【作者】 王蕾；

【导师】 周永坤；

【作者基本信息】 苏州大学 ， 宪法与行政法学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 本文试图在法律的“关系本体论”立场的指引下重新审视宪法平等规范的性质。目的是要说明,宪法平等规范的生命在于应用,它的内涵在无数次的应用过程中得以确立,真正的宪法平等规范就体现在宪法平等条款中的平等理念与个案之间的对应关系中,是一种关系性存在。离开了应用与解释,就不存在宪法平等规范这回事。首先我们探究的是平等的理念,作为正义的核心与基础的平等,本身仅是一个形式意义的存在,它的具体内涵有待于他在的价值标准予以填充。这个填充过程并非简单地表现为逻辑演绎,而是体现为一种理性的论证过程。构成平等内涵的是一种经论证而来的“可接受性”,而非特定价值观念所带来的(自然科学意义上)“确定性”,平等的理念是一个实践理念。其次,在进行宪法哲学层面的平等理念的探究之后,转向实在法层面,在实在法层面探究平等的规范意义。在诠释理念之下,宪法平等规范不再是预先存在于宪法文本之后等待人们去“发现”的“正确答案”,它毋宁是一个需经宪法解释主体(诠释者)在宪法条款与生活事实之间“往返流转”、论证发展的规范群。这个规范群通过诠释者的主观参与和生活事实的不断变换保持其生命力,因而这个规范群的内涵不是封闭的,它通过衍生规范的形式延伸或改变已有的意义。就目前的宪政实践而言,不但“平等是一项公民基本权利”的内涵来自于“每个公民在法律上(面前)都是平等的”这一直接的宪法规范,而且这个衍生的平等权规范又衍生出了“平等是一个具有客观价值的宪法原则”这类次级衍生规范。另外,如果我们结合司法实践中各种“平等”的论证方式和适用特点,并从内容上加以类型化,会发现宪法框架下的平等规范还包括第三个面向——政策。最后,无论是平等权、平等原则还是政策,都不是平等规范内涵的中止之处,面对变化多端的个案,它们都不能预先给定有关“平等与否”的准确判断。只有经过宪法诉讼中法官的价值衡量和规范论证,才能作出有关个案的裁判。具体来说,从平等规范的结构上来看,可适用于具体案件的平等规范来自于“相同/相似情况相同对待”与“不同/不似情况不同对待”这两个子原则间的权衡和取舍。这两个目标相反的子原则在逻辑上包含了所有的可能性,因此平等规范本身是一个具有“铁律”性质的规则,即它在规范上不可能存在例外。因此无论是德国的概念式审查标准还是美国的类型化审查标准,都不过是平等规则内部的两个子原则间的较量和权衡的外部表现而已,只是,由于在具体的个案中与之相伴随的司法审查原则和立法民主原则间的分量有所不同,因而立法者的裁量空间和司法审查的正当性程度有所不同,从而呈现出宽严度不同的审查标准类型。诠释学的理念给了我们一个新的探究宪法平等规范内涵的视角,与以往的宪法解释观相比,它更注重得出结论的“过程”和“方法”,而不是那个具有语境化特点的“结论”。这些“过程”和“方法”才是至关重要的东西,它们是根本性的、不变的和可把握的,它们是决定“内容”和“结论”的事物。从这个角度说,中国的平等保护问题尚未从规范的意义上予以解决,这不仅是由于缺乏宪法诉讼和有效的宪法解释的机构,更重要的是缺乏由宪法解释者所做的对于平等判断的论证过程。因为“论证”是平等规范的适用不可缺少的环节,平等规范的意义借此才得以形成。对于宪法规范尚处于休眠状态的中国人权保护状况来说,这令人深思。更多还原

【Abstract】 The thesis attempts to reconsider the nature of the constitutional equality norms in the viewpoint of“relation-ontology”in order to expound that the life of the constitutional equality norms is rooted in its application, during the countless times of which its connotation is well established. The real constitutional equality norms are closely reflected in the corresponding relation between the equality notion and the individual cases, thus exist as a relation-being. Without application and interpretation, there are no constitutional equality norms.Firstly, we study the equality ideal. As the basis of the justice, the equality itself merely presents its form, while its concrete connotation is to be substantiated by the values of other beings. The course of substantiating does not simply show a sort of easy logic deduction, but a kind of rational demonstration course. The connotation of the equality lies in its“acceptable nature”derived from demonstration, but not the“definitude”brought up by non-specific values (in the nature of natural science). The equality ideal is practical.Secondly, we proceed on the significance of equality norms in the statute after philosophically studying the equality ideal in constitution. Under the interpretation idea, the constitutional equality norms are no longer“correct answers”, which people try to search behind the constitutional text. Rather, it is a group of norms which the interpreters make great efforts to detect and prove between the constitutional precepts and the reality. This group remains its vitality through the participation of interpreters and changing of realities, thus it is open, which expands or transfers its possessed meaning through deriving its form. In light of the present constitutional practice, not only the connotation of“equality is a basic right of citizens”derives from the constitutional precept of“every person is equal before the law”, but also this derived equality norm produces a sub-norm,“equality is a constitutional principle of objective values”. In addition, if we consider the demonstration program and the characters of all kinds of equality norms in the judicial process, and classify them according to the content, we will find the equality norms contain the third respect----the policy.Lastly, whether the equality rights, equality principle, or the equality policy, none of them is a final judgment of equality in the face of the various individual cases. Only after the valuation and argument by the judge in the constitutional lawsuits, the judgment concerned with individual cases can be made. Concretely, in view of the structure of the equality norm, the equality norm which could be applied to a specific case derives from the balance and the choice between the principle of“treating the same similarly”and the principle of“treating the difference differently”. The two principles of contrary purposes consist of all the possibilities in logic, so the equality norm of stringent nature is a rule without exception. Whether the conceptual investigation criterion of German or the typical investigation criterion of American is only the outer expression of the competition of the two principles. As the change of the weight of the legislative democracy principle and the judicial review principle, the establishing space of the legislator and the rationality of the judicial review are different, thus the different types of reviewing criterion are embodied.The idea of interpretation gives us a new viewpoint of studying the connotation of the constitutional equality norms. Comparing with the preceding textualism idea of constitution, it emphasizes the“process”and the“method”, but not the“conclusion”. The process and the method are of great importance. They are essential, non-changing, and assurable which determine the“content”and the“conclusion”. In this view, the equality protection in China has not been resolved in the sense of norm, which is not only due to the absence of the constitution lawsuits and the interpretation body of constitution, but also due to the lack of the argument on equality judgment by the constitution interpreter. The“argument”is indispensable to the application of equality norms, through which the connotation of equality norms takes shape. As for the protection of the human right in the constitutional norms at rest in China, it is worth thinking deeply.更多还原