制度变迁与美国国际经济政策

【作者】 李巍；

【导师】 孙哲；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 国际政治， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 本文的核心研究问题是:为什么美国国内制度结构的特点及其变迁,会在美国国际经济政策选择中发挥重大的作用,它具体又是如何发挥作用?本文将集中考察美国国际经济政策的制度逻辑,强调国家政权和国内社会的区分,以及这两者的制度关系和互动模式所给美国国际经济政策带来的影响。具体而言,本文主要研究美国国内三个层次的制度变迁如何影响美国国际经济政策的制定。这三个层次的制度变迁分别是国家与社会关系的宏观制度结构,行政-立法-中间三大部门的中观政府体系,以及部门内部微观的决策系统。其中框定其他层次制度关系的宏观制度结构——国家与社会关系——是决定美国国际经济政策的最核心、最本质的制度关系。本文认为,美国的国内制度结构(国家与社会关系)的变迁,具体体现为行政-立法两大部门关系以及各部门内部微观决策系统的调整,塑造了体系、国家和社会三个层次的变量对美国国际经济决策发挥作用的次序和方式,决定了国内社会的利益与偏好和国际体系的压力与刺激,如何作用于处于两者中间位置的国家政权,进而对联邦政府通过政策工具的选择来改变美国与世界的经济关系施加了影响。国家既处在国家之间进行政治经济互动的体系之中,又在国内社会的范畴之内运行。国家是全体国民公共利益的代表者,而社会是由无数的私人行为体构成,社会利益体现为私人利益的总和,而由于社会结构天然就是失衡的,因此,社会利益往往体现为特殊利益,国家与社会围绕国际经济决策的权力竞争,体现为公共利益与特殊利益的竞争。由于美国的国家利益越来越多地通过政府在国际体系中的政策行为来实现,国家与社会的关系决定了政府在国际体系中通过国际经济政策保卫公共利益的能力。本文认为,在一个“强国家、弱社会”的制度结构下,即“强总统、弱国会”的政府体系下,美国联邦政府将根据美国在国际体系中的总体利益理性地进行国际经济决策,努力实现经济利益与安全利益、国际利益与国内利益的平衡;在一个“弱国家、强社会”的制度结构下,即“弱总统、强国会”的政府体系下,美国联邦政府的国际经济决策更容易迎合国内社会的特殊利益,沦为国内政治过程的产物。本文致力于复兴国际关系研究中的比较政治学(国内政治)传统,通过考察制约或刺激国家对外政策选择的国内制度因素,以挑战新现实主义所坚持的一些基本研究方法和研究假定,将国内政治找回来;同时,本文试图超越单纯的国内导向的研究路径,关注国际体系的压力和刺激如何通过变迁中的国内制度作用于政府决策。本文的研究路径,体现了作者试图为打破传统的国际关系与国内政治的界限而进行的努力。笔者通过构建一种解释美国国际经济政策的制度变迁理论,驱动当今风头正劲的国际政治经济学与比较政治经济学之间的对话和联姻。它将传统分离的国际关系与国内政治两大领域进行学理上的整合,以加强对国家对外经济政策和国际经济互动的解释力。更多还原

【Abstract】 The fundamental question of the dissertation is why the institutional characteristics and changes can exert great influence in the US international economic policy choices, and how the concrete influence occurs? The dissertation focuses on the institutional logic, emphasizes the identification of the state and society, and how the institutional relations and interactive styles between them influence the US international economic policies.In details, the dissertation pays attention to that how the US international economic policies are influenced by the institutional changes on three levels. They are state-society relation, which is macro-institution; executive-legislative-middle branches relations, which are middle-level institutions; and the decision making system in a single branch, which are micro-institutions. Among them, the macro-institutional structure, which frames others, is the most crucial and substantial institutional relations.The dissertation argues that the changes of American domestic institutional structure (state-society relation), which is reflected as the adjustment of inter-branches relations and the micro-decision making system, shape the sequences and manners in which international system, state, and domestic society exert influence in US international economic policy making. The changing institutional relations determine how the societal interests and preferences as well as systemic pressures and stimulus act on the state, which stands in the middle of them, thus it exerts influence on that what policy tools US government use to change the economic relations between the nation and world. The state stands in the system in which states interact with each other, and also the state operate in the sphere of society.State is the representative of national public interests; however, society is compromised by countless private actors, which act on their own interests. Societal interests are reflected as the aggregation of private interests. As the societal structure is naturally unbalanced, societal interests are generally reflected as special interests rather than public interests. Therefore, the power competition of state and society on international economic policy making reflected as the competition of public and private interests. As more and more American national interests are realized by governments’ policies and actions in international system, the state-society relation determines the government’s capacity to defend public interests in international system.The dissertation argues that under the institutional structure of strong state and weak society, in other words, strong president and weak congress, US federal government will make international economic policy rationally according to the general interests in international system, and try to strike a balance between economic interests and security interests, international interests and domestic interests. Otherwise, under the institutional structure of week state and strong society, in other words, week president and strong congress, the federal government’s international economic policy will easily cater to special interests, and become the victim of domestic political process.The dissertation devotes to revive the tradition of comparative politics (domestic politics) in IR studies. Through the examination of domestic institutional factors which restrict and stimulate the state’s foreign policy choices, the dissertation try to bring the domestic politics back in, then to challenge some research methods and assumptions held by neo-realism. Addition to that, the dissertation also tries to surpass the purely domestic-oriented approach by paying much attention to that how the pressures and stimulus of international system act on the government policy making through changing institutions. This approach reflects my effort to bridge the traditional gap between International Relations and Comparative Politics. I try to construct a institutional change theory to promote the dialogue and marriage of International Political Economy and Comparative Political Economy. It integrate the two subfields International Relations and Domestic Politics together, and then strength the explanations to foreign economic policies and international economic interaction.更多还原