【作者】 陈少平；

【导师】 傅春；

【作者基本信息】 南昌大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 中国所处地理环境是世界上各种自然灾害频发地区,与世界平均水平相比,自然灾害频率高18%,尤其是洪水灾害。频繁的洪灾事件使众多的受灾者“因灾至贫、因灾返贫”。不仅严重影响了受灾者的经济发展和受灾者生活改善,也给国家财政带来了沉重的负担。随着社会经济的发展和人口密度的增大,财富集中度上升,洪水灾害发生的频率和损失程度不断上升。据水利公报统计,1990～2007年间,中国每年因洪水灾害造成的直接经济损失达1000多亿元。仅1998年的大水灾就导致了2550多亿元的损失,2005年、2007年的淮河水灾造成的损失也高达100多亿元。洪水成为中国头号自然灾害,期间,政府财政救灾支出每年均达47.5亿元左右,虽然政府在防洪减灾等方面扮演着重要的角色,起到举足轻重的作用,但面对巨额的经济损失,政府的灾后补偿作用又显得微不足道,杯水车薪,起不到根本性作用。传统的单纯的工程措施已不能完全满足中国人多地少,快速城市化与土地过度开发的现状下的防洪形势的要求,2003年国家防汛抗旱总指挥部提出:“防洪要从控制洪水向洪水管理转变”。洪水灾害给国家和人民财产带来的损失随着经济实力的增强而增长,为了减轻灾后重建的压力,西方洪灾高发的国家都纷纷引入了不同模式的洪灾保险机制完美其社会损失保障制度,通过洪灾保险制度的相关配套措施达到减少洪水灾害损失的目的,以稳定社会经济生活。中国的洪水灾害救济补偿机制历史悠久,但与洪灾保险机制完善的英美两国相比,中国的洪水灾害损失补偿制度存在明显不足,形式单一。基本上以财政救灾为主、社会援助为辅,灾后的损失基本上由受灾群体独自承担。从风险分摊、资源分配效率与公平的原则而言,洪水灾害造成的所有经济损失不应当由受灾公众独自承担。而洪灾保险作为一种以保险契约形式存在的损失补偿方式,能够公平高效地为洪水灾害损失提供补偿。而作为被众多发达国家反复证明的,有效的市场化风险转移和应对机制——洪灾保险,由于制度安排上的缺陷,在中国没有发挥其在分散风险、补偿损失等方面应有作用。国内防范洪水风险的洪灾保险种类几乎是空白,目前,中国对洪灾风险有效承保能力严重不足,洪水灾害风险以其突发性和巨大破坏性直击保险业的软肋,国内保险公司每年的洪水灾害赔付与洪水灾害导致的实际损失相差悬殊,比例约为1比100。保险在管理洪灾风险方面的作用远没有发挥出来。洪灾保险市场存在着远远超过目前保险业供给能力的现实与潜在需求。本文基于上述背景,从洪灾风险与洪灾保险概述谈起,针对中国洪灾损失保障的现状,结合洪灾风险管理的特点,从转变补偿机制的角度,分析需求方和供给方的影响因素。同时,本文在借鉴国际洪灾保险模式经验的基础上,结合中国经济发展不完善、保险市场发展不够规范的具体国情,探索构建由政府参与、保险公司运作,政府、保险、投保主体共同承担洪灾风险的可行的洪灾保险模式的途径。第1章是绪论。用事实和数据分析了洪水灾害风险在中国的现状,指出当前洪水灾害风险已经成为影响中国人民生产、生活和社会稳定的重大事件,提出了在中国建立有效的洪灾保险制度的必要性。首先从洪水灾害及其损失概况、洪水灾害损失与保险补偿提出了研究的主题。其次,对国内外文献中相关研究进行了述评。此外,还对本文的研究目的及意义,研究思路、方法及内容进行了并说明。第2章对洪灾风险的可保性及其保险产品的经济学属性进行了探讨。从洪灾风险的概念、洪灾风险的特点、保险的一般理论引出了洪灾风险及其保险。其次,通过分析风险可保性的影响因素,结合洪灾风险的特点,探讨了洪灾风险的可保性,指出洪灾风险并不是普通意义上的可保风险,同时提出了扩大洪灾风险可保性的途径,再次,分析了洪灾风险的保险产品-洪灾保险的内涵、约束条件及其特点,最后,探讨了洪灾保险的经济学属性。指出洪灾保险是混和产品中具有利益外溢特征的产品,阐述了洪灾保险正外部性的政策主张,认为洪灾保险是介于纯粹的公共物品和私人物品之间的准公共物品。洪灾保险在某些方面具有公共物品的特征,如效用上不可分割性、经营上的规模性。但洪灾保险在某些方面又具有私人物品的特性,如消费上的竞争性和收益上的排他性。这种准公共产品如果没有政府的支持是很难运作的。正外部性的存在导致市场失灵,使洪灾保险的购买者和供给者成本利益失衡,从而缩小了洪灾保险的供求规模,使其小于社会最佳规模,造成市场失效。指出由政府介入通过价格补贴或政策倾斜等方式,可以实现了洪灾保险产品资源配置的最优。第3章与第4章是本文的核心内容,主要从中国洪灾保险市场失灵的经济学分析的视角来讨论为什么中国需要洪灾保险产品而又没有洪灾保险产品,又是什么导致了洪灾保险市场出现供给与需求都冷的现象。第3章对中国洪灾保险的需求进行了分析。首先,从中国农业保险的困境引出了中国洪灾保险有效需求不足的主要原因也是根本原因即购买力过低。对潜在的洪灾风险人群进行了市场细分和需求分析,运用博弈论方法分析了政府救灾力度对洪灾保险需求的影响。其次,探讨了影响洪灾保险购买意愿的因素,运用预期效用理论与猜测理论的观点,估计平均WTP(支付意愿)与信赖区间。最后,以鄱阳湖区的波阳县和洞庭湖区的华容县的405户居民调查结果为例进行了实证分析,实证分析结果发现,有购买其他保险经验对购买洪灾保险意愿有显著的正面影响;洪灾保险价格对洪灾保险购买意愿呈现显著的负面影响;个人社会经验属性对洪灾保险购买意愿有影响,但影响程度不大,而家庭平均收入对洪灾保险购买意愿有显著的正面影响;政府的防洪减灾策略对洪水保险购买意愿有负面影响。通过对样本数据的深层次的分析发现,华容县居民回答购买洪灾保险的愿意的明显高于波阳县居民,随着问卷保费的逐步增加,受访居民购买洪灾保险的意愿逐步降低,进一步发现,当保费高100元时,两县受访居民购买洪灾保险的愿意大幅下降。收入越高、年纪越轻、房子越新、遭受洪灾经验越多或具有其他保险购买经验的受访者,购买洪灾保险的意愿较高。两县综合的平均愿付保费置信区间在80—100元期间。第4章对中国洪灾保险的供给分析。由于洪灾风险具有巨灾损失特性,洪灾保险产品的特性与企业实现自身发展目标,使得厌恶风险的保险提供者,缺乏提供洪灾保险的积极性。在当前中国现有的保险市场和资本市场发展水平下,发展洪灾保险并不完全同保险公司的企业发展目标相一致,甚至在某种程度上相背离,造成中国目前洪灾保险市场供给不足的重要原因之一,本文运用博弈理论从政府、保险公司、公众三者的立场进行了博弈分析,解释中国当前洪灾保险发现不足现状的理论根源,指出洪灾保险的供给有限的主要原因是洪灾保险不能给经营它的保险公司带来利润,与保险公司的商业组织性质相背离。同时,洪灾保险的边际收益过低也是洪灾保险供给不足的一个重要原因。