【作者】 朱阁；

【导师】 吕廷杰；

【作者基本信息】 北京邮电大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 本文主要从消费者决策出发,结合企业竞争和政府监管三方行为研究移动商务的用户接受和移动用户的转移。具体来说即从消费者购买决策的角度对移动商务的用户接受度进行理论与实证研究;从消费者行为和企业行为的角度出发建立博弈均衡模型对用户在移动商务运营商之间的转移进行研究;最后从政府监管行为的角度对移动号码可携带政策引发的用户转移成本降低和市场结构优化进行理论论证和实证检验。总体来说,无论用户接受还是用户转移均属于消费者决策行为的研究范畴。对目标消费者行为的认知和理解是市场营销活动的基础。理论上,消费者决策行为可分为两部分:一是购买决策,二是购买行动。购买决策是消费者在使用和处置所购买的产品或服务之前的心理活动和行为倾向,属于消费态度的形成过程,即用户接受度研究;而购买行动则更多是购买决策的实践过程,即重复购买或用户转移研究。在现实的消费生活中这两部分相互渗透和影响,共同构成了消费者行为的完整过程。移动商务是移动运营商通过无线通信网络为移动用户提供的各类信息服务的总称。它包括基础语音,移动互联网以及根据手机自身特性而创新的各类移动特色业务。本文重点对移动互联网的用户接受,从理论上建立以自我效能感为基础的价值接受度模型(SVAM),并以移动拍卖业务为调查对象进行理论与实证研究。结果表明移动拍卖的自我效能感和感知价值(分为功能、社会、情感和费用四个价值维度)共同影响了移动拍卖的用户采用态度。移动商务在为消费者提供创新价值的同时也要降低用户由传统电子商务向移动商务转移时的阻碍,即纵向转移成本。本文通过对在校大学生的问卷调查分析了由金钱、学习、信任、风险以及手机缺陷等原因造成的转移成本对移动互联网业务(仍以移动拍卖为例)采用意图的影响,结果显示手机自身缺陷(如屏幕、键盘和网速)是传统互联网用户向移动互联网转移时面临的最大转移成本。消费者决策影响着移动商务的接受和扩散,同时其导致的用户持续购买或转移行为也直接影响着移动运营商之间的竞争。移动用户和移动运营商是移动通信市场的两个主体,而连接在两个主体之间的是移动商务。一方面,运营商通过提供移动商务服务为顾客创造价值;另一方面,顾客在获得价值的同时需要支付企业一定的利润回报,其中产品定价是企业市场竞争行为的重要手段。对目前仍占移动商务主要成分的基础语音业务(可简化为无差别产品),根据消费者行为与企业行为本文建立了一个双寡头垄断市场下的,考虑顾客偏好和价格补偿机制的价格竞争博弈Nash-Bertrand模型,研究移动用户在不同运营商之间的横向转移成本。通过收集整理中国移动和中国联通2002-2007年可观察的市场数据(用户、新增用户、市场份额和企业收入的变化),代入理论模型得到了这期间动态的用户转移成本、均衡价格、均衡补偿、均衡份额、顾客忠诚度等变量,研究了用户转移成本与中国移动市场结构变化之间的关系,特别对2003年准单向收费和2004年价格管制放松带来的市场结构变化进行了分析。在移动通信市场,政府管制行为也可以影响消费者决策、企业竞争以至于社会福利和市场结构。号码可携带即是一项可降低用户转移成本,提升运营商间竞争,增加社会福利的管制政策,并已在国外40多个国家或地区被实施。然而,有关该政策是否一定有利于较小运营商的市场份额目前仍存在学术质疑和社会争论。本文结合理论推导和实证分析最终证明无论在何时引入号码可携带政策都可以起到优化市场结构的目的,对市场中偶尔出现的所谓反常现象进行了合理的解释。总之,从消费者决策行为出发,本文对移动商务的用户接受度和移动用户的转移成本进行了理论和实证相结合的深入研究,希望能为运营商创新并推广移动商务,政府监管和推动通信市场的健康、快速和可持续发展提供理论支持与实践指导。更多还原

