【作者】 戴建华；

【导师】 阚凯力；

【作者基本信息】 北京邮电大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 不同电信网接续后,一个电信网为另一个电信网的用户提供了服务并发生了相应的成本。网间结算是指,如果这个电信网的运营商没有从另一个运营商的用户得到相应的费用,则另一个电信网的运营商就应由自己的收入中向这个电信网的运营商支付费用。这时,网间结算的资费究竟应该支付多少,就直接关系到互联双方的利益,并成为互联互通的核心问题,也是政府电信管制政策的热点问题之一。本论文在第一章首先介绍了电信业务网间结算产生的根源及重要性。第二章系统地分析了迄今为止全世界对于网间结算的各种理论和方法。论文把它们归纳为补偿原则、成本原则和其他网间结算方法三种类型,分别对其特点和缺陷进行了深入的分析。分析的结果表明,目前国内外还没有一种能够在理论和实践上完全解决网间结算问题的方法。第三章利用福利经济学中的阿罗不可能定理,从理论上严格证明了:当市场上运营商数量不少于三个时,不存在确定能找出统一网间结算标准的制度或者方法(即“社会福利函数”)。所以,网间结算的原则至少应该具有以下几种特性:公平性、可实施性,并对不同网络采用不同的结算标准。第四章阐述了网间结算的资费独立原则。在国际研究已经证明双向付费优于单向付费的基础上,论文进一步证明了资费独立原则可以有效地避免单向付费所引起的网间结算费过高和社会福利损失,在这一点上与双向付费等效。因此,在不改变现有资费体系约束条件下,资费独立原则是最优的结算方案。同时,因为资费独立原则不需要测算网间结算成本,公开透明,所以它有助于大大降低政府的监管成本,促进电信业的有效竞争。第五章对本论文进行了总结,并指出了其局限性和今后的研究方向。本论文的贡献在于,在目前全世界还没有完善的网间结算理论和方法的情况下,从理论上证明了网间结算统一标准的不可能性。论文进一步证明了,在不改变电信资费体系的约束条件下,资费独立原则是最优的网间结算方法。更多还原

【Abstract】 As telecommunication networks interconnect, the interconnected network provides services to customers of the interconnecting network and costs occur. Provided the operator of this interconnected network is unable to collect charges for its costs, the interconnecting operator should transfer a certain portion of its revenue to the interconnected operator as compensation, or the interconnection charge. Therefore, the amount of this charge directly impacts the interest of both parties, and thus becomes a core issue of network interconnection, and thus becomes the focal point of telecommunication regulation.Chapter 1 of this dissertation reviews the background of interconnection charges and its vital importance to a competitive environment for the telecommunication industry.Chapter 2 reviews and systematically analyses numerous international literature on interconnection charges so far. After categorizing all related theories and methods into three classes (compensation principle, cost-based principle, and others), the conclusion was that there are no theories or methods on interconnection charges that can satisfactorily resolve the issue so far.Chapter 3 applies Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem in Welfare Economics and proves: When there are at least 3 operators to interconnect in a telecommunication market, any method to find a uniform interconnection charge cannot possibly exist. Therefore, any theory or method for determining interconnection charges must have the following characters: impartiality, executability, and variability from network to network according to their individual characters (costs, operation, etc.).Chapter 4 describes the Principle of Tariff Independence (PTI) for interconnection charges, and, based on worldwide empirical research which proves that Both-Party-Pays (BPP) or Receiving-Party-Pays (RPP) is superior to Calling-Party-Pays (CPP), further proves that, similar to BPP (or RPP), PTI effectively avoids substantially higher-than-cost interconnection charges caused by CPP. Thus, PTI is the optimal and most effective solution for deciding interconnection charges when CPP cannot be replaced by BPP for political or social reasons. In addition, because PTI does not require accomplishing the Hercules task of measuring and calculating network costs, it is a substantial cost-saving methodology for regulating authorities and further promotes effective telecommunication competition and social welfare.Chapter 5 summarizes this dissertation, points out its limitation, and provides suggestions for future research.Contributions of this dissertation include, while there is no existing effective and systematic solution for deciding interconnection charges. For the first time, prove the nonexistence of a uniform solution for interconnection charges, and further prove that PTI is the optimum solution to deciding interconnection charges when tariff practices cannot be replaced by BPP.更多还原