【作者】 刘艳华；

【导师】 王家传；

【作者基本信息】 山东农业大学 ， 农业经济管理， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 建设社会主义新农村是事关全面建设小康社会和现代化建设全局的重大历史任务。无论是发展现代农业,促进粮食生产和农民增加收入,还是加强农村基础设施建设,全面进行农村综合改革,都离不开农村金融的大力推动和支持。然而,中国农村信贷配给机制现况扩大了农村信贷资金的供需缺口,成为制约新农村建设的重要因素。理论逻辑证明,制度内生和信贷市场不完全使得非均衡信贷配给和均衡信贷配给成为中国农村信贷市场的典型现象。信贷配给理论也表明,利率管制、逆向选择和道德风险、交易成本、产权与制度缺失、金融垄断等因素都可能成为信贷配给产生的诱因。经验研究表明,农户和农村中小企业普遍面临着严重的信贷配给问题。农户和农村中小企业的信贷配给程度高、贷款覆盖面窄和信贷可获性差是众多学者调查研究结论的共鸣。基于此种现实,本文依据信贷配给理论、农村经济发展理论,运用协整、Match估计、数据包络分析(DEA)等计量分析方法,采用宏观与微观分析相结合、定性与定量分析相结合的研究方法,对中国农村金融机构信贷配给的绩效进行计量和评价,以正确把握中国农村信贷市场的特征,并在此基础上,提出了有效提升中国农村信贷配给绩效的政策建议。本文主要有两个研究目标:一是以信贷配给理论为理论基础,研究中国农村信贷市场的信贷配给特征;二是在计量农村信贷配给的经济效应的基础上,评价中国农村信贷配给的绩效。为了实现这两个目标,本文设计了八章三大部分内容。第一部分包括第1章、第2章和第3章。本部分首先在对信贷配给的内涵和外延进行明确界定的基础上,定性地剖析均衡与非均衡信贷配给现象的产生原因;然后,以此为理论基础,以经验研究为事实论据,定性与定量地论证均衡与非均衡信贷配给现象在中国农村信贷市场的存在性;最后,追溯中国农村金融制度的变迁,全面解剖制度内生下的信贷配给演进的来龙去脉。第二部分包括第4章、第5章、第6章和第7章。第4章首先构建两期动态模型,分析信贷配给对农村经济实体的投资产出的影响,然后阐明货币政策的信贷配给传导渠道,分别从微观和宏观的角度对信贷配给的经济效应进行理论分析;第5章在对中国农村的信贷需求和信贷供给进行定性和定量描述的基础上,计量信贷供给对信贷需求的满足程度,初步评价中国农村信贷配给的绩效;第6章运用协整分析和Match估计的方法,分别计量中国农村信贷配给的效率和农户的福利效应,进一步评价中国农村信贷配给的绩效;第7章首先分析农村金融机构信贷配给经营的收益与成本,利用收益与成本对比的分析方法,初步评价中国农业银行、中国农业发展银行和农村信用社等金融机构的信贷配给效益;然后,在初步评价的基础上,利用DEA评价模型,以山东省JN市农村信用社为研究样本,进一步评价农村金融机构信贷配给经营的效率;最后,以山东省JN市样本农村信用社为研究对象,在对其信贷风险进行统计描述的基础上,利用DEA模型进一步评价样本农村信用社利用信贷配给防范信贷风险的效率。第三部分是第8章,对本文的研究结论进行了总结,并在此基础上提出了有效提升中国农村信贷配给绩效的政策与建议。本文的基本研究结论是:(1)中国农村具有非均衡和均衡信贷配给的双重特征。从导致信贷配给现象产生的因素来看,中国农村信贷市场几乎囊括了能够诱发信贷配给的制度因素和市场因素。制度内生于中国农村信贷市场,非均衡信贷配给特征伴随着农村金融体制的变迁而演进,与农村金融机构的发展、农村信贷市场的结构、利率管制以及国家的信贷管理体制密切相关。(2)农村信贷配给程度在总体上有所缓解。农业信贷配给度的变迁取决于农村金融体制的变迁。农业和农村中小企业的信贷配给程度具有显著差异:农业信贷配给度呈下降趋势,而农村中小企业的信贷配给程度逐年加深。这种差异与信息不对称的程度有关。但是,在信息对称的情况下贫困者会受到更严重的信贷配给,而且信息越完全,贫困者受到的信贷配给程度越严重,这意味着政府(财政)应在扶贫信贷中发挥主导作用。(3)通过协整分析发现,农业信贷资源的配给效率较低,导致这一结果的因素包括逆向选择、政府的贷款指令计划、要素产出的边际递减规律和贷款的可替代性;农村中小企业的配给效率较高,其原因在于,与农户相比农村中小企业的信息不对称程度较低。通过对比分析可以发现,农村金融体系形成与稳固阶段的农业的信贷配给效率高于农村金融改革的推进和深化阶段的农业信贷配给效率,原因包括信贷行政投入的盲目性和要素产出的边际递减;农村中小企业的信贷配给效率高于农业的信贷配给效率,这种差异与信息不对称的程度有关。(4)农村信贷配给损失了农户福利,导致了农户的收入、生活消费、医疗消费和教育消费等方面的缩水。利用Match估计法对调查取得的样本进行分析发现,信贷配给具有传导作用。信贷配给会直接地减少受到信贷配给的农户的福利水平,也会间接地减少未受到信贷配给的农户的福利。因此,缓解农村信贷配给是提高农民福利水平的一个重要举措,是新农村建设及农村金融体制深化改革的当务之急。(5)通过收益与成本对比的分析发现,中国农业银行与样本农村信用社的信贷配给经营亏损,而中国农业发展银行的信贷配给经营盈利。导致这种结果的关键因素是制度和市场:一方面,利率管制压缩了农村金融机构的获利空间;另一方面,信贷市场的不完善产生了高昂的放贷成本。因此,本文认为,放松制度约束和完善信贷市场是提高农村金融机构信贷配给效益的关键举措。在2003年国家“花钱买机制”的作用下,农村信用社的信贷配给经营效率总体上有所提升:随着农信社信贷配给规模的增加,其信贷配给成本有减少的趋势。DEA模型分析发现,信贷配给有效地防范了信贷风险,实现了农村金融机构信贷配给经营的初衷。这可能是信贷配给现象的唯一“益处”。但是,农村金融机构利用信贷配给防范信贷风险的效果也存在个体差异。更多还原

【Abstract】 The construction of Socialistic New Country is a most important historical mission relative to the construction of Well-off Society and Modernization. Whether to develop the Modern Agriculture, or to promote agricultural production and increase the farmers’income, or to build the rural infrastructure, rural finance is very necessary. However, the Chinese rural ration widens the gap between the demand and the supply for the rural credit. The Chinese rural ration becomes the obstacle for the construction of New Country.Theoretically,The endogenetic system and the credit market imperfection make the disequilibrium ration and the equilibrium ration to be typical phenomenon in the Chinese rural credit market. The Ration Theory indicates that interest control, adverse selection, moral hazard, transaction cost, absence of property right and system and financial monopolization