【作者】 李文君；

【导师】 李齐云；

【作者基本信息】 山东大学 ， 财政学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 伴随着巨大的融资需求发展起来的中国资本市场既体现了其强大的融资功能,又反映了我国金融体系从高度依赖以银行为主的间接融资向直接融资的转变。伴随这一转变的是我国上市公司的股权融资偏好,这种偏好有悖于西方经典的优序融资理论(pecking order theory)。众多的学者对这一问题的原因进行了研究,试图找到解决问题的方法。本文在这样的现实背景下,通过对西方经典融资理论的梳理,提出了两个问题:一是西方经典融资理论的价值基础是什么,其是否具有普适性?二是我国上市公司表现出来的股权融资偏好有悖于优序融资理论是否就说明我国上市公司的融资是非理性的?对经典理论的梳理以及相关的实证检验文献回答了第一个问题,西方经典融资论的价值基础是企业价值最大化,即资本成本最小化。而实证检验并不是都支持优序融资理论。因此,用我国上市公司的融资偏好与优序融资理论不符而否定其行为的研究就是一个错误的起点。企业形态的发展是伴随着融资尤其是外部融资行为实现的。股份制公司作为现代公司制企业的主要形式,是进行外部股权融资的结果。因此,要了解企业的融资目标不得不从企业的演变与企业的本质来寻找答案。企业融资的目标与企业财务管理的目标在以MM定理为研究起点的融资理论中发生了直接的联系,即只要实现资本成本最小化,就可以实现企业价值的最大化。而在实践中,企业作为一个法人,是否一定遵循着规范研究的假设,实现企业价值最大化?我国企业,尤其是上市公司的形态演变不是一种自然演变过程,而是制度变迁的产物,不可避免带有旧体制与制度诱导的印迹,因此,将上市公司作为一个独立的群体,而不考虑其过去的研究是否能够解释其偏好是值得怀疑的。因此本文以经济人的趋利动机为分析起点,在控制权成本—收益的经济学研究框架下,研究我国上市公司的融资偏好问题,对国有企业不同历史时期的融资偏好特点以及其市场表现、股权分置改革前后、全流通时代上市公司的融资条件、变化、趋势以及股权融资偏好的正负效应等内容进行了理论与实证分析,最后提出了解决融资偏好问题的对策性建议。本文共分五章,其主要内容如下:第一章为导论,通过对理论和现实背景的梳理,提出了问题以及本文的研究思路和方法,并就本文的相关概念、结构、研究结论与创新之处进行了归纳。第二章是全文的理论基础。正是在对控制权成本与控制权收益重新界定与认识的基础上,下文运用控制权成本与控制权收益来分析我国上市公司的股权融资偏好。第一节是对控制权收益的相关文献综述。对控制权收益概念的提出、内涵以及相关的一些研究进行了概述与评价。正是由于目前对控制权收益概念内涵的不统一,因此有了对其重新界定的必要性。第二节是对控制权成本的认识。获取、维持以及执行控制权都会产生相应的成本。本节对控制权的事前成本与事后成本进行了剖析,并对资本成本与控制权成本做了比较,得出两种成本不同的适用环境。第三节对控制权收益进行了重新界定。正是由于控制权的获取、维持与执行都需要成本,因此根据经济学的一般原理,控制权的成本需要收益的补偿,从这个角度说控制权收益是合理的。但是,根据控制权发挥的两种完全不同的效应:协同效应和隧道效应,控制权收益中既有合理的成分,共享控制权收益(基于协同效应产生的收益);又有不合理的成分,私有控制权收益(基于隧道效应产生的收益)。第三章是我国上市公司股权融资偏好的理论分析。第一节分析了我国上市公司融资的价值取向。从融资方式的变迁来看我国上市公司的融资偏好,与其说是制度变迁导致的企业融资偏好的变化,倒不如说制度的变迁并没有改变其融资的根本目标,即获取控制权收益的最大化。利用上市公司担保获得大量银行贷款资金、通过上市与股权再融资疯狂“圈钱”等融资行为都是将上市公司当成了“提款机”,充分揭示了控股股东利用上市公司获取控制权私利的侵占性和独占性本质。而委托代理理论可以解释我国上市公司以控制权收益最大化为融资目标的内在原因。第二节通过控制权成本的比较,解释了我国上市公司的股权融资偏好,在于企业融资约束效力的软化,从根本上改变软约束取决于有效制度下的微观经济行为和支撑企业融资行为的资本市场调控的有效性。第三节通过理论模型的建立与分析得出了我国上市公司追求控制权收益最大化的特定约束条件,通过对这些约束条件的限制或改变,可以实现对上市公司融资行为的引导。第四章是我国上市公司股权融资偏好的实证分析。基于上一章分析得到的特定约束条件,股权分置改革恰好改变了其中的第一个条件。第一节分析了股权分置改革之后上市公司“定向增发热”这一新的融资偏好的原因。第二节利用Probit二元选择模型研究了后股权分置改革时期上市公司侵占度、终极控制权下的现金流权、控股股东性质等九个特征变量对上市公司股权再融资概率的影响。模型结果与特征变量的统计分析得到的结果是一致的。非国有控股的上市公司,现金流权越高,越倾向于股权再融资。这在一定程度上是由于非国有控股上市公司,尤其是其中大量的民营企业上市融资时往往规模比较小,控股股东的直接控股比例较高,而这些企业为了迅速扩大企业规模,增强抵御风险的能力,往往上市后很快提出再融资要求。当然,考虑到我国的实际情况,这一点有时候更多的取决于政策的倾斜度。但是现金流权与股权融资偏好的一致结果在一定程度上说明,随着股权分置改革的完成,上市公司获取控制权私利的一个重要来源给切断了,而这一收益几乎可以说是无成本收益。那么可以说股权分置改革客观上抑制了上市公司的“圈钱”目标,引导了其融资的行为。而实证研究结果没能通过国有控股的上市公司,侵占度越大越倾向于股权融资的显著性检验。至于这样的结果可能是由于我们选择的样本中再融资家数与非再融资家数相差比较大造成的,如果能够得到提出股权融资预案的上市公司的数据资料,样本中再融资家数就会显著增加。另一方面的原因可能是两年的数据,时间跨度太小,因此需要今后进一步积累数据,以便得出更加可靠的结论。第三节对于全流通市场下的上市公司融资趋势进行了预测。上市公司控股股股东追求控制权收益的最大化不会因为全流通而发生变化。不管控股股东是否出售股票,二级市场股价都成为影响其总体收益的关键参数。因此,对股价的操纵和控制以实现控制权收益的最大化可能成为控股股东的新增目标。控股股东的“隧道”行为将更加隐蔽,而配合股价拉升通过资产注入等的“逆向隧道”行为将会更多。这些都一定程度上会影响到企业的融资选择。第五章是关于我国上市公司股权融资偏好的效应与对策性思考建议。以前面章节的分析为基础,本章探讨了我国上市公司的股权融资偏好的正负效应。股权融资偏好对我国宏观经济方面的贡献是有目共睹的;对满足企业的融资需求、降低资产负债率,改善资本结构等方面做出了突出的贡献。但是,我国上市公司股权融资偏好也对公司行为、资本市场功能的发挥带来了严重的危害。因此,本文提出了解决我国上市公司股权融资偏好的负面效用,促进正面效用发挥的对策性建议。这些建议的出发点就是建立和强化对控股股东的内外部治理的激励与约束机制。比如优化股权结构、改革国企人事任命制度,合理界定控制权共享收益,建立发挥“协同效应”的内部激励与约束机制;改革发行制度、培育资本成本意识、加强信息披露与信誉制度、控制权市场与退市制度、监管与法律制度等加大企业的机会主义成本,形成有效的外部约束机制。另外建立债券市场对于完善证券市场结构,均衡股市风险,增加企业融资渠道和投资者投资渠道都具有非常重要的现实意义。本文的研究方法主要有宏观与微观、规范与实证、历史与逻辑相结合的方法。创新之处主要体现在对我国上市公司股权融资偏好根本动机的研究是基于经济人的趋利动机,在重新界定控制权收益的基础上,重点检验了股权分置改革后影响我国上市公司股权融资偏好的特征变量。我国上市公司的形态演变不是一种自然演变过程,而是制度变迁的产物,不可避免带有旧体制与制度诱导的印迹,因此,本文从对国有企业到上市公司融资变迁的历史研究为出发点,得到上市公司控股股东股权融资的的趋利动机,这一点显然与经典的融资理论中企业价值最大化目标相矛盾,因此也就不能用资本成本来分析企业的融资选择。在对控制权成本重新认识的基础上,本文对控制权收益重新界定为共享控制权收益与私有控制权收益两部分。在控制权成本-收益的经济学研究框架下,通过数理模型分析得出了控股股东追求控制权收益最大化的约束条件,并据此通过实证研究检验了在股权分置改革这一约束条件改变后上市公司融资的新特征和影响其股权融资偏好的变量特征。并且对全流通后上市公司可能的融资趋势进行了预测。最后客观分析了我国上市公司股权融资偏好的正负效应,针对负效应提出了相关的对策性建议,具有较强的指导意义和可操作性。更多还原

