【作者】 岑雅衍；

【导师】 顾功耘； 胡汝银；

【作者基本信息】 华东政法大学 ， 经济法学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 我国债券市场已经走过了20多年的发展历程,无论在市场规模、产品覆盖和市场参与度方面都有了较快的发展。随着我国债券市场的不断发展,其对整个社会经济的影响力在不断增强,我国政府对债券市场的重视程度也在不断提高。因此,通过改进监管来促进债券市场顺利发展的要求更加强烈,债券市场监管的重要性也日益凸显。90年代以来,我国债券市场的监管法律取得了不小的成绩,出现了一系列相关的法律法规,但仍存在不完备性。在监管组织方面,监管组织多元化的法律制度不利于市场发展。在市场行为监管方面,也存在相关法律制度不完善、监管手段行政化、结算托管后台不统一和风险控制措施不到位等问题。在债券市场投资者权益保护方面,也有法规制定部门众多、立法层次不一、法律法规的保护内容和手段还不够充分等问题。因此,有必要对我国债券市场监管法律制度作实证研究,分析其不完备的原因,进一步提出改进的建议。本文的重点是从监管不完备角度对中国债券市场监管法律制度进行分析。笔者认为：对债券市场的法律制度的研究,不能仅停留在法律规范本身,必须深层次思考这些法律制度的形成机理。虽然“福利经济学”等理论对债券市场的监管提供了理论依据,但这些理论本身只是从不同角度推论出市场失灵现象的存在,提出政府干预的必要性,并没有就政府干预本身是否完备进行讨论。公共选择理论从监管目标设定、监管利益角度提出了阿罗不可能定理、寻租和政治集团等理论,论证了市场监管本身必然存在的不完备性。这些不完备,在债券市场体现出来的是监管体制的不统一、监管行政化和法律法规不完善、对投资人法律保护力度不足。对不完备的改进,不是一时的,只有认识到监管本身存在的不完备,对我国债券市场监管持续地进行近距离实证分析,对债券监管制度进行持续的修正,才能最大程度地发挥监管对市场的正激励和安全运行保障作用,才能实现监管的目的——保护投资者、确保市场的透明度、公平和效率、降低系统风险。在整篇论文的结构安排上,本文共分七章。第一章为导论,第二、三章侧重监管不完备的理论和形成机理,第四、五、六章分别从市场监管组织体系、债券市场行为监管和债券市场投资人权益保护角度对我国债券法律制度展开实证研究,最后一章则在前面几章的基础上,从三个方面提出改进我国债券市场监管的建议。具体各章内容如下：第一章主要分析论文选题的意义、研究思路和论文结构、主要研究方法以及论文的贡献和不足。第二章主要是对监管不完备进行理论分析。福利经济学、诠释政府监管的相关理论和法律不完备理论,或者从外部性、公共物品、垄断、信息不对称等市场失灵角度,或者从法律不完备角度,得出监管引入的必要性结论。但这些理论并不能得出政府干预和政府监管完备性的结论。而阿罗不可能定理、寻租理论、监管生命周期理论、利益集团理论和委托代理理论等分别从多重角度等对监管不完备进行探讨。阿罗不可能定理借助数学公理化的方法,对监管意图取得的社会整体利益的存在提出了质疑,从监管目标实现角度论证了监管本身存在的不完备性。寻租理论和利益集团理论都是通过不同角度对政府干预和政府监管可能存在的问题进行论证,主要集中在政府和市场主体自身各自的利益冲突,以及不同利益集团在寻租、设租、创租过程中的利益平衡方面,说明了政府监管存在不完备性。夏洛夫从监管法规的生命周期提出了监管不可能永远如其在产生期和青春期那么有生命力,在成熟期开始就出现了严重的不完备现象。委托代理理论从监管当事人关系分析的角度,提出了信息不对称条件下规制者的信息滥用,从新的角度得出规制或监管自身存在不完备的必然性。第三章分析我国债券市场监管不完备的形成机理。从利益冲突角度看,我国债券市场中客观存在着几个利益集团,分别是强效的监管利益集团、次强效的债券发行人(以及机构投资者、服务商利益)集团和弱效的个人投资者利益集团。他们有各自的利益诉求,他们之间甚至各利益集团内部都存在利益冲突,但目前我国债券市场的核心冲突是监管集团内部的利益冲突。2008年我国债券市场的中期票据风波可以说明两个主要监管集团之间的竞争和利益冲突。监管者的局限性(包括监管者的信息局限和经验局限)同样是造成债券市场监管不完备的一个原因。而我国债券市场的历史演进和发展轨迹,也从另一角度对监管不完备的形成做出了解释。第四章从监管组织方面对我国债券市场监管法律制度进行实证分析。我国债券市场形成了银行间市场、交易所市场和商业银行柜台市场三个子市场在内的统一分层的市场体系。在监管架构上出现财政部、人民银行、证监会、银监会、保监会、发改委等监管组织多元化的问题。我国债券市场监管机构的法律体系及其内在结构很好地反映了这个特点。而资本市场发达的国家,债券监管体制具有统一的政府监管和完善的自律监管特点。从定价、流动性、市场成本和交易成本角度看,多元监管法律制度都存在市场和监管效率低下问题,监管组织多元化的法律制度不利于市场发展。第五章从市场行为监管方面对我国债券市场监管法律进行实证分析,共分四节。用实证研究和比较研究的方法,分别对债券的发行、交易、结算、托管以及债券评级等法律制度进行分析,提出我国目前监管法律制度存在的多元化监管、行政化色彩过浓、市场化不足以及风险控制措施不完备等问题。第六章从投资者权益保护的视角对我国债券市场的监管不完备进行实证分析和评价。债券市场投资者保护是监管目标之一,其法律框架主要包括合同法保护、经济法强制保护和证券投资者保护基金的三种保护方式。债券发行人通过招募说明书等合同的方式对自己的行为进行约束,属于合同法保护方式。由于这种方式具有自发性、差异性、单向性特点,因此实践中无论在保护范围还是在保护力度上都十分有限。为了弥补合同法保护的漏洞,每个国家都从市场公平和效率出发,通过以公司法和证券法为主要核心的法律制度,从公司设立、公司治理、公司破产、债券发行上市、信息披露等方面,提出债券投资人保护的最低限制。这种经济法保护的方式具有强制性和普适性。证券投资资者保护基金则是新的债券投资者保护途径。第六章介绍了我国投资者保护的相关法律和实践,并指出在这三个方面都存在一定问题。监管不完备并非意味着监管无用,而是说明监管改进的重要性。第七章是在前六章的基础上,提出当前最急迫的是解决监管组织多元化的问题,有必要建立一个债券市场统一监管的法律制度。在解决监管组织多元化问题后,必须理清我国目前相关法律制度,建立和完善我国债券监管法律体系。必须建立对新监管法规的影响分析制度,以及动态的法规审查制度,来确保债券市场监管法律制度的持续有效。有效的法律制度要发挥作用,还需要完善监管执法,保证法律制度得以遵从。此外,还需要特别关注加强和完善投资者保护的相关制度,提高投资者保护水平,是实现监管目的的重要方面。笔者最后对债券发行、自律监管、信息披露、风险控制和投资者保护等具体法律制度提出了改进建议。在研究方法方面,本文主要通过系统分析的方法从不完备理论探讨、不完备形成机理以及监管机构、行为监管和投资者保护三个方面对我国债券市场的监管法律制度进行分析。其他的研究方法包括通过语义分析法对一些重要概念进行界定；通过实证分析法对债券监管法律制度进行考察；借助(国别、类别)比较分析法分析我国债券监管现状；根据价值分析法对债券监管法律制度进行评价；使用历史分析法追溯我国债券监管法律的历史,以说明不完备的形成机理。更多还原

