【作者】 徐晓明；

【导师】 杨海坤；

【作者基本信息】 苏州大学 ， 宪法学与行政法学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 行政许可作为一项政府管制手段,它是“政府行政机构在市场机制的框架内,为矫正市场失灵,基于法律对市场主体的经济活动以及伴随其经济活动而产生的社会问题进行的微观层面上的干预和控制活动。”我国《行政许可法》的出台使得许多行政许可监管机关已经认识到行政许可权范畴不仅包括行政许可准入监管环节,而且还包括行政许可准入以后的行政许可后续监管环节。本文立足于对我国《行政许可法》实施以后,我国行政许可后续监管制度在制度建设、运行中所出现的各种问题,针对性地进行深入剖析与反思,以信息均衡为视角运用行政法治的一般原理努力为行政许可后续监管制度的进一步完善提供制度解决方案。由于行政许可后续监管权是行政许可后续监管制度得以构建的根本基础,因此,笔者首先是展开了对于行政许可后续监管权的研究,笔者认为,行政许可后续监管权具有区别于行政许可准入监管的“熟人”背景性、中立性、线性动态性等特点。行政许可准入监管权与行政许可后续监管权之间所存在的本质差异决定了行政许可后续监管的不可替代性。行政许可准入监管与后续监管之间的辩证关系具体体现为行政许可准入监管是行政许可后续监管对象筛选机制,而行政许可后续监管则从宏观与微观两个层面反作用于行政许可准入监管,起到保障与提升行政许可准入监管效能的功能。基于基本理论的研究,笔者深入地对我国行政许可后续监管存在问题及其对信息不对称状态之影响进行了研究。通过研究,笔者认为,我国行政许可后续监管制度建设问题主要存在于监管组织设置层面、监管执法以及监管法律责任层面。这些问题的存在对行政许可后续监管法律关系主体之间的信息状态构成了重大影响,使得行政许可持有人的信息优势地位更加凸显。基于对行政许可持有人机会主义行为逻辑之考察,笔者认为,行政许可持有人在信息优势状态下所表现的一种违法状态就是一种机会主义行为倾向。正是由于各种主客观条件的限制,行政许可监管机关与社会公众不可能充分及时获得行政许可持有人实施行政许可的所有信息,因此,在特定情形下,行政许可持有人就可能会利用某些有利的信息优势来谋取不正当的私人利益。基于信息均衡的视角,笔者提出了完善我国行政许可后续监管制度的路径设想。第一,政府义务型信息均衡机制即政府信息公开机制。行政许可后续监管制度规制的重点不仅要强调信息劣势方要通过自身积极主动的行为搜寻信息以增加决策信息量,缓解自身的信息劣势地位,而且还要一并构建信息优势方的信息披露制度。政府信息公开制度作为以政府为信息供给义务主体的公权信息强制披露制度就其本质而言是一种实现公众知情权、舒缓公权机关与公众之间信息不对称的制度。政府监管信息公开程度直接决定了信息劣势方的信息获取量,直接影响到社会公众与行政许可监管机关、行政许可持有人之间的信息不对称状态能否得到舒缓。笔者提出了通过科学设置监管机构、构建行政许可监管信息共享机制、加快电子政务建设、建立“黑名单”制度、完善正当行政法律程序等来完善我国行政许可后续监管政府信息公开机制;第二,相对方义务型信息均衡机制即行政许可持有人强制信息披露机制。尽管,政府信息公开制度的实施增加了整个社会的信息供给量,但笔者认为,要从根本上缓解行政许可监管法律关系主体之间的信息不对称问题,单一地依靠政府供给机制来供给信息是远远不够的,实现良好的行政许可后续监管还需要建立新的监管信息供给机制。基于此,从平衡的角度来说,建立以信息优势方即行政许可持有人为义务人的行政许可持有人强制信息披露机制成为必然。笔者对强制信息披露制度价值、建立原则、参考要素等内容进行了研究,尤其是对强制信息披露内容确定参考要素进行了深入研究,提出了行政许可持有人强制信息披露机制的构建需要参考信息搜寻成本、信息披露成本、专业化程度、市场竞争度等要素来加以确定。第三,社会性信息均衡机制即公众参与监管机制。公众参与作为一种重要的民主机制对于行政许可后续监管信息均衡目标的实现具有重要的意义。为此,笔者从公众参与机制对于行政许可后续监管的制度价值入手,对我国行政许可后续监管公众参与存在问题进行了分析并提出了相关的完善设想。例如,培养公民意识、完善行政许可监管影响评价制度、完善悬赏举报制度等。更多还原

