steel industry scale economy under the motivation of revenue and politics. Large state-owned steel enterprise achieves scale production, but larger organization scale offsets the scale economy efficiency of steel industry as to the deficiency of inner motivation and stimulation. the non-public steel industry acquires rapid development and high efficiency in the "lemon market", however its serious outer development induces negative effect to sustainable development of scale economy. The paper includes 6 chapters as followings. The first chapter is introduction made up of main problems; study significance document research summary of Chinese steel industry scale economy .The document research summary introduces industrial economics study of steel industry at home and abroad. The first chapter briefly provides key points, Research ideas, basic framework and innovation. The second chapter introduces theoretic views of steel industry scale economy including Marxism、Harvard School、Chicago School and Neo-Austrian school. The chapter measures optimal size of steel industry and adduces index .It also preliminarily estimates optimal size and international competitiveness of Chinese steel industry. The third chapter is empirical research of steel industry scale economy in development countries, which studies the characteristics of steel industry scale economy、market structure、institutional environment .It also estimates the scale economy of steel industry in developed countries and adduces index of optimal size of steel industry as good approaches China should take for example. The forth chapter does positive analysis to market structure of Chinese steel industry which analyzes development history、characteristics of scale、and estimates Chinese market concentration. The fifth chapter analyzes Chinese steel industry performance positively. It utilizes EDA model to choose、test、and analyze status of 44 steel enterprises from 2004-2007. It also utilizes MALM model to chooses test、and analyze status of 36 representative steel enterprises .The two kinds of model study inspect the effectiveness of scale for Chinese steel enterprises as well as effectiveness of scale for different steel enterprises and attain new conclusion. The chapter analyzes、tests status of labor productivity、labor utilizations emolument、welfare and draws reasons for non-economical scale. The sixth chapter positively analyzes the main factors which affect Chinese steel scale economy. It takes evidence-based technical analysis into the regulation policy we which competent department of central government apply to steel industry. It verifies the validity of regulation policy and analyzes the investment and motivator of local government to prove the effect from the local government It analyzes the behavior characteristics of state-owned steel enterprises with the case of Shougang Group relocation. and does game analysis to verify the institutional reasons of steel industry scale economy. This chapter provides institution variable in game analysis and introduce Pareto improving approach..The complimentary close summarizes the whole paper and gives conclusions. The paper manages to make creation for every conclusion. It studies the market structure of Chinese steel industry creatively and anglicizes the special phenomena of Chinese steel industry market structure. The number and production quantity of individual big scale enterprises are raising compared with the persistent decline of the whole industry. The paper introduces the index of "Elasticity Coefficient of Industry Affinity" and makes calculating and analyzing. This explains the decline of affinity, the special characteristics, improves the index of industry affinity and provides the new vision to understand the steel industry affinity of China intelligently, objectively and roundly. This paper also introduces "steel production Affinity "to figurate Chinese steel production affinity and finds the characteristic that high-end product has high affinity and low wastage and low-end product has low affinity and high wastage. The paper re-estimates market performance of Chinese steel industry scale economy, analyzes managed data from 2005-2007 of Chinese key large and medium enterprise ,and reaches the conclusion that most Chinese steel enterprises has the effective scale or to-be-effective scale and large or extremely large steel enterprises has no various efficiency advantage compared with medium and small steel enterprises. Key large and medium steel combined enterprises have different efficiency which there is institution obstacle for Chinese steel enterprises to achieve scale economy. This paper analyzes the governmental action of Chinese steel industry scale economy to introduce the conclusion that the institutional reason is because the steel industry itself but the macroscopic institutional environment. The game analysis of Shougang Group relocation proves that the scale diseconomy of Chinese steel industry the game result of central government, local government, steel enterprises .The individual rational choices cause collective failure and the scale diseconomy of the whole steel industry .The paper draws institutional variable into game analysis and analyzes Pareto Improving Approach of scale economy for steel industry.更多还原