美国对华金融外交研究

【作者】 周叶菁；

【导师】 孙哲；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 国际政治， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 作为国际关系中由来已久的一个现象,金融外交在新时期已经成为了美国对华整体外交中的重要组成部分。为什么金融外交会成为美国对华外交的一个核心部分?究竟应该如何运用合法的制度手段有效应对美国的金融外交?——这就是本论文着力回答的核心问题。具体到本论文选取的人民币汇率问题的例子,从政策过程的角度出发,人民币汇率问题为什么会被政治化,并成为政策议程的一部分?为什么围绕人民币汇率问题展开对华金融外交可以从美国的特殊集团利益诉求变成美国的公共政策?政策过程中的调整又是出于怎样的原因?在政策执行阶段,美国的对华金融外交活动呈现出怎样的形态和特征,为什么?在另一方面,从议题参与者的角度出发,在国际货币领域长期相对沉默的利益集团为什么会积极参与人民币汇率议题?美国国会的部分议员频频抛出人民币汇率的相关议案,但无一成为具有强制力的法律,那么,国会究竟在扮演怎样的角色?行政部门作为政策最终的制定者和执行者,在政策过程中的独立性如何,实现了或正在实现怎样的目标和使命?鉴于人民币汇率议题中的众多参与者,是“议题网络”还是“铁三角”决定了美国对华金融外交的形成与走向?对于中国而言,中国究竟应该如何运用合法的制度手段有效应对美国的金融霸权外交?本论文认为,人民币汇率问题之所以会在美国从经济问题走向政治化,并最终成为美国政策议程中的一部分,得益于以制造业集团为主要代表的利益集团在其中所扮演的驱动者和沟通者角色。在考察不同利益集团在金融外交政策过程中的不同角色时,本论文发现,认为“利益集团在美国国际货币政策过程中很难形成集体行动”的传统观点在本文的案例中无法获得足够的证据支持。以贸易/货币划界,认为利益集团在国际货币领域的活跃度和影响力远小于贸易领域——这样的路径无论在理论上还是在实践中都是行不通的。正是由于制造业和劳工集团在人民币汇率议题上的积极活动、金融利益集团的参与、跨国企业和贸易自由主义的放水,对华金融外交从美国的特殊集团利益变成了美国的公共利益。这种公共利益诉求如何转化为具体政策?本文的研究表明,国会通过积极的立法和监督活动,在客观上充当了金融外交从公共利益诉求转化为具体政策的沟通行为体。但不容忽视的一点是,府会“合作性张力”的权力结构以及国会自身的政治结构都限制了社会压力通过国会到达行政部门的作用过程。美国行政部门主张通过金融外交与中方展开接触,劝说人民币升值,在斯诺时期制定了包括高层对话、多边外交以及技术接触在内的具体策略。然而,在保尔森时期,在国会立法和制造业—工会集团更趋强硬的背景下,行政部门的政策却出现了趋于缓和的反向调整。对此,本论文认为,在议题网络中其他行为体的力量不变甚至表现出更加强硬的政策偏好时,华尔街——财政部集合体效应的凸显导致了政策的调整。因此,本论文认为,在人民币汇率问题上形成了覆盖广泛的议题网络,利益集团—国会—行政部门的模式仍然是美国对华金融外交发生的路径。然而,无论是“铁三角”还是“议题网络”都存在逻辑或经验的不足,一个相对可行的框架是:议题网络设置了金融外交的政策边界,利益集团—国会—行政部门三者之间并不稳定的三角仍然是金融外交的决策核心。在外交形式方面,个人外交在金融外交中的作用凸显;金融外交催生了崭新的双边战略经济对话,推动金融外交向机制化发展;高度一体化的国际金融市场决定了多边外交在金融外交中的独特地位。金融外交成为了全球化时代一种崭新的外交形态。在奥巴马时代,人民币汇率很可能继续成为中美经贸关系中的的核心争议,美国对华金融外交的进程也必将延续。为此,中国在“大力开展经济金融外交”的政策指引下,必须善于利用美国的制度化渠道,有效缓解风险、化解挑战。中国必须将利益集团作为一个重要变量,积极建立“抵消游说联盟”;中国需大力开发媒体和舆论引导的优势,合理整合并充分利用现有的各种金融外交资源和渠道,形成强大的金融外交合力,以服务于国家的整体利益。更多还原