加之,国内商业保险公司对于洪水灾害缺乏较为精确的评估手段和详尽的统计资料,再加上精算技术的难度,缺乏有效的再保险支撑,使得众多保险公司不敢轻易涉足洪灾保险市场。更为重要的是,供给者自身的财务特性与政府对洪灾保险态度,会影响供给者的供给决策行为。本文以预期效用与非预期效用理论从洪灾风险的特点、信息不对称、风险成本、保险公司的财务特点、政府政策的规范五个方面分析了洪灾保险供给的特点,建立的供给决策模型与效用测量方法,同时,针对中国执行洪灾保险政策,保单供给者的态度与影响供给态度的因素进行讨论,作为防洪减灾政策评估的参考。最后,通过对国内12家财产保险公司及其分支机构的21位精算人员与62位核保人员的问卷调查为例,应用预期效用与非预期效用理论进行了实证研究,研究发现洪灾保险供给决策受到概率不确定因素影响从而降低供给意愿,符合非预期效用风险规避特性。同时,通过供给决策模型分析结果得出保险业者因受到风险感知、风险成本的影响而提高保费,而政府相应配套措施可以促使保险业者提高洪灾保险供给意愿。第5章是洪灾保险模式的国际比较。通过对国际上正在运行的巨灾保险模式的分析,重点介绍了英国保险公司主导的“捆绑式”洪灾保险、美国政府主导的“专项式”洪灾保险。及其它国家的一些模式,如挪威的保险公司专营的“捆绑式”、日本的政府主导及财政支持式、土耳其多主体合作的“小捆绑”式,并对这些模式的资金来源、承保方式、政府角色法律制度及承保范围、保单设计、洪灾基金投资背景及原则等方面的共同点进行比较研究,同时,还比较了这些模式的优缺点,提出了对中国洪灾保险模式构建的启示。第6章对中国未来实施的洪灾保险模式进行探讨。重点对中国历史上开展的准洪灾保险制度的历史与现状进行了回顾,并分析指出准洪灾保险制度存在的主要问题是中国应付洪水灾害损失主要依靠政府的救济和民间的捐助,保险意识不强,致使商业性洪灾保险制度的供给则严重不足。中国现阶段发展洪灾保险,要坚持从中国国情出发,根据中国流域的分布和发生情况,根据市场对保险的需求和中国各地区经济发展实际,吸收借鉴国外成功模式的经验,走商业保险公司运作、多渠道分散风险,辅之以政府政策支持的道路,因此,洪灾保险制度的路径选择方面根据前面第3章、第4章对中国洪灾保险市场的供给与需求分析的基础上,结合第5章国际洪灾保险模式的比较,针对中国的国情,结合中国洪水保险政策性特点以及经济发展的实际情况,提出了建立政府主导下商业性保险公司经营的洪水保险经营模式。最后,对这一模式下洪灾保险运行框架、洪水保险体系的组织与管理、洪水保险的再保险以及开展洪水保险的对策进行了研究。总之,建立洪灾保险机制是一项庞大的社会工程,需要国家、社会各相关部门共同参与,它依赖于客观的灾害风险分析评价、风险区域的划分、科学的损失估算和非工程的防灾减损等风险管理体系的建立与完善。目前,综合学科知识的发展和先进科技手段在自然灾害风险管理领域的应用为洪灾保险机制的建立奠定了技术基础。本文在这方面的研究仅仅是一个探索性的起步。更多还原

【Abstract】 In accordance with the water communique, up to 2007, China has been suffering significant losses from floods with 103.89 billion Yuan per year since 21st century. Although the state government provides huge amount of relief with 4.75 billion Yuan annually, it means nothing to compensate the losses caused by floods. Few flood insurance products are available now in China, where, however, the demands to the flood insurance are much greater than the present supply in the flood insurance market.In order to reduce the increasing losses, worldwide nations has set up various compensation systems. Though with a long history of relief for flood, there are conspicuous flaws in the compensation system of China, in contrast with the U.S.A. and the UK. Unequal and inefficient resource allocation resulting from the unreasonable cost paid by unmotivated citizens and local government in high-risk areas, the government is not the only one who shall pay the financial losses. Flood insurance that encourages the insurer and the government to take measures to reduce the losses of floods, may create a stable environment for economic growth.The flood insurance is lack of sufficient capacity in China now. Since the subject matters of flood insurance do not meet the demand of independent and identical distribution, this type of insurance goes against the traditional principle of large number. The amount of compensation made by the domestic insurance companies is much smaller than that of real losses caused by floods. In recent years, by the ratio of 1: 100 between indemnity and losses, the government takes the majority