【作者】 李章印；

【导师】 刘杰；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 外国哲学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 自20世纪90年代起,学术界才真正关注海德格尔的形式指引方法,但至今还没有从整体上统一地刻画海德格尔思想的方法特征。要把其早期、《存在与时间》时期和后期都统一地在整体上作为方法而予以刻画,还是有着特殊难度的。在严格的学术规范下,我们对一种哲学的把握往往会变成对一种现成对象的把握,而海德格尔思想在本质上又不可能成为一种现成的对象。由此,我们就必须首先与海德格尔思想真正地“混”“熟”,必须首先通过对其文本的本真阅读而让它本真地闪现出来。在这种闪现频繁和强劲到一定程度的时候,我们再转而合乎规范地把握它,通过规范化的学术话语把它构造出来。由于这种构造又很容易再次把海德格尔思想弄成现成的对象并使其失真,所以这种构造又必须同时具有一种解构和超越自身的能力,必须能够把人指引到海德格尔思想本身之中去。这样,对海德格尔思想的把握就必须活动于构造和解构的循环往复之中。这种循环往复的次数越多,我们构造出来的“成果”就越能空灵地让海德格尔思想显现出来。通过这种“闪现-构造-解构-再构造……”的方式,我们发现,海德格尔的现象学作为方法,其本身就是解构和指引。由于这种解构和指引的内在统一性,我们进一步称之为“解构-指引”。海德格尔的早期思想是解构-指引,其《存在与时间》是构-指引,其后期的思想同样也是解构-指引。这一发现既解决了海德格尔思想的前后统一性问题,又完成了对它的整体刻画。它既可以让我们看到海德格尔思想的本质,也可以让我们更透彻地理解其神学意蕴。这一发现同时也是借助于德国古典哲学尤其是胡塞尔现象学而得以实现的。我们把胡塞尔哲学以及德国古典哲学中所蕴涵的现象学基本特征叫做前海德格尔现象学的基本特征。这个课题就把对前海德格尔现象学之基本特征的刻画作为它的第一部分。第一部分首先考察“现象”的复兴,“现象学”的出现,“现象学”在德国古典哲学时代的七种含义。接下来考察胡塞尔对德国古典现象学的改造,对实证主义的批判,对科学世界的生活世界还原。由于胡塞尔的目的是要建立严格科学的哲学,而生活世界归根结底仍然属于自然的世界,所以生活世界还原并不是真正的终点。接下来考察的就是胡塞尔为了把握生活世界的本质和源头而实施的本质还原和先验还原。这两个还原加上从科学世界向生活世界的还原,共同构成胡塞尔现象学的还原特征。但还原还只是一个方面,它的另一个方面是构造。所以,接下来的考察就是胡塞尔所描述的时间意识构造,感觉意识构造,知觉意识构造,自在性和客观性构造,交互主体性构造,自然世界-生活世界的构造,世界视域的构造,以及科学世界的构造。这样一个考察思路本身就已经揭示出胡塞尔现象学的还原特征和构造特征。由于还原和构造既是相反的,同时又是分不开的,所以,我们最后把胡塞尔现象学的基本特征归结为“还原-构造”。这个基本特征就是海德格尔现象学的“前特征”。海德格尔正是通过对胡塞尔还原-构造现象学的继承和改造,才形成自己的现象学思想的。课题第二部分所考察的就是海德格尔在早期弗莱堡时期如何继承和突破胡塞尔的还原-构造现象学。由于胡塞尔仍然是以理论的方式来处理理论领域的问题,而对于海德格尔来说,最源始的东西是前理论的,所以,这一部分首先分析的就是海德格尔与胡塞尔的学术关系,尤其是海德格尔如何通过“讲台体验”和“问题体验”而向前理论领域和前理论方式突破。前理论的方式在海德格尔这里最后落实为形式指引方法。形式指引不仅可以从现象的“内容意义”突入现象的“关系意义”,它更重要的是可以突入现象的“实行意义”和“到时意义”。这样的形式指引不仅是向着前理论领域的一种指引,而且同时也是对理论领域之现成对象的一种解构。另外,形式指引方法向前理论领域的推进,同时也展示出其诠释学因素。由此,海德格尔就初步把胡塞尔的“还原”改造为更彻底的“解构”,把胡塞尔的“构造”改造为朝向前理论领域的“指引”,从而初步把还原-构造现象学改造为解构-指引现象学。不过,解构-指引方法在早期弗莱堡时期所针对的还只是生存的“实行”,一般存在问题的真正提出是《存在与时间》时期的事情,是海德格尔通过超越胡塞尔在纯粹意识中已经涉及到的两种存在(真理意义的存在和系词意义的存在)而得以实现的。课题的第三部分首先考察海德格尔如何超越胡塞尔的两种存在而提出存在问题,然后考察《存在与时间》对存在问题的阐释,其中涉及到此在的基本存在状态,此在之存在与一般存在的关系,以及追问一般存在的基本思路等。接下来分析这个基本思路的重要意义,尤其是其中所体现的解构-指引方法,以及《存在与时间》之话语本身的解构-指引性。最后考察的是海德格尔在这个时期对形式指引方法的进一步阐释,包括哲学概念如何是一种形式指引,人的生存本身如何是一种形式指引,以及在“存在者”、“畏”、“无”和“存在”之间如何也有着一系列的形式指引。课题的第四部分通过分析海德格尔的“现象”和“现象学”来解决他的“形式指引”与“现象”“学”的统一性问题。这是一个最为困难的问题,这里的工作同时也有点“接着说”的味道。首先是海德格尔对“现象”(Ph(a|¨)nomen,phenomenon)和“显现”(Erscheinung,appearance)的形式区分问题;然后是这种形式区分的意义;再后是各种不同的现象概念问题;再后是“现象学”中的“学”以及现象学的先行概念;再后是回头再次分析现象学的现象以及区分“现象”与“显现”的意义。至此,就可以大致解决下面一些极为困难的问题:“现象”与“显现”、“显示”(zeigen,showing)与“宣示”(melden,announcing)为什么经常是倒置的?“显示”、“宣示”与“指引”(Anzeige,indication)又是一种什么关系?“现象”“学”与“形式”“指引”又是如何统一的?存在作为现象学的“现象”,为什么又是“显现”出来的?充实意义上的“现象学”究竟是干什么的?在大致解决了这些难题之后,我们最后结合《现象学基本问题》(1927)来讨论对现象学及其基本环节的界定问题。这种界定再次展示出海德格尔对胡塞尔还原-构造现象学的改造和突破。第五部分处理海德格尔的后期文本,以表明其后期同样属于解构-指引现象学,而且把解构-指引最后归结为本真的“思想”。其中的第一章首先把存在之思从《存在与时间》过渡到《形而上学导论》,考察海德格尔对存在的词源学分析以及如何通过存在者指引出存在的本质。然后沿着他自己的思想道路剖析他对传统形而上学的解构,并在这种解构中引出其后期的最重要概念Ereignis,进而分析Ereignis的发生指引性、缘起性以及有关的翻译和解读问题。第二章从源始诠释学、语言-道说、踪迹-指引、艺术的敞开、诗意的居住、物之物化以及科学的限度与追思等多个角度,来展示和分析后期形式指引的丰富多彩性。第三章把这种丰富多彩的形式指引归结为思想。这样的思想不是计算性思维,而是追思,是敞开世界和守护大地,是对天地神人四方统一的保护,是对隐退者的跟随,是对呼唤者的应答。这样的思想在我们这个时代是最为急迫的事情,其任务就是回头思考一直未被思考过的澄明。这种澄明是一个无法表象的域,是一个“域化域”。思想的本质就是非意求地、解构性地去切近这个域化域,就是基于域化域的顺随(Gelassenheit,releasement)、等待、“守望”(Inst(a|¨)ndigkeit,in-dwelling)、忍耐、感恩和回归。第六部分考察海德格尔对传统基督教神学的解构和指引。这里从他的故乡世界开始(第一章)。故乡世界既是现实的世界,同时也意味着思想的乡土。海德格尔先是把他的故乡世界等同于天主教的世界,随后又把二者区别开来,并脱离天主教而走上自己的神学之思。第二章考察海德格尔在早期弗莱堡时期运用形式指引方法对源始基督教经验的阐释,对本真信仰生活的指引,以及对奥古斯丁神学的解构。第三章考察《存在与时间》的宗教背景、宗教意义、基督教动力及其对基督教神学的解构,分析海德格尔对神学的界定(神学最终是一种基于信仰的在具体生存层次上的非对象化的思想),对神学与哲学关系的界定(哲学可以为神学提供一种基础或形式指引),及其在神学和信仰上的异教和异端倾向。第四章考察海德格尔对传统基督教及其存在-神-学根基的更彻底解构以及对新神的迎接。在这里,他把荷尔德林看作先行者和知己,确立了人、神与神圣者的独特关系,并指引出一种崭新的神学。在这种崭新神学中,神不再是人格-位格之神,而本质上是一种“神动”(G(o|¨)tern,gods’godding),是需要经过最长久准备才会来临的最后之神和路过之神,同时也是最深沉的开端之神。更多还原