【Abstract】 Administrative license,as a means of government control,is "the government executive bodies in the framework of market mechanisms,in order to correct market failures,based on the laws of the market,as well as the main economic activity accompanied by their economic activities and social issues arising from the micro level intervention and control activities. The introduction of "Chinese Administrative License Law" leads many administrative license regulatory authorities recognize that the scope of administrative license includes not only access to the regulatory aspects of administrative license,but also include the follow-up supervision. This article is based on the various issues that arise after the implementation of "Chinese Administrative License Law" .In order to provide system solutions,author specifically make in-depth analysis and reflection with the general principles of administrative law from the balanced information perspective.Since the power of the follow-up supervision of the administrative license is the foundation of making the follow-up supervision of the administrative license system, therefore,first of all,Author launched a study of the follow-up supervision power of the administrative license. Author believe that follow-up supervision of the administrative license has the characteristics of "acquaintance" background, neutrality and linear features and other. The fundamental difference between the power of the access regulation of administrative license and the power of the follow-up supervision of the administrative license grants the irreplaceability of follow-up supervision,and the dialectical relation between the access supervision and the follow-up supervision is that the access supervision is the object screening mechanism of the follow-up supervision and the follow-up supervision is the guarantee mechanism of the value of the access supervision,and the follow-up supervision of administrative license from the macro and micro level in the administrative license access counterproductive regulation play to enhance security and access for monitoring the performance of administrative license functions. Based on the basic theory research,author research some problems of the Chinese administrative license and its impact on the state of the asymmetric information. Through research,author believe that follow-up monitoring problems of Chinese administrative license system mainly consist in the regulatory body of the set level,the supervision of law enforcement and regulatory aspects of legal responsibility. The existence of these problems of follow-up supervision of the administrative license law relationship between the main body of information state constitutes a significant impact, making administrative license holder’s information superiority status become even more prominent. Based on the administrative license holders of opportunistic behavior of the study of logic,author believe that administrative license holders in the state of information superiority by the performance of an unlawful state dishonesty is a tendency of opportunistic behavior. It is due to various objective and subjective conditions,the administrative license regulatory authorities and the public can not receive full and timely information of the implementation of administrative license from the administrative license holders,therefore,in specific circumstances,the administrative license holders may use a more favorable information superiority to gain improper personal benefit. Based on the balanced information perspective,author proposed the solution to improve follow-up monitoring of Chinese administrative license system envisaged in the path. First,government information publicity is the balanced information mechanism.In order to increase the amount of information for making decision and ease the information status,author think the focus of follow-up supervision of administrative license system is not only to emphasize that information inferior side should take own actions , but also to build information superiority’s information disclosure system. As the main obligations of the mandatory information disclosure system,open system of government information by its very nature is a realization of the public right to know,the right to relieve information asymmetry state between the public authorities and the public.The extent of information disclosure of government regulation directly determines the amount of information acquisition of information underdog,directly affects the state of information asymmetry between the public , administrative license agencies , and administrative license holder. In order to improve Chinese administrative license government information publicity,author put forward to set the scientific regulatory body, to build the administrative license regulatory information-sharing mechanisms , to accelerate the building of e-government,to establish "blacklist" system,to improve the due process of administrative law. Second,author study the mandatory information disclosure mechanism of the administrative license holder.Despite the implementation of the government information disclosure system can increase the information to the whole community,author believe that in order to fundamentally ease the problems of information asymmetry between the body of the administrative license regulation legal relationship, relying on the government supply mechanism singly is far from sufficient to achieve a good follow-up supervision of the administrative license also need to create new regulatory mechanisms for information supply. Based on this,from a balanced point of view,author think it is inevitable to establish administrative license holder mandatory information disclosure mechanism. author study the value of mandatory information disclosure system,the principle of establishment,the reference element,etc. and especially put forward that setting mandatory information disclosure mechanism need to make reference to the cost of searching information,the cost of disclosing information,the degree of specialization and market competition.Third,author study the social balanced mechanism of information that is public participation in regulatory mechanism. Public participation in democracy is an important mechanism.It is good to the balanced information goals of the follow-up supervision of the administrative license. To this end,On the basis of studying the value of public participation to the follow-up supervision of the administrative license, author carry out an analysis of existing problems and put forward some ideas,for example,fostering a sense of civic awareness,improving the regulatory impact assessment system,and improving the reporting reward system.更多还原