【作者】 王俊杰；

【导师】 杨俊一；

【作者基本信息】 上海大学 ， 社会学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 中国国有公司普遍建立了法人治理结构,但在实际的公司治理中,国有公司往往并不依照法人治理结构进行,出现了组织结构与运作的明显不一致。学术界已对此予以充分关注,认识到公司治理是中国国有公司发展的关键,并对国有公司治理进行了详细分析。然而,目前对国有公司治理的研究主要集中在经济学和法学领域,研究成果明显受到学科视界的限制。人们更多地是从公司治理主体之间关系展开研究,有意无意地忽视了国有公司治理的外部环境和外部治理机制,对于国有公司治理“得形忘意”的现实逻辑和内在机理缺乏深入探讨。本研究在梳理国有公司治理相关文献的基础上,以石家庄市的一家国有公司——S公司为个案,沿着组织社会学的新制度主义分析路径,从组织的制度合法性出发,探讨了中国国有公司治理结构与实际运作的关系及其内在机制。本文的研究发现在于:1、国有公司普遍建立法人治理结构,主要是在制度环境的压力下,为了追求组织的合法性,采用社会上被广为接受的组织形式和做法,努力符合社会公认的规则,而不管这些做法对企业是否真正适用。国有公司面临的制度环境压力,包括法律规定的强制、政府部门的控制、社会舆论的影响和公司间的示范效应。2、国有公司治理表现出选择性,根本原因是公司治理主体的实际权力与其职权设定明显不一致,权力制衡的原则被打破。政府部门在控制股东大会的基础上,进而获得了直接干预国有公司领导层任免的权力,而基于出资者的最终控制权却逐渐丧失;董事会的权力遭到来自政府部门和经理层两方面的侵蚀,人事决定权和决策权都受到抑制;经理层不但具有委托—代理关系中的信息优势,而且还有长期企业管理中形成的个人影响力,再加上缺乏来自外部市场的竞争压力,其实际权力明显超越了职权范围;监事会受到制度缺陷、缺乏独立性等因素的制约,其监督权只是停留在理论层面,缺少现实基础。3、从组织理论层面看,制度化组织的结构与运作的分离,不一定是制度环境合法性要求与技术环境效率要求相矛盾的结果。制度环境的要求与组织内部关系不协调乃至相互冲突,也会使处于制度环境中的组织出现组织结构与实际运作的不一致。在这种情况下,制度环境与技术环境的要求可能是一致的,统一的。为进一步分析制度化组织的非正式运作,本文提出了“选择性运作”的概念。选择性运作与组织成员的互动密切相关,其深层逻辑是组织理性的有限性。4、从公司治理理论层面看,公司外部治理十分重要,甚至是公司治理的重点。公司治理结构的选择,可能是在制度环境压力下追求组织合法性的结果。由于公司治理主体的实际权力取决于自己的社会身份、地位、价值观、需要、能力等因素,一部分治理主体通过形成单向的依赖关系,增加个人影响力,实际权力明显超出了职权;而其他治理主体则相应地失去了权力,职权不断虚化,导致公司治理主体之间权力失衡,治理行为出现扭曲。因此,公司治理主体之间权力制衡,需要以外部治理机制为保证。更多还原

【Abstract】 It is commonplace that state-dominated corporations have set up the structure of corporation governance. However, practically these corporations usually don’t go in agreement with the structure, causing great inconsistency between structure and activity, to which the academe has paid enough attention, by realizing that the corporate governance is the key to the development of state-dominated corporations in China and performing a detailed examination about it. Nevertheless, the present study on the governance of state-dominated corporations mainly focuses on the fields of economics and law, apparently limited by the subject view. The study is always centered on the relations of governance bodies, neglecting the environment and external governance system of the corporations. There exists a lack of deep exploration of the practical logic and immanent mechanism of those state-dominated corporations, which catch structure but lose substance.The study in the article examines the relation between governance structure and practical activity, and the immanent mechanism of state-dominated corporations in China, based on the arrangement of the documents on state-dominated corporation governance, taking a state-dominated corporation in Shijiazhuang for case, starting from the imstitutional legitimacy of the structure along the route of the New Imstitutionalism in Organizational Sociology. The findings of my study are mainly:(1) State-dominated corporations have mostly set up governance structure mainly suffering from the pressure of system, reaching after legitimacy of their corporations. They adopt the generally accepted type of organization and practice, trying to conform to the regulations enjoyed by society without considering whether these regulations are fit for corporations. The pressure facing state-dominated corporations comes from being imposed by law, control of government, expectance of the public and exemplary effects of other corporations.(2) State-dominated corporations show preference basically because of the obvious disagreement of the practical power and their nominal authority of the bodies in these corporations and breaking the principle of checks and balances of power. The government controls the conference of all shareholders of these state-dominated corporations, obtaining the power of appointment and removal of the leaders of the corporations while the final control power based on the investors disappears gradually. Power of the board is eroded by both government and manager ship, and the power of personnel decision is restrained. Not only does the manager ship holds the access to information of the relation between entrusting and deputizing, but also enjoys the personal influence coming from long term management, with which their practical power easily exceeds the limits of their functions and powers because of the lack of competition from the market. The power of the board of supervisors, without basis of reality, only exists theoretically, conditioned by such factors as system defect and dependence.(3) Seeing from the theory of organization, the separation of structure and activity of institutionalized organization is not necessarily the result of contradiction between legal demand of institutional environment and efficiency demand of technical environment. The lack of coordination or even collision between demands of institutional environment and internal relations in organization can also cause disagreement of the organization structure and practical activity in the corporation in institutionalized environment, in which cases, the demands between system environment and technical environment may be consistent and unity. To further analyze the informal activity of institutionalized organization, this article puts forward the concept of optional activity. Optional activity, whose deep logic is the limitation of organization reason, is closely related to interaction of the organization members.(4) Seeing from the theory of governance, option of the governance structure in corporations may be the consequence of pursuing organization legitimacy under the pressure of institutional environment. In this case, the real power of governance bodies in corporations rests with many factors, such as their social status, standing, values, needs and ability etc. Part of the bodies, whose real power obviously exceeds their position, strengthens their personal influence by forming a one-way relation of dependence. Accordingly, other governance bodies lose power and their authority is becoming nominal, which leads to unbalance of power among governance bodies in corporations, and distortion of governance behavior. Therefore, the external governance of corporations is crucial, even the key point of governance.更多还原