responsibility in compensation without any support from commercial insurance.In the first chapter, it firstly introduces the topic of the article. Then it makes a summary on the research abroad and at home, and finds their flaws. In addition, it states the objective, significance and methodology employed in this article. Chapter 2 studies the insurable possibility of flood risk and its economic nature. It introduces the flood risk and flood insurance based on the concept and characteristics of risk, and the general theories of insurance. Secondly, according to the features of flood risk, it discusses the insurable possibility of flood risk by analyzing the factors affecting the insurable risks, indicates that flood risk is not a general insurable risk, and proposes the way to increase the insurable possibility of flood insurance. Thirdly, it analyzes the flood insurance products, as well as connotation, restriction and features of flood insurance. Finally, it studies the economic nature of flood insurance. It insists that flood insurance is quasi-public goods between pure public goods and private goods. Flood insurance possesses the characteristics of public goods, such as undividable utility and big scale of operation; whereas in other aspects it is of the features of private goods including competition of consumption and exclusiveness in benefits. Therefore such quasi-public goods can hardly work without the support of government.Chapter 3 makes analysis on the demands to flood insurance. Firstly, it summarizes the reasons of demands insufficiency based on the agricultural insurance dilemma, and analyzes the demands influenced by the game between the governments and individuals. Secondly, it discusses such four factors that motivate purchasement of flood insurance, as cognition and prevalence of flood insurance, preventive measures against floods taken by government, features of flood victims, social and economic features of individuals, and insurance willing. From above analysis, it concludes the purchasement utility function and purchasement probability of individuals and the interaction between them. Finally, taking the positive analysis on investigation of 405 local families in Boyang and Dongting as an example, the data proves that when the premium is higher than 100 Yuan, the percentage of "willing to buy the insurance" declines dramatically. The higher income they earn, the younger they are, the newer house they own, the more experience about flood they possess, and the more insurance they bought; the more these families are willing to buy flood insurance. The confidence interval of average premium that the families are willing to pay is between 80-100 Yuan. Chapter 4 focuses on the demands to the flood insurance. This chapter illustrates the underwriting manner and the factors that affect the decision process. Based on