【作者】 宋理升；

【导师】 徐向艺；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 企业管理， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 根据现代企业理论,上市公司是由股东、债权人、管理者、员工、供应商、顾客、政府以及社会公众等利益相关者组成的一系列契约的联结,各利益相关者都需要上市公司提供自己需要的信息来进行决策。同时,上市公司是证券市场的重要组成部分,信息披露是沟通证券价格与企业价值之间的桥梁,其质量的高低直接影响到证券市场资源配置的效率。因此,上市公司需要及时、全面、准确地披露相关信息,使信息需求者能够随时了解上市公司的具体情况并做出相应的决策,保证证券市场的高效运行。我国的证券市场自成立以来,上市公司的信息披露一直存在比较严重的问题,信息披露舞弊事件层出不穷,琼民源、红光实业、郑百文等舞弊丑闻一波未平,接二连三的又发生了银广厦、麦科特、科龙电器等恶性造假案件。在西方发达国家,上市公司的信息披露也并非完美无缺,进入21世纪后,美国相继爆发了安然(Enron)、世通(Worldcom)等重大信息披露舞弊事件,意大利也发生了帕马拉特(Parmalat)事件。这些事件严重损害了投资者的信心,动摇了证券市场运行的基石。面对接连不断的信息披露舞弊丑闻,各国政府积极地采取各种措施以提高信息披露透明度,虽然措施不尽相同,但是加强对信息披露的监管是共同点。自La Porta等(1999)的研究以来,越来越多的研究发现上市公司的股权结构在绝大多数情况下是集中而非分散,绝大多数上市公司都有实际控制人,我国的上市公司就是典型代表。实际控制人由于其拥有的控制权而对上市公司的行为具有重要影响,包括信息披露策略的选择,因此本文提出提高上市公司的信息披露透明度必须从实际控制人出发,并从控制与制衡两个角度建立了信息披露透明度研究范式。不同性质的实际控制人在代理问题的产生和解决方式上存在明显的差别,并对上市公司的行为产生不同的影响,因此研究实际控制人控制与制衡对信息披露透明度的影响时应该同实际控制人的类型相结合。本文正是以此为基础,选取受中央政府或中央政府直属企业控制的上市公司(以下简称中央上市公司)、受地方政府或地方政府直属企业控制的上市公司(以下简称地方上市公司)和受民营公司控制的上市公司(以下简称民营上市公司)为样本,研究了实际控制人控制和制衡在不同类型的上市公司中对信息披露透明度的影响。论文主要围绕以下问题展开:1.信息披露透明度的理论分析和评价。本文从上市公司的信息披露谈起,论述了信息披露的理论基础,然后从信息披露供应链的角度提出了信息披露透明度的定义,并利用因子分析的方法建立了信息披露透明度评价模型,该模型的评价结果同深圳证券交易所的信息披露考核结果显著相关。2.实际控制人控制对信息披露透明度的影响。本文首先检验了不同类型的实际控制人控制下的上市公司信息披露透明度的区别,然后,从实际控制人的控制权、现金流权、控制权与现金流权分离和控制层次等角度研究其对信息披露透明度的影响。结果发现,民营上市公司的信息披露透明度显著低于中央上市公司和地方上市公司;随着实际控制人控制权、现金流权的增加,中央上市公司和地方上市公司的信息披露透明度显著增加,而民营上市公司的信息披露透明度没有显著提升;随着实际控制人控制权与现金流权分离程度的增加,民营上市公司信息披露透明度显著降低,而中央上市公司和地方上市公司的信息披露透明度没有显著变化;随着实际控制人控制层次的增加,地方上市公司和民营上市公司信息披露透明度显著降低,而中央上市公司的信息披露透明度没有显著变化。3.实际控制人制衡对信息披露透明度的影响。本文从股东、独立董事和注册会计师三个方面分析了实际控制人受到的制衡力量对信息披露透明度的影响。关于股东制衡对信息披露透明度的影响,本文将股东按类别分为大股东、机构投资者和中小股东,分别检验不同类型股东的制衡力量对信息披露透明度的影响。结果发现,在民营上市公司中,单一大股东对信息披露透明度具有显著的负面影响,而在中央上市公司和地方上市公司中,这种影响并不显著;关于大股东的联合对信息披露透明度的影响,无论是中央上市公司、地方上市公司和民营上市公司,该影响均不显著;在地方上市公司和民营上市公司中,以基金为代表的机构投资者对信息披露透明度具有显著的正面影响,而在中央上市公司中,该影响并不显著;对于参与股东大会的中小股东来说,其持股占整个中小股东持股的比例在各类型的上市公司中对信息披露透明度均无显著影响,但其人数在中央上市公司和民营上市公司中对信息披露透明度具有显著的正面影响,而在地方上市公司中该影响并不显著。关于独立董事对信息披露透明度的影响,本文从独立董事占董事会的比例、任职时间、薪酬水平、持股数量、亲自参加会议次数、任职企业数量、会计专家数量和任职行为等角度出发,检验独立董事对信息披露透明度的影响。结果发现,在中央上市公司和地方上市公司,信息披露透明度同独立董事的持股数量、任职企业数量显著正相关,同独立董事发表非标准意见或发生非正常辞职显著负相关,同独立董事的比例、任职时间、薪酬水平、亲自参加会议次数和会计专家数量无显著相关关系;在民营上市公司,信息披露透明度同独立董事发表非标准意见或发生非正常辞职显著负相关,同独立董事的比例、任职时间、薪酬水平、持股数量、任职企业数量、亲自参加会议次数和会计专家数量无显著相关关系。另外,本文发现会计专家独立董事同其他独立董事相比发现信息披露存在问题的能力并没有显著区别,而具有会计实践经验的独立董事相对于其他独立董事发现信息披露存在问题的能力更强。关于注册会计师审计对信息披露透明度的影响,本文从规模、地域、行业特长等角度检验了会计师事务所对信息披露透明度的影响。结果发现,对于中央上市公司来说,各种类型的会计师事务所之间审计质量并没有显著差异。而对于地方上市公司和民营上市公司来说,与其属于同一省份的不具有复核资格的会计师事务所相对于其他会计师事务所审计收费显著偏低,而且出具标准无保留意见审计报告的比例显著偏高,因此审计质量偏低,并对信息披露透明度产生负面影响。相对于中央上市公司,地方上市公司和民营上市公司更愿意聘请审计质量较低的会计师事务所。本文的创新之处在于:利用因子分析的方法构建了信息披露透明度评价模型,并通过此模型对上市公司的信息披露透明度进行评价;将研究视角从传统的经理人员转移到实际控制人,并从控制与制衡两个角度建立了信息披露透明度研究范式;发现相对于信息披露透明度较高时,信息披露透明度较低时独立董事提出非标准意见或辞职的概率显著偏高,而且会计专家发现信息披露中存在问题的能力同其他独立董事相比并没有显著区别,但是具有实践经验的会计专家发现信息披露中存在问题的能力相对于其他独立董事更强。更多还原

【Abstract】 According to the modern enterprise theory, company is the nexus of contracts of stakeholders, which include shareholder, creditor, manager, staff, supplier, client and the public, etc. Stakeholders require company to disclose essential information to make decisions. Listed company is an important part of security market, its information disclosure influences the security market’s efficency of allocating resources. So listed company needs disclose information in order to help stakeholders make corresponding decisions and guarantee the efficency