can all lead to ration. The evidence says that the Chinese farmers and rural medium & small enterprises face terrible ration problems. The researchers believe in their survey that the rural credit resource in the rural credit market is hardly available for the farmers and rural medium & small enterprises. Based on the fact and the Ration Theory above and Rural Economic Ddevelopment Theory, this paper uses many quantitative methods, such as Co integration Analysis, Match Estimation and DEA, etc, to calculate and assess the performance of the Chinese rural ration macroscopically and microcosmically, qualitatively and quantificationally, to check the efficiency of the Chinese rural ration. Finally, this paper makes suggestions and policy advice to promote the ration’s performance.This paper has tow targets: one is to research the credit ration feature in the Chinese rural credit market based on the credit ration theory, and the other is to calculate and appraise the performance of the Chinese rural credit ration on the basis of the credit ration’s effect on the economy. The article is divided to three parts for the targets, including eight chapters. The first part contains Chapter 1, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. In this part, the paper firstly qualitatively analyzes the factors that generate the rural credit ration after the credit ration’s concept and its extension. Then the paper uses empirical studies to ague qualitatively and quantificationally about the existence of the credit ration in the Chinese rural credit market. At last, the third chapter traces the transition of the financial system to know completely the course of the rural credit ration. The second part contains Chapter 4, Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. Chapter 4 designs a two-period dynamic model to find how the credit ration affects the investment and production of the rural economic entities and explain clearly the ways in which credit ration influences the money policy. Following that, Chapter 5 describes qualitatively and quantificationally the credit demand and supply in the country, then calculates how much the credit demand is satisfied to assess the performance of the credit ration preliminarily. To acquaint more about the performance of the credit ration, Chapter 6 continues to compute the efficiency of the rural credit ration by Co integration and analyze the effect the credit ration has on the farmers’welfare by Match Estimation. Then Chapter 7 researches the income and the cost in the ration process of the rural financial institutes and assesses preliminarily the credit ration’s performance for China Agricultural Bank and Agricultural Development Bank of China,and takes the Rural Credit Cooperatives of JN City in Shan Dong province for example to assess further the credit ration’s performance for rural financial institutes by DEA. Finally, the paper measures the credit ration’s efficiency for risk controlling by DEA with the Rural Credit Cooperatives of JN City in Shan Dong province as example. The third part has Chapter 8 only included. This part puts forward policies and proposals to improve the performance of the rural credit ration at the basis of the paper’s summary of research findings.The paper’s basic research conclusions are:(1) Disequilibrium ration and equilibrium ration are obviously present at Chinese rural credit market. From the factors leading to credit ration, there are all the factors about system and market in Chinese rural credit market. System is endogenous at Chinese rural credit market, and disequilibrium ration changes with the transition of the rural financial system very relative to the development of rural financial institutions, the structure of rural credit market, the interest controlling and the system of the country credit management.