【Abstract】 Chinese bond market has been developing for more than twenty years. Market scale, bond products and extend of market participation have gained a rapid development. With the strengthening of social and economic influences of the bond market, the recognition degree of Chinese government to the bond market has also been improved. Therefore, the importance of bond market supervision has been acknowledged. Although bond market supervision in China has achieved remarkable success since 1990, there still remain many problems. Multi-supervisory institutions make against market development. There are also many problems in the supervision of market behavior, such as incompletion of laws and regulations, use of administrative means in supervising, multi-institutions in the settlement and registration, incompletion of risk control etc. As far as bond investor protection is concerned, there are problems of difference of law hierarchy, incompletion of legal protection. Therefore, it is necessary studying in bond market supervision legal system to put forward suggestions to improve the level of supervision.The thesis emphases in the study of supervision legal system of Chinese bond market. From the writer’s point of view, it’s of the same importance studying the legal system as researching the reasons behind it. Theory of welfare economics gives the theoretical basis on government supervision of the bond market, however, it does not discuss the completion of government supervision. Public choice theories such as Arrow’s impossibility theorem,rent-seeking theorem argue the government failure, because of which the problems such as disunity of supervisory institutions, insufficiency of investor protection in Chinese bond market come into being. Only on the basis of the recognition of supervision incompletion, and by empirical analysis and persistent improvement of legal regulations, can exert the positive incentives and function of safeguard of the bond market supervision, and can realize the supervision aims, which are bond market investor protection, bond market transparency, fairness and efficiency, and risk control.There are seven chapters in this thesis. The first chapter is an introduction to the thesis. The second and third chapters are about the theoretical analysis of supervision incompletion. The fourth, fifth and sixth chapters are of the empirical analysis of the supervisory institutions, market behavior supervision and bond market investor protection. In the last chapter, the writer brings forward some suggestions to improve the supervision on Chinese bond market.In the first chapter, the writer discusses not only the significance of topic selected, but also the research thinking, research methods and structure of the thesis.The second chapter is about the theoretical analysis of supervision incompletion. Theories of welfare economics, interpretating government supervision and law incompletion make conclusion of the necessity of government supervision on the consideration of externality, public goods, monopolization and information asymmetry. Public choice theories such as Arrow’s impossibility theorem, rent-seeking theorem, supervision cycle theorem and interest group theorem