【作者】 王献锋；

【导师】 雷海章；

【作者基本信息】 华中农业大学 ， 农业经济管理， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 农业国有企业,无论从农业发展还是国企改革的角度分析,都具有不可取代的地位和作用。我国是农业大国,发展农业国有企业有助于解决三农问题,推动农业现代化进程。但是,我国的农业国有企业却没有发挥应有的作用,其中,监督体系不健全,法人治理机制的不完善是一个关键问题。为此,应加强对农业国有企业监督体系的研究,更好的发挥农业国有企业的应有作用。本文分九章,论述农业国有企业监督体系问题。第1章,导论。介绍选题背景,论证选题意义,对于国内外研究现状进行述评,说明研究思路、总结主要内容、表明研究方法,指出可能的创新之处和对未来研究的展望。第2章,理论基础。农业国有企业监督体系的核心理论是委托代理理论。企业所有权和控制权的分离,引发了委托代理问题。委托代理问题产生的原因是多方面的,除了两权分离外,还有信息不对称、委托人和代理人的目标函数不一致,以及不确定性等因素。委托代理理论的目的是建立激励制度,降低代理成本。代理成本包括委托人的监督成本、代理人的保证成本、剩余损失三个部分。为降低代理成本,理论上设计了不同的委托代理模型。我国农业国有企业的委托代理关系具有自身特点,由于公有产权,造成所有者缺位,委托代理关系具有链条冗长、行政性代理和市场性代理并存、委托人风险和代理人风险并存的情况,因此,既要对代理人监督,又要对委托人监督。第3章,我国农业国有企业监督体制的改革历程。首先,对农业国有企业进行界定,指出农业国有企业是指农业范围内属国有或国家控股的农、林、牧、副、渔各行业企业的总称。并在此基础上分析了农业国有企业的特点。然后,分析我国农业国有企业的监督机制改革中出现的问题。第4章,农业国有企业监督委托人问题分析。农业国有企业代理过程中有许多中间委托人,加强对中间委托人的监督与激励,尤其防范政府与企业这一代理层次的委托人代表——政府官员,是加强国有企业监督中的重要一环。农业国有企业委托人问题的主要表现形式是委托人和代理人的合谋寻租,代价是国有资产的流失。本章通过分析委托人(政府官员)和经理的合谋博弈模型,在此基础上构建二层级治理模式,即如何由国资委和国有资产管理公司行使委托人职能。第5章,农业国有企业监督代理人问题分析。农业国有企业的代理问题表现为:作为代理人的经营者的管理腐败行为,其实质是企业家的非生产性寻租。国有企业代理问题的核心是内部人控制。内部人控制具有正负两方面的效应,分析产生代理问题的原因,建立委托人对代理人激励约束模型,降低内部人控制的负面效应。第6章,农业国有企业监督的核心:国家出资人的监督。国家作为出资人,其对国有企业的监督不同于自然人或法人股东,基于国有企业双重性的特点,国资委作为履行出资人职能的代表,应当履行监督职责,所以,应当建立以国资委为代表的国家出资人的日常监督机制,具体包括:强化国有企业外部董事制度、外部监事制度,建设完善业绩考核体系。第7章,农业国有企业监督的重要保障:外部监督机制。建立多种主体的外部监督机制,一是国家审计监督。核心问题是保证国有企业财务报表的真实性和国有企业审计的客观性。二是社会中介组织的监督。社会中介组织监督具有独立性、客观性,具有很高的权威性和公正性。三是新闻媒体的监督。以信息披露为主要内容,发挥信息公开的效用。四是债权人的监督。建立以银行为主的债权人相机治理。五是外部市场监督机制。完善资本市场、产品要素市场、经理人市场等外部竞争性市场机制。第8章,农业国有企业监督的有力支撑:企业内部监督机制。一是内部审计的监督。从观念上,由传统的财务审计向经济效益审计转变;从制度上,健全内审机构,建立与现代企业制度相适应的内部审计模式。二是效能监察。农业国有企业的效能监察是国家监察职能的延伸,是农业国有企业不同于其他性质企业的独有的监督方式,是国有企业内部控制的构成部分。三是职工的监督。职工拥有农业企业监督权是国有企业特殊性的必然要求。第9章,农业国有企业监督体系重构。我国国有企业监督的多元化体系,出现职能交叉重叠现象,为提高监督效率,有必要对国有企业监督体系资源整合,重构我国国有企业的监督体系。更多还原

【Abstract】 The agriculture state - owned enterprise have played important role regardless from the agricultures development still a state-owned enterprise reform , which contribute to work outing "three agriculture problems "and push an agriculture modernization progress. But Chinese agriculture state-owned enterprise don’t function that should , corporate governance especially supervision system problem is one of main reasons.This article divides nine chapters and discusses agriculture state-owned enterprise supervision system problem.Chapter one, Introduction. This part introduces background, presents domestic and international research, explains research method and the main contents, and enunciates creative points.Chapter two, Theories foundation. The core idea is agent theories, that caused by separation of ownership and control right. One of key conceptions is agent cost which includes three parts: supervision cost, ensure cost and residual loess. Corporation governance aims to reduce agent cost. Chinese agriculture state-owned enterprise also have agent problem and differentiate from others’. Because administration agent and market agent exist together in Chinese agriculture state-owned enterprise, therefore it is necessary to supervise both agent and principal.Chapter three, The history of agriculture state-owned enterprise supervise mechanism.First, this part definite agriculture state-owned enterprise. Then it prensents the history of agriculture state-owned enterprise supervise mechanism.Chapter four, Principal problems of agriculture state-owned enterprise. Agriculture state-owned enterprise have many principals in agent relatives. One of which is government officials. In order to reduce rent that paid to officials by managers of enterprise, supervision mechanism should be built .It needs to set up two layer classes to manage mode ,one is state owned assets supervision and administration committee of state council; the other is state owned assets management corporation.Chapter five, Agent problems of agriculture state-owned enterprise. The agent problem of the agriculture state-owned enterprise is manage corruption. Its essence is rent-seeking that results in insider control. The supervision model need to be build up to reduce its negative effect. Chapter six, The core of agriculture state-owned enterprise supervision mechanism: the supervision of representative of national ownership. The ownership of agriculture state-owned enterprise are all citizens, for whom it is impossible to magnet asset. State owned assets supervision and administration committee as their representative have supervision right .It is urgency to built supervision mechanism including exterior board director’s system, exterior supervisor system, and accomplishment valuation system.Chapter seven, The guarantee of agriculture state-owned enterprise supervision mechanism: the exterior supervision system. The exterior supervision system is various: One is a nation audit whose core problem is the objectivity of audit report. Two is supervision of society organization which has independence, objectivity and high authority. Three is the supervision of medium that main problem is the information disclose. Four is the creditor governance. Five is supervision of the exterior market which include capital market, products market, and agent market etc.Chapter eight: The base of agriculture state-owned enterprise supervision mechanism: the inner supervision system. One is inner audit which need reform from traditional finance audit to economic performance audit. Two is an effect inspection system which is the extension from government inspection and become an internal control part of state-owned enterprise. Three is the workers’ supervision that is the inevitable request of state-owed enterprise .Chapter nine, Reorganization of agriculture state-owned enterprise supervision mechanism. Chinese agriculture state-owned enterprise supervision mechanism is diversified and have overlap phenomenon. In order to raise efficiency it is necessary to reorganization of agriculture state-owned enterprise supervision mechanism.更多还原