【Abstract】 The development of Chinese capital market with the great fiancing demand has most directly embodied its powerful financing function and reflected the financial system changes. At the same time the listed companies’ equity financing preference has attracted much attention. Many scholars have come to a conclusion that this phenomenon is contradicting to the classical pecking order theory and studied on the reseons of the preference and the methods resolving this problem.This dissertation posing two questions after hackling the classical fiancing theories: one is that what is the value foundation of the classical fiancing theories? The other is how about their applicability? The second one is that can the equity finacing preference of Chinese listed companies against the pecking order theory mean the fiancing behavior irrational. The enterprise value maximization, namely capital cost minimization is the classical financing theories’ value foundation. And not all the ampirical tests support the pecking order theory. Therefore it’s a wrong starting point using the inconsistency to deny the Chinese listed companies behaviour. Enterpise form has evoluted with the financing, especially external fiancing behavioue. As the major form of morden company system enterprises, stock company is the result of external fiancing. So in order to know the enterprise’s finacing target, we have to find the anwer from the evolution and the essence of them. The financing tartet has directly associated with the financial target in the financing theories which begin with MM theorem. That is when the capital cost is minimum the enterprise value can realize maximization. But in reality as a legal person will the enterprise follow the phypothessis of normative research? The Chinese enterprises, especially the listed companies are products of institutional change, not natural evolution, inevitably with blots of old system and institutional change. Therefore it is suspectable to study the the listed companies’ fiancing preference, not considering the past. Because the preference is initiated from economic man’s intention to pursue more benefits, this dissertation in the economic framework of cost-benefit of control studies the financing preference of Chinese listed companies and focuses on the different characteristics in different pieods、market performance、effects. Based on the theoretical and empirical studies this dissertation has stated countmeasure suggestions to solve the financing preference problem.The major part of dissertation can be divided into five chapters.Chapter 1 is the introduction. In this part questions have been posted after hackling the literatures. And then we put forward this dissertation’s