study from different angles and find the supervision incompletion.The third chapter is about the formation mechanism of supervision incompletion of Chinese bond market. There are many interest groups in the Chinese bond market, including supervisory institution interest group, bond issuer interest group (and also institutional investor interest group, bond market servicer interest group) and personal investor interest group. There exist interest conflicts between those groups, sometimes even within one group. The main interest conflict in Chinese bond market is the interest conflict between different supervisory institutions, which is illuminated by the medium-term bond event in 2008. The regulator limitation of information and capability are also one of the reasons of supervision incompletion.The fourth chapter sees the empirical analysis of legal supervision of Chinese bond market supervisory institutions. There are three markets—interbank bond market, exchange bond market and over-the-counter bond market——in China. The supervisory institutions include the Ministry of Treasury, People’s Bank of China, China Securities Regulatory Commission, China Banking Regulatory Commission, China Insurance Regulatory Commission, National Devolopment and Reform Commission. However, in the developed countries, bond market supervisory institution is usually unique. The existence of multi-supervisory institutions will bring about the market inefficiency and supervision inefficiency.The fifth chapter is about the empirical analysis of market behavior supervision of Chinese bond market, including bond issuing, settlement and registration. As of the conclsion, the writer points out the existence of problems such as incompletion of laws and regulations, use of administrative means in supervising, multi-institutions in the settlement and registration, incompletion of risk control etc.The sixth chapter is about the empirical analysis of bond investor protection in China. To protect bond investor, especially personal investors, is one of the main aims of government supervision. The legal investor protection concludes three parts: contract law protection, economic law protection and securities investor protection fund. There are also some problems in investor protection in China.To recognize the supervision incompletion does not mean the useless of supervision. Contrarily, it awakes us of significance of the incessant improvement of government supervision. In the last chapter, the writer brings forth some suggestions. First and most urgent work to do is to unify the supervisory institutions. Secondly, it is necessary to examine existing laws and regulations to elevate the legal system of Chinese bond market. Lastly, the writer makes suggestion in the bond market behaviour supervision, self discipline and supervision, risk control and investor protection.In the whole thesis, the writer mainly use the systematic method by discussing the legal supervision incompletion in institutions, market behavior supervision and investor protection. Other research methods include semantics method, empirical method, comparative method and history method.更多还原