(2) The degree of rural credit ration generally is alleviated. The changes of the degree of the agricultural credit ration depend on the rural financial system. There is a difference in the credit ration degree between agriculture and medium & small enterprises. In detail, the degree of agricultural ration becomes smaller and smaller; relatively, the degree of medium & small enterprises’ration becomes more and more terrible year by year. The difference has something to do with the information imperfection. However, in the case of information perfection, the poor are rationed terribly and the information is more perfect, the ration is more terrible for the poor. So the government should play the most roles in the project of supporting the poor.(3) The paper finds that the efficiency of agricultural credit ration is very low, and the causes include adverse selection, the government’s credit policy, the law of diminishing marginal and the credit substitution. At another hand, that of medium & small enterprises is relatively high. This is because the information perfection degree between the financial institutes and medium & small enterprises is lower than that between the financial institutions and farmers. Another discovery by comparison is the efficiency of agricultural credit ration at the initial stage of the rural financial system is higher than that at the later stage, which results from the blindness of the government credit and the law of diminishing marginal. The comparison also finds that the credit ration’s efficiency of medium & small enterprises is higher than that of agriculture, which results from the information imperfection.(4) One of the conclusions is that rural credit ration cuts down the farmers’welfare in the income, life consumption, medical expenditure and education expenditure. The paper finds by the Match Estimation that the credit ration has conduction. That means, the credit ration can reduce directly the rationed farmers’welfare, and also indirectly reduce the welfare of those who are not rationed. As a result, credit ration must be removed to promote the farmers’lives.(5) The article finds out that credit ration brings loss for China Agricultural Bank and Rural Credit Cooperatives and brings profit for Agricultural Development Bank of China, which results from the system and market: at one hand, the interest controlling narrows the profit space; at the other hand, the imperfect market increases the credit ration cost. So lessening the system constraint and making the credit market perfect is the key to improve the performance of the credit ration. At last, the paper finds by DEA the credit ration can restrain the risk from credit, which may be the only“advantage”of the credit ration. However, there are differences in the risks controlling by ration for different financial institutions.更多还原