of security market.Since the foundation of China’s security market, there have been many fraudlent information disclosure events, for example, Qiongminyuan, Yinguangxia, etc. At the same time, information disclosure in developed countries is not perfect, Enron event,Worldcom event,etc broke out in USA, and Parmalat event broke out in Italy. These events damage the competence of investors, shake the cornerstone of security market. Now, governments are taking active methods to heighten information disclosure transparency. Although the methods are not the same, but strengthen regulation of information disclosure is the common idea.The ownership of company is focused rather than scattered, and most companies have an ultimate controlling owner. Ultimate controlling owner have important influence on information disclosure, this paper proposes an idea that study information disclosure transparency must start from the basis of ultimate controlling owner, and set a paradigm on the view of control and balance. Different kind of ultimate controlling owner has different influence on company, so we should select different way in different company. On the basis of this view, this paper classify listed company into center listed company, local listed company and private listed company, test the influence of ultimate controlling owner’s control and balance on information disclosure transparency.This paper mainly includes questions as below:1. Theory analysis and appraisal of information disclosure transparency. This paper analyzes the theory basis of information disclosure, and then gives the concept of information disclosure transparency, establishes an information disclosure transparency appraisal model applying factor analysis, the result of this model is significantly related with the result of Shenzhen Security Exchange. 2. The influence of ultimate controlling owner’s control on information disclosure transparency. Firstly, this paper tests the difference of information disclosure transparency with different ultimate controlling owner, and then test the influence of control right, cash flow right, divergence between control right and cash flow right, control range of ultimate controlling owner on information disclosure transparency. The result shows that information disclosure transparency of private listed company is lower than that of center listed company and local listed company; with the increase of control right and cash flow right of ultimate controlling owner, information disclosure transparency of center listed company and local listed company increase significantly, and that of private listed company increase insignificantly; with the increase of divergence between control right and cash flow right of ultimate controlling owner, information disclosure transparency of private listed company decrease significantly, and that of center listed company and local listed company changed insignificantly; with the increase of control range of ultimate controlling owner, information disclosure transparency of local listed company and private listed company decrease signifieantly, and that of center listed company changed insignificantly.3. The influence of ultimate controlling owner’s balance on information disclosure transparency. This paper tests the influence of ultimate controlling owner’s balance from the aspect of shareholder, independent boarder and external