research thinking and methods and summarize the related concepts、structure、research conclusion and innavation.Chapter 2 is the theretical foundation of this dissertation. Based on the redefination of control cost and control benefit, this dissertation has studied on the equity financing preferrence of the Chinese listed company. First we review of the related literature about control benefit. Just because of controversial points of its connotation, it’s necessary to redefinate the defination of control benefit. Then we re-recognize control cost. Obtaining、maintaining and executing the right of control all need cost. After the analysis on the beforehand cost and the afterwards cost, we compare the differences between control cost and capital cost which is the standard to determine the financing choice in the classical thories. Finanlly the defination of control benefit has been redifined. From the point of control cost, control benefit is reasonable. However according to the two different kinds of effects generated by the using of control right, control benefit can be devided two parts: common-control benefit corresponding to cooperative effect and self-control benefit corresponding to tunneling effect.Chapter 3 is the theoretical analysis on the equity financing preferrence of Chinese listed companies. In first part we disscusse the value orientation of Chinese listed companies’ financing: maximum of control benefits which is concluded from the views of the financing transition path、the external behaviour of making use of the listed company to obtain huge amount of capital. This value orientation can be explained by the principal-agent theory. In the second part we study the financing preference of Chinese enterprise under the control cost. Due to soft constraint the equity finacing preference choice of Chinese listed company is rational. In the third part we discuss in the peoried of non-tradable shares what the constraint conditions of the equity financing preference are by establishing mathematical model. We can limit and guide this preference through changing these constrain conditions.Chapter 4 is the empirical analysis on the equity financing preferrence of Chinese listed companies. In this part we have a study on the fiancing preference after shareholder structure reform. The simple and pround reasons are discussed on a new phenomenon of directional add-issuance. Then we use the Probit Binary Choice Model to analyze the probability of the influence of nine characteristic variables on the financing preference of the listed companies. The results are consistent to the statistical analysis results. Higher the cash flow right is, non-state holding listed company is inclined to choice equity financing. The non-statle holding listed company, especially more private enterprise has smaller scale after EPO、higher controlling shareholding and presents SEO quickly after IPO to expand rapidly and to strengthen ability of anti-risk. Considering the real financing condition, it maybe more due to the policy inclination. But to a certain extent shareholder structure reform has cut one way of obtaining the private control benefit that is no