【作者】 高嵩；

【导师】 舒华英；

【作者基本信息】 北京邮电大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 组织间的战略联盟被广泛地认为是提高组织竞争能力的手段,联盟持续的增长在各个行业中已经成为一种普遍的现象。有些战略联盟是不对称的,由大的、成熟的企业和小的、成长中企业组建而成,这种联盟被称之为‘非对称战略联盟’。非对称战略联盟对产品创新具有重要意义,在很多领域内发展迅猛。尽管战略联盟可以为企业带来诸多优势,但联盟中仍然存在着阴暗面,其中伙伴的机会主义就是降低联盟绩效,造成联盟失败的主要根源。现有的对机会主义的研究都是在二元分析范式下进行的,即以‘交易’、‘关系’作为分析单元来研究机会主义的前因、后果以及治理等问题,没有考虑联盟所嵌入的社会网络,缺乏利用网络分析方法对机会主义问题的研究。而近年来网络理论及分析方法不断发展,已经具备了为机会主义研究提供方法论基础的可能。基于以上考虑,本文确立了研究目标,就是利用网络分析方法,在非对称战略联盟网络环境下,研究小企业机会主义的前因、后果,研究机会主义治理中的关键问题,以及机会主义在网络中的扩散机理。本文主要解决的问题包括(1)非对称战略联盟网络的形成条件是什么?在现实中是否存在?如果存在这样的网络,那么它可能具有哪些特点?(2)非对称战略联盟网络中的机会主义前因有哪些?这些前因如何作用于不对称的联盟伙伴?与小企业机会主义的关系怎样?(3)非对称战略联盟网络中小企业的机会主义行为对网络环境造成了哪些后果?(4)非对称战略联盟网络中机会主义是否存在网络中扩散?扩散的机理是什么?(5)非对称战略联盟网络中机会主义的主要治理机制是什么?治理的关键问题是什么?围绕着这些研究问题,本文对现有的相关文献展开调查。在文献综述部分首先对机会主义研究的理论基础进行总结,随后对战略联盟中机会主义研究的热点问题进行综述。在此基础上对非对称战略联盟研究进展、网络理论及其在联盟研究中的应用进展进行了总结评述。通过文献调查,总结了现有研究的局限。在确定了研究内容,提出了研究框架的基础上,进行研究的设计。选取中国电信增值业务行业中的运营商与SP企业为研究样本,利用目的抽样原则,采用访谈法对10家企业进行访谈,并对访谈资料进行效度评价。研究展开后,首先在分析比较现有各网络概念的基础上,提出了非对称战略联盟网络的7个形成条件。利用收集到的资料进行验证,结果表明非对称战略联盟网络存在于电信增值业务行业。在此基础上,论文进一步讨论了非对称战略联盟网络的网络结构,认为ASAN以星型结构为基本网络结构,提出ASAN网络中存在三种关系,即L-S(Large-Small)关系、S-S(Small-Small)关系以及A-E(Alliance-Environment)关系。在机会主义的前因研究部分,论文提出了三个前因,即信任、依赖、伙伴间的竞争与冲突。在信任前因的研究中,论文从信任建立的途径入手,分析权力、交流、组织文化等关键因素对非对称联盟伙伴信任建立的作用,提出了一个信任建立关键因素-信任等级-机会主义水平三者关系的概念模型及相关理论假设。在依赖前因的研究中,分析了伙伴的不对称依赖产生的原因及其后果,提出不对称依赖程度与小企业机会主义水平正相关理论假设。随后分析了伙伴间竞争所产生的后果,提出伙伴间竞争是小企业机会主义行为的前因的理论假设。在伙伴冲突部分,则提出伙伴间未能得到充分交换的资源,管理目标的冲突是小企业机会主义行为的前因。随后论文通过访谈收集到的证据对各理论假设进行逐一验证。得到的主要结论包括伙伴间的信任等级与小企业的机会主义水平负相关;不对称依赖与机会主义水平正相关。伙伴企业间的竞争、未能得到充分交换的资源、未能得到解决的冲突都是小企业机会主义行为的前因。在小企业机会主义的后果研究部分,论文分析了ASAN网络的内外部环境,提出了网络中的机会主义可能对网络外部环境产生的两种影响,随后利用访谈证据进行验证。结果表明,网络中的机会主义会导致行业结构变化加剧;ASAN网络中小企业的机会主义有可能进一步引发消费者的机会主义行为,从而对社会环境施加负向影响。在小企业机会主义的扩散研究部分,本文从机会主义信息的传播以及机会主义行为的采纳两方面进行了研究,提出两组理论假设,即机会主义在ASAN网络中的传播渠道包括直接渠道和间接渠道;小企业机会主义的采纳具有影响度原则、对等原则和反馈原则。访谈证据支持了关于传播渠道的两个假设,但在采纳原则上,证据只支持了对等原则。在小企业机会主义的治理研究部分,论文提出了大企业治理机制。首先对大企业在网络中的位置进行了分析,提出大企业拥有信息优势和控制优势,这些优势可以在治理的前摄机制和反应机制中转化为机会主义治理优势的假设。另外论文强调大企业的治理态度很重要,并受到四个因素的影响,即成本收益考虑、边际贴水、联盟网络环境压力、伙伴间竞争。访谈证据表明,前摄机制中大企业的治理优势未得到验证,但在反应机制中控制优势可以转化为治理优势。在四个影响因素的实证调查中,除边际贴水外,其余三个因素的作用明显。论文最后对研究的结论进行总结,并分别对大企业、小企业、政府部门提出了管理启示,指出了论文的不足之处,对未来的研究提出展望。论文应用网络理论和方法,对ASAN网络及ASAN网络中机会主义的前因、后果以及扩散,治理等关键问题进行了研究,将网络分析范式引入机会主义研究领域,弥补了现有二元分析范式的不足。更多还原