auditor.This paper divides shareholders into big shareholder, institutional shareholder and small shareholder, and test the influence of shareholder on information disclosure transparency. The result shows that the influence of single big shareholder is significantly negative in private listed company and insignificant in center listed company and local listed company; the influence of the alliance of big shareholders is insignificant regardless in center listed company,local listed company and private listed company; the influence of institutional shareholder is significantly positive in local listed company and private listed company and insignificant in center listed company; the influence of the ratio of small shareholder’ share who take part in the general meeting is insignificant regardless in center listed company,local listed company and private listed company, but the influence of the number of small shareholder is significantly positive in center listed company and private listed company and insignificant in local listed company. This paper tests the influence of independent boarder on the information disclosure transparency from the aspect of serve time, reward, share, meeting times, serve number, knowledge background and action. The result shows that information disclosure transparency is significantly positive related with the share and serve number, significantly negative related with the unstandard opinion expression or resignation, unrelated with other factors in center listed companies and local listed companies; information disclosure transparency is signifieantly negative related with the unstandard opinion expression or resignation, unrelated with other factors in private listed companies, .In addition, this paper also finds accounting expert’s competence of finding problems in information disclosure is not significantly different from other independent boarders,but accounting experts with practical experience are more competent than other independent boarders.This paper tests the influence of CPA auditing on information disclosure transparency from the aspect of size, position and expertise. The result shows that in center listed company, audit quality of audit firm is not different; in local listed company and private listed company, small audit firms which are in same province with clients have lower audit quality than other audit firms, so they have negative influence on information disclosure transparency. In addition, local listed company and private listed company are more willing to employ lower quality audit firm than center listed company.The innovations of this paper include three points. Firstly, this paper establishes an information disclosure transparency appraisal model; secondly,this paper switches the view from manager to ultimate controlling owner, and set a paradigm on the view of control and balance; thirdly, this paper finds the probability of unstandard opinion expression or resignation of independent boarders is significantly higher when compared low information disclosure transparency with high information disclosure transparency, and accounting expert’s competence of finding problems in information disclosure is not significantly different from other independent boarders,but accounting experts with practical experience are more competent than other independent boarders in finding problems of information disclosure.更多还原