cost to some extent. So we can say that the reform has restrained the listed company’s goal of "money-looping" and guide its financing behaviour. On the other hand the pypothethsis that more the separation degree of control right and stock control right, the state listed company is more inclined to choice equity financing doesn’t pass the significance test. One fact that the listed companies with SEO are much more than the non-SEOs maybe produce this result. The other reason may be that the researching period is too short for just two years after the shareholder structure reform. So we should go on collecting materials and come to more reliable results. Last we forecast the financing preference of the Chinese listed company in the period of Full Circulation. The goal of maximum of control benefit will not change. The fluctuation of stock’s market price will cause the controlling shareholder’s benefit. Manipulation of stock price to obtain the benefit control will be the newly added goal that will have an effect on the listed company’s financing choice.Chapter 5 analyzes the positive and negative effects of Chinese listed company’s equity financing preference and puts forward suggestions on restricting this preference according to the harm it has produced. This financing preference has a positive effect on the macro-economy and the companies’ self-development. But it also has a negative effect on company behaviour and the function of capital market. We propose the suggestions to build and strengthen the internal and external restraint-incentive mechanisms, especially restraint mechanisim. Such as optimizing ownership structure、reforming personnel appointment system and rational defining common benefit of control form the effective internal restraint-incentive mechanism. Reforming stock issuing system、cultivating cost of capital consciousness、strenghening information disclosure、reputation、delisting、legal and supervision system will increase control shareholders’ cost of opportunitism and build external restraint mechanism. In addition bond market is necessary to build for perfecing capital market structure、balancing stock market risk and increasing ways to finance and invest for the enterprise and investor.The combination of macroscopic and microscopic research、nomotive and empirical analysis、historical and logic study are employed in this dissertation. The creative points include the study of fundamental motivation of Chinese listed company、redefinition of control benefit、empirical test of influence factors after the shareholder structure reform. The evolution of enterprise form is not a natural process but a product of institutional change in China. We come to the conclusion that Chinese listed company pursues the maximum of control benefit not of enterprise value. Based on the redefination of control benefit we not only analysize the restraint conditions of equity preference on control cost frame but also study the influence factors after the shareholder structure reform by an empirical test. At last we put forward corresponding suggestions according to the analysis on the positive and negtive effection of financing preferrence.更多还原