【Abstract】 Heidegger’s method of formal indication has attracted the attentions of academia since the nineties of the twentieth century, but the basic characteristic of Heidegger’s thinking has not totally been outlined as method. It is surely very difficult to depict this kind of characteristic on the whole, if the totality of Heidegger’s thinking must be concerned with his thinking during his early Freiburg period, his period of Being and Time, and his late period. Furthermore, with the rigid academic norms, our grasp of a philosophical thinking could easily become a grasp of an object that is present-at-hand, and Heidegger’s thinking can never be such an object essentially.If we are to interpret and explain Heidegger’s thinking appropriately, we must first let it flash out through our authentic reading of his texts, and become deeply familiar with it. Only when the flashing is frequent and strong enough, we can then turn to grasp it normally, and re-construct it with normal academic conceptions. We must also make this re-construction itself hold a possibility of destructing and transcending itself, and indicate Heidegger’s thinking as such for us, because this re-construction could easily make Heidegger’s thinking an object that is present-at-hand, and distort it. In this way, our grasping of Heidegger’s thinking may need to repeat the re-construction and destruction again and again, so that our ’production’ thus re-constructed is able to let Heidegger’s thinking emerge undistortedly.Using the mode of ’flashing-reconstruction-destruction-...’, I have attained such an insight that Heidegger’s phenomenology as method is itself destruction and indication, and because of the unity of the two, I also name the characteristic ’destruction-indication’. According to this insight, Heidegger’s early thinking, his thinking embodied in Being and Time, and his late thinking is all the destruction-indication. By such insight, we can both resolve the problem of the unity of his thinking in his different periods and also depict his thinking totally. We can thus both penetrate the essence of his thinking and also understand its theological significance better.It is also by depicting the basic characteristic of Husserl’s phenomenology, which can be traced back to German classical philosophy, and which can be called the ’basic characteristic of pre-Heidegger’s phenomenology’, that I reach the above insight. The first part of this dissertation is thus about the basic characteristic of pre-Heidegger’s phenomenology.In the first part, I first investigate the renewal of ’phenomenon’, the birth of ’phenomenology’, and the seven kinds of significations of the ’phenomenology’ in the times of German classical philosophy. Then I analyze Husserl’s alteration to German classical phenomenology, his criticism of positivism, and his reducing science-world to life-world. But this reduction is not the final one, because the life-world still belongs to natural world, on the basis of which, Husserl could not make philosophy a really rigorous science. Therefore, I then describe his eidetic reduction and transcendental reduction, through which, the essence and the origin of the life-world (natural world) can be gained. These two reductions plus life-world reduction together constitute the characteristic of reduction of Husserl’s phenomenology. But it also has another equal basic characteristic, which is the one of construction. I then describe Husserl’s construction of time, sense, perception, inter-subjectivity, natural world (life-world), world horizon, and science-world. Through all these discussions mentioned above, we have disclosed the characteristics of reduction and construction of Husserl’s phenomenology. These two characteristics are opposite with respect to their directions, but they are also the same essentially, so that I finally characterize Husserl’s phenomenology with the ’reduction-construction’.This basic characteristic is pre-characteristic of Heidegger’s phenomenology. It is just by inheriting from and alteration to Husserl’s reduction-construction phenomenology, that Heidegger posed his own phenomenology. In second part of this dissertation, I