【Abstract】 As a long-time phenomenon in international relations, financial diplomacy is now an important part in U.S. diplomacy towards China, particularly after the second half of 2003. How does U.S. financial diplomacy towards China become possible? This is the core question of the dissertation. In the case of RMB exchange rate that the dissertation focuses on, the core question develops into a couple of sub-questions. Regarding policy process, why is the RMB exchange rate issue politicalized and how does it turn into part of policy agenda? Why does financial diplomacy on RMB issue resolve itself from special interests into public interests? What are the adjustments in the policy process and how come? In the stage of policy implementation, what are the forms and features of the financial diplomatic activities and why are these policy tools selected? On the other side, starting form issue participants, why do interest groups, who have long been silent in U.S. international monetary policy, participate in the RMB issue agressively? Some congressmen have introduced a large number of RMB-related bills, but none of them has become law with binding force. Then, what role does the congress play? The administration is supposed to be the final policy maker and implementor, but what’s the degree of its independence and what are the aims that the administration has achieved and is now striving to achieve. Given the large number of participants in the RMB issues, is it Issue Network or Iron Triangle that decides the establishment and trends of U.S. financial diplomacy?We argue that the reason that the RMB issue has been politicalized and developed into part of U.S. policy agenda lies in the driver and communicator role of interest groups, more exactly, the manufacturing groups. In the discussion of the different roles of various groups in the policy process of financial diplomacy, we find that, the traditional argument that interest groups are hard to take collective actions in the process of U.S. international monetary policy cannot be proven in the case of the RMB issue. Therefore, the approach of dividing trade and money, and the argument that interest groups’ influence in international monetary field is far less than that in trade cannot hold water in both theory and practice. The manufacturing groups and labor groups has acted aggressively in the RMB issue; the financial groups participate in the issue out of their own concerns; multi-national corporations and trade liberalists turn a blind eye to the above groups. All these groups have unintentionally joined together to make financial diplomacy melt from special interest to public interest. Then, how does the public interest change into specific policies? Our research showes that the Congress, through its active legislation and supervision, acts as a real doer and communicator. However, it is worth noting that the "cooperative tension" between the asminitration and the legislature, as well as the power structure within the legislature, has posed constraints for the process by which social pressure may arrive at the administration.The U.S. administration has adopted the stratege of persuading China to revaluate the currency by financial diplomacy. The then Secretary of the Treasury John Snow has introduced specific policies of high-level dialogue, multi-lateral diplomay and technical engagement. However, after Henry M. Paulson Jr. assumed office as the Treasury Secretary, the policy makes a U-turn even though the legislature and the manufacturing and labor groups grow more aggressive. As for the seemingly unreasonable adjustment, we argue, when other actors in the issue network remain unchanged in terms of force, or show stronger policy preference, it is the effect of the Wall Street-Treasury Complex that leads to the policy adjustment.Therefore, we believe that the interest group - congress - administration model remains the path of U.S. financial diplomacy, even though there forms a large issue network about the RMB issue. Nevertheless, either Iron Triangle or Issue Network has theoretical or empirical flaws, and a possibly feasible framework is: issue network sets the policy border of financial diplomacy, while an unstable triangle of interest group - congress - administration is the core strucuture of policy-making in financial diplomacy.Regarding forms of diplomacy, personal diplomacy plays a crucial role in financial diplomacy; the brand-new bilateral strategic economic dialogue is developing financial diplomacy into effective institution; the highly globalized market of finance requires the use of multi-lateral model in financial diplomacy. In the times of globalization, financial diplomacy embodies many new features and a striking originality.Under the Obama administration, Chinese currency will probably remain a core dispute in China-U.S. economic and trade relations, and the U.S. is sure to continue its financial diplomacy towards China. Therefore, with the policy of "making great efforts to develop economic and financial diplomacy", China should learn to take advantage of legitimate and institutional measures in the U.S., so as to effectively ward off risks and challenges. In light of the role interest groups play, China must take interest groups as a major variable in U.S. financial diplomacy, and endeavour to form a counter-lobby coalition; China needs to explore the relations with mass media in the U.S.; China has to integrate its resources of financial diplomacy and make joint force of financial diplomacy, which can better serve the country’s national interest.更多还原