【Abstract】 Consumer adoption of M-commerce and the switching of mobile consumers are studied in this dissertation, by focusing on consumer decision-making, combined with corporation competition and government regulation. Specifically speaking, a theoretical and empirical research on the consumer adoption of M-commerce is conducted from the perspective of consumer decision-making; a game equilibrium model is established to study the switching of consumers between different M-commerce operators, based on consumer behavior and corporation behavior; the mobile number portability policy which reduces the switching costs and optimizes the market structure is theoretically argued and empirically tested based on government regulation. Generally speaking, both the consumer adoption and consumer switching fall to the study of consumer decision-making.Perception and understanding of the target consumers’ behavior is the basis of marketing. In theory, decision-making behavior of consumers can be divided into two parts: one is the purchase decision-making, and the other is the purchase action. Purchase decisions are the consumers mental activity and action inclination prior to using and disposing the products or services purchased, which falls to the study of formation of consumer attitudes, that is, consumer adoption; while purchase action falls to the study of the practice process of the purchase decision-making, that is, repeated purchase or consumer switching. In real life consumption, the two parts constitute the complete process of consumer behavior, by penetrating into and influencing each other.M-commerce is a general term of all types of information services that mobile operators provide to cellular phone consumers through the wireless communication network. It includes the basic voice, mobile Internet and special mobile services designed according to the characteristic of mobile phones. This paper conducts a theoretical and empirical research on the acceptance of mobile Internet, by establishing a Self-efficacy-based Value Adoption Model (SVAM), and choosing mobile auction as the object of survey. The results show that the M-auction self-efficacy and perceived value (categorized into perceived functional, social, emotional value and perceived fees) are the variables that influence the consumers’ attitude towards M-auction. While M-commerce is providing the consumers with the value generated from innovation, it should also reduce the obstacles for them to switch from traditional E-commerce to M-commerce, namely to decrease the vertical switching cost. Based on the questionnaire finished by university students, the impact of switching costs (such as costs that are caused by money, learning, trust, risk and cellular phone limitations) on M-auction adoption intention is investigated. The results indicate that cellular phone limitations, such as screen, keyboard and internet access speed, are the biggest obstacles for the traditional Internet consumers to switch to mobile Internet.Consumer decision-making influences the adoption and diffusion of M-commerce, meanwhile, the resulted repeated purchase or switching also have a direct impact on the competition among mobile operators. Mobile consumers and mobile operators are the main bodies in the mobile communications market, with M-commerce as the tie between them. On the one hand, mobile operators create value for customers by offering M-commerce; on the other hand, consumers need to pay operators for the value obtained, thereby making product pricing an important tool for operators in market competition. For the voice service, which is still the major service of M-commerce (is simplified as Undifferentiated products in this paper), a Nash-Bertrand model in dual oligopoly market is established according to consumer behavior and corporation behavior, and which considers the customer preferences and price compensation mechanism, to study the switching costs of consumers between different operators. The observable market data of 2002-2007 China Mobile and China Unicom (such as the number of consumers, newly added consumers, changes in market share and corporation income, etc.) are collected and taken into the theoretical models to find the dynamic consumer switching costs, equilibrium price, equilibrium compensation, equilibrium share, customer loyalty and other variables. The relationship between switching costs and Chinese mobile market structural changes are analyzed, especially changes caused by quasi-one-way toll in 2003 and deregulation of price control in 2004.In the mobile communication market, government regulation can also affect the consumer decision-making, the competitiveness of enterprises, and even social welfare and market structure. Number portability policy can reduce consumer switching costs and enhance competition between operators to increase the social welfare, and have been implemented by more than 40 countries or regions in the world. However, there are still social controversy and questions in the academic circle as whether the policy could benefit the smaller operators in terms of market share. In this paper, theoretical and empirical analysis are done to prove that whenever the number portability policy is introduced, it can fulfill the purpose of optimizing the market structure; so-called occasional anomalies in the market are reasonably explained.In short, this dissertation thoroughly studies the consumer adoption of M-commerce and their switching costs theoretically and empirically by focusing on the consumer decision-making. This study is hoped to provide theoretical support for mobile operators to innovate and popularize M-commerce, as well as guidance to government regulation, as well as to promote the Chinese cellular phone industry to develop in a healthy, rapid and sustainable way.更多还原