investigate how Heidegger inherited from and broke through Husserl’s reduction-construction phenomenology during his early Freiburg period. For Heidegger, Husserl still dealt with theoretical objects in theoretical ways, but the most primordial thing is pre-theoretical, therefore, this part first analyses the concrete academic relationship between Heidegger and Husserl, especially how Heidegger began with Husserl and then advanced into (and also went back into essentially) pre-theoretical sphere by pre-theoretical manner through his ’experience of lectern’ and ’experience of question’. The pre-theoretical manner then became the method of formal indication, which not only makes us go from the content sense of a phenomenon into the relation sense of it, but more importantly also makes us into the enactment sense and the temporalizing sense. Such formal indication is not only indication towards a pre-theoretical sphere, but also destruction to theoretical objects. Furthermore, the formal indication also has a hermeneutical dimension. In this way, preliminarily, Husserl’s ’reduction’ has changed into Heidegger’s ’destruction’, and Husserl’s ’construction’ into Heidegger’s ’indication’, and the reduction-construction phenomenology thus into destruction-indication phenomenology.But, the method of formal indication just aims at the enactment of man’s existence during Heidegger’s early Freiburg period. The question of Being in general is not really formulated until the period of Being and Time. In the third part, I first analyze how Heidegger surpassed Husserl’s two kinds of conceptions of Being related to consciousness, which are the Being as truth and the Being as copulative, and formulated his own question of Being. Then, I investigate Heidegger’s explication of the question of Being in his Being and Time, which is also related with the questions of Dasein’s basic state of Being, the relationship between Dasein’s Being and the Being in general, and the outline of questioning Being in general. Then, I review the significance of the outline, especially the method of destruction-indication embodied by it, and the destructive-indicative characteristic of both the language and the conceptions of Being and Time. Finally, I discuss Heidegger’s further interpretation of his method of formal indication during the period of Being and Time, which involves the formal indicative of both the philosophical conceptions and the Dasein’s existence itself, and a series of formal indications among beings, anxiety, nothing, and Being.In fourth part, I try to resolve the problem of unity of Heidegger’s ’formal indication’ and his ’phenomeno-logy’ by analyzing his conceptions such as ’phenomenon’ and ’phenomenology’. This is the most difficult one of all problems I deal with, and here, along with Heidegger, I may make some unspoken but most important thing spoken to some extent. Intimately related with this problem, are such problems as the formal distinguishing between ’phenomenon’ and ’appearance’, the significance of this formal distinguishing, all kinds of different conceptions of ’phenomenon’, the signification of the ’-logy’ of "phenomenology’, the anticipatory formal conception of phenomenology, the phenomenon of phenomenology, and the final significance of the distinguishing between ’phenomenon’ and ’appearance’. After clarifying such problems, we can approximately resolve the following very difficult problems: Why are ’phenomenon’ and ’appearance’, and ’showing’ (zeigen) and ’announcing’ (melden) often upside-down? How are ’showing’ (zeigen) and ’announcing’ (melden) connected with ’indication’ (Anzeige)? How are ’phenomeno-logy’ and ’formal’ ’indication’ united? Why does Being as the phenomenon of phenomenology appear or announce itself? What does the ’fulfilled’ ’phenomenology’ do? After approximately resolving these difficult problems, 1 finally in this part discuss the