the investigation on the officials and assessors in property insurance companies in China, it analyzes the decision-making procedure of underwriting by expected utility theory and non-expected utility theory. Firstly, it indicates the characteristics of flood insurance supply from five aspects: flood risk, information asymmetry, risk cost, financial features of insurance provider, and criterion of government measures. Secondly, it sets up a flood insurance supply mode on the basis of utility and risk decision-making theory. Finally, positive analysis is made on the questionnaire of 21 officials and 62 assessors in 12 property insurance companies and their branches, with following conclusions: (1) underwriting decision makers generally agree that low probability and high risk are the basic features of floods, and believe the adverse selection may occur in insurance supply; (2) underwriting decision makers agree with a cooperative operation between the government and private companies. Under this mode, the government plays an important role in policy enactment, while private companies are responsible for the business operation; (3) insurance supply decision makers will lower the supply affected by the uncertainty of probability, regardless of the losses. If the losses are taken into consideration, its amount is in an outstanding link with decisions. The larger the losses are, the less the insurer is willing to supply. Decision makers prefer the penetration of government into insurance market. In the current insurance market, the target of flood insurance is not fully in line with normal commercial insurance, which result in the insufficiency of flood insurance supply.Chapter 5 focuses on the international comparison of flood insurance and enlighten from it. It makes a remarkable introduction on commercial flood insurance framework in the U.K., and state flood insurance framework in the U.S.A. In addition, it makes a comparison among worldwide nations about laws, coverage, policy design, and fund investment. Finally, it summarizes experience of those two countries for the flood insurance framework in China: (1) appropriate behavior of government, (2) combination of prevent measures and rescue works, (3) good management of insurance and reinsurance, and (4) improvement of laws. Chapter 6 discusses the flood insurance mode to be taken in China, Firstly; it introduces the several modes of flood insurance taken in history, and proposes the principles and rules to be followed in framing the flood insurance in China. Secondly, according to the analysis made in Chapter 3, 4 and 5, it concludes that the flood insurance mode to be taken in China shall be a kind of cooperation among government, insurer, and the public, in which the government plays a leading role, run by commercial insurance companies in line with areas and stages.更多还原