【Abstract】 Strategy alliances between organizations is generally viewed as a means for enhancing competitive competence, the continuing increasing of strategy alliances has become a common phenomena in many different industries. Strategy alliances between larger, established firms and smaller, growing firms are called asymmetric strategy alliance, asymmetric strategy alliance is critical for product innovation, particularly in high-technology markets.Though so many advantages strategy alliance can bring to firms, the dark side still follows. Opportunism is the main reason for alliance failure. The extant researches on opportunism are all with dyadic view, especially in Transaction Costs Economics and Social Exchange Theory, ’contract’, ’transaction’, ’relationship’ are used as analysis unit, while a fact is neglected, that is alliances between firms exist and develop in a social networks. So there needs such research as using social network analysis method analysing, explaining opportunism in network environments. So the purpose of this research is using social network analysis method, developing a systematic explanative understanding about the opportunism behavior of smaller firms in the Asymmetric Strategic Alliance Networks(ASAN), including antecedents and consequences of opportunism, the control of opportunism and diffusion process of opportunism in the networks. This research will answer these questions about opportunism in the networks: (1) What are the conditions of ASAN’s comeing into being. Is there ASAN in reality? if there is,what is ASAN’s network structure and the characters of ASAN? (2) What are the antecedents of opportunism in ASAN? and how they work? (3) What are the consequences of opportunism in the netwrok environments. (4) Does the opportunism behavior of smaller firms diffuse among ASAN? and how to diffuse? (5) What is the main control machine of opportunism in ASAN?and what are the key factors in controling? Firstly, the theoretical foundations are introduced. Including the theoretical foundations of opportunism research, the focus of opportunism research, the progress in asymmetric strategic alliance research, the progress of applications of social network analysis in strategy alliances research.. According to the contents of this research, a conceptual framework is formed. Eight Service Provider (SP) companies and two communication operation companies in China was choosen as empirical study samples. Materials are collected through interviewing with the employees of sample companies.Through the analysis of different extant network concepts, seven conditions for ASAN’s coming into being are listed. The first research hypothese of the research is that ASAN exists. Materials collected from the empirical environment are used and this hypothese is tested to be true, an ASAN exists in the telecommunication add-value service industry. Further researches on ASAN find that the network structure of ASAN is star form and three kinds of relationships in ASAN are L-S(large-small),S-S(small-small) and A-E (alliance-environment). The network structure and relationships in ASAN will act as research foundations for the following content.Three antecedents of smaller firm’s opportunism behavior are put forward, that is trust, dependency, competition and conflictions among partners. Key factors, such as communication, organization culture, power, are analysed in trust building prediction process, intentionality process, capability process and calculative process. A concept model of key factors in trust building-trust level-opportunism are put forward. At dependency antecedent part, the hypothese is that there exists asymmetric dependency among the asymmetric partners and the degree of asymmetric dependency is positive related with smaller firms’ opportunism behavior. The competition among partners, weak point of resources exchanges , managerial goals conflictions among partners are all antecedents of opportunism. Materials collected from interviews are used for testing these four groups of hypotheses. The result is that all the hyphtheses about antecedents are tested to be true except hypothese about capability process of trusting building of larger firms on smaller firmsIn the consequences research part. There are two hypotheses are proposed, the first is that the smaller firms’ opportunism behavior will result in tempestuously changes of industry structure; the second hypothese is that the smaller firms’ opportunism behavior will inflict damage on social environment. Materials collected from interviews are used for testing these two hypotheses. Both of thest two hypotheses are true and the last hypotheses are enriched as that the smaller firms’ opportunism behavior in ASAN will arouse opportunistic behavior of customers in the networks in succession, then inflict damage on social environment.In the opportunism diffusion research part, the opportunism information diffused process and opportunism information adopted process are analysesed. There are two groups of hypotheses are proposed, that is opportunism information diffused process are direct process and indirect process; opportunism information adopted process are ruled by: personal network exposure rule, equivalence rule and feedback rule. The first group hypotheses about diffused process are tested to be true, while the second group of hypotheses about opportunism information adopted process don’t pass the test all, only equivalence rule is tested to be true.In the opportunism control part, the larger firms in ASAN are proposed as the main control machine on smaller firms’ opportunism behavior. The network position of larger firms in ASAN are analysesed and according to social network analysis larger firms will own information benefit and control benefit in ASAN, it is possible that these two kinds of benefits will help larger firms for the controlling of smaller firms’ opportunism behavior. So hypotheses are proposed that information benefit and control benefit owned by larger firms in ASAN will be advantages of controlling opportunism in prepositive control process and in reaction control process. It is also important that the larger firms’ attitude about smaller firms’ opportunism behavior, four factors can explain the attitude change of larger firms, that is cost-profit consideration, margin premium, pressures from environments, competitions with smaller firms. The hypotheses are tested with the interview materials. The result is that larger firms’ control benefits work in reaction control process, but neither of information benefit and control benefit work in prepositive process. Except the factor of margin premium, three other factors are tested to do influce the attitude of larger firms about opportunism control.The lasted part is conclusion and discussion.Several useful implications for larger firms, smaller firms and government are put forward. Limitations and future research are also proposed.Network theory and methods was used to research the antecedents, consequences, diffusion and control of smaller firms’ opportunism behavior, it is a new application of network theory and method in opportunism research.更多还原