definition of phenomenology and the basic components of it connected with Heidegger’s The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927). These things exhibit once again Heidegger’s alteration to and breaking through Husserl’s reduction-construction phenomenology.In fifth part, I deal with Heidegger’s late texts, in order to exhibit that his late thinking also belongs to destruction-indication phenomenology, and interpret ultimately his destruction-indication as authentic thinking. The first chapter of this part explores the transformation of Heidegger’s thinking of Being from Being and Time to Introduction to Metaphysics, and his etymological analysis of Being, and also his discussion about how to indicate the essence of Being through the indication of beings, and then reviews his destruction to traditional metaphysics, and then discusses his ’Ereignis’, the most important conception in his late thinking, being involved with its indicatively and dependently genetic characteristic, and with the problems of interpretation and translation of it. The second chapter exhibits the richness and colorfulness of formal indication in Heidegger’s late texts, by analyzing his thinking about original hermeneutics, language-Saying, trace-hinting, art-opening, poetic dwelling, thing’s thinging, and the limit of science. The third chapter views such rich and colorful formal indications as authentic thinking for Heidegger. Such thinking is not calculative thinking, but contemplative thinking or reflection. It is a thinking that opens world, shelters earth, protects the unity of earth, sky, gods, and mortals, follows that which withdraws, and responds to that which calls. Such thinking is the most urgent thing in our times, and its task is to think back the most worthy of but never thinking of unconcealment. This revealing-concealing unconcealment cannot be represented. It is a mysterious region. It is that-which-regions (Gegnet). The nature of authentic thinking is just nearing that-which-regions non-willingly and destructively, and this nearing is also just waiting upon, in-dwelling (Inst(a|¨)ndigkeit), enduring, thanking, and returning, which are based on that-which-regions. Authentic thinking is essentially ’releasement’ (Gelassenheit).In final part, I investigate Heidegger’s destruction and indication to traditional Christian theology. I begin with his ’home-world’ in chapter 1. The home-world is both an actual world and a country of his thinking. For Heidegger, his home-world was first equal to Catholic world, but then they were separated from each other, and even Heidegger himself was divorced from Catholicism and began to think about religion in his own way. In chapter 2,I explore Heidegger’s interpretation of primordial Christian experience and authentic religious life, and his destruction to Augustine’s theology, exercising his method of formal indication during his early Freiburg period. In chapter 3, I fist examine Being and Time from its religious background, its religious significance, its Christian impetus, and its destruction to Christian theology, then analyze Heidegger’s definition of theology (theology is in the end a non-objectifying existentiell [existenziell] thinking based on faith itself), and of the relationship between philosophy and theology (philosophy can give theology a ’foundation’ or a formal indication), and finally point out his heathen and heterodox tendency. In chapter 4, I first investigate Heidegger’s more radical destruction to traditional Christianity and its onto-theo-logical foundation, and then explicate his new god and new theology, with respect to which, he established a distinguished relationship between man, god and the holy. According to his new theology, god is no longer a personal god, but a god’s godding, a last god that needs the longest preparing, a passing god that can never halt, and a beginning god that is deepest.更多还原