【作者】 黄国良；

【导师】 王化成；

【作者基本信息】 中国矿业大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 在信息不对称和契约不完备的情况下,自利管理者与股东之间的利益冲突,引发管理者固守职位并最大化自身效用的管理防御行为。资本结构管理控制学派认为在公司管理者持有很少股份或没有股份时,面对约束、激励、接管和破产,会通过融资行为固守职位并最大化自身效用。论文针对我国上市公司第一大股东的超强控制与内部人控制并存,较低的资产负债水平与较低的盈利水平并存的现实背景下,提出从资本结构管理控制权视角考察管理防御、资本结构与公司业绩的三者之间的关系。论文首先从经济人假说、委托代理理论、不完全契约理论、信息不对称理论、控制权理论、资本结构管理控制理论和高阶管理理论系统提炼了管理防御理论基础、管理防御与资本结构关系理论基础和管理防御与公司业绩关系理论基础,提出管理防御、资本结构和公司业绩之间的理论分析框架。在此基础上,论文从规范和实证两个角度,利用多元线性回归、Logistic回归、主成分分析法、中介效应检验法和结构方程等方法探讨管理防御对静态资本结构影响规律、管理防御对资本结构优化调整影响规律、管理防御对公司业绩影响规律和管理防御通过资本结构影响公司业绩的传导规律。在实证研究中,论文从管理者能力特征、管理者激励特征和管理者监督特征三个方面选择了管理者年龄、管理者任期、管理学历、管理者持股、独立董事比例、两职设置情况、股权集中度7个指标衡量管理防御程度。研究发现:管理防御程度越高,越偏好低负债;管理防御影响资本结构调整意愿与速度。在高杠杆企业中管理者防御程度越高,越愿意优化调整资本结构,调整速度越快,在低杠杆企业中管理者防御程度越高,越不愿意调整资本结构,资本结构优化调整速度越慢;管理防御程度越高,公司业绩越差;在总体样本和国有样本中发现管理防御通过资本结构影响公司业绩的传导关系成立。论文最后根据研究结论提出了完善经理人市场、重新认识对管理者的激励、健全约束管理者内部环境和完善公司破产与接管机制等建议。论文立足中国特殊制度和背景,研究股权高度集中和控股股东“不完全性”引发的管理防御对资本结构和公司业绩的影响规律,在一定程度可以丰富资本结构管理控制理论,并为抑制上市公司管理者自利行为、缓解委托代理问题、优化公司资本结构和提升公司业绩提供依据。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the information asymmetry and incomplete contract circumstances, the interest conflicts between self-benefit managers and shareholders, and the managerial entrenchment behavior, through which the managers strengthen their position and concentrate on perusing their own utility, was inspired. According to the managerial model of capital structure, when managers hold few or no share of their corporation, they would strengthen their position and maximize their own utility by financing activities while they were in constraint, incentive, takeover or bankruptcy. From the view of theory of control right of capital structure this thesis studies the relationship among managerial entrenchment, capital structure and corporate performance in the realistic background of a combination between the super-control of the largest stockholder and insider domination, lower leverage coexisting with lower profit level in the listed corporations.This thesis firstly abstracts theoretical foundation of managerial entrenchment, the relationship between managerial entrenchment and capital structure and the relationship between managerial entrenchment and corporate performance from economic man hypothesis, agency theory, incomplete contract theory, information asymmetry, control right theory, theory of control right of capital structure and upper echelons theory, then constructs the theoretical analysis framework of managerial entrenchment, capital structure and corporate performance. On the above basis, from both empirical and normative study, this thesis uses multiple linear regression, logistic regression, principal component analysis, intermediate effect inspection and structure equation model to explore the four rules, which respectively are the influence of managerial entrenchment on static capital structure, optimization adjustment of capital structure, corporate performance and the conduction of managerial entrenchment through capital structure to corporate performance. In the empirical study, seven factors are selected to estimate the degree of managerial entrenchment through the three aspects which are individual characteristics, incentive and monitoring characteristics of manager. They are manager’s age, tenure, diploma, proportion of manager’s shareholding, proportion of independent directors, the selection of corporate leadership’ structure and ownership concentration. It is found that, the higher the degree of managerial entrenchment is, the lower leverage is, and the managerial entrenchment affects the intention and speed of capital structure adjustment. In the high-leveraged group, more intention of optimization adjustment is consistent with higher speed adjustment, in the lower leverage group, less intention of optimization adjustment is consistent with lower speed adjustment. Moreover, it shows that higher degree of managerial entrenchment leads to worse corporate performance. In addition, we find that the managerial entrenchment affects the corporate performance through the capital structure both in total sample and state-owned sample. Finally, this thesis suggests that it is necessary to improve the professional manager market, re-recognize the incentive to managers, perfect the internal environment which helps to restrict managers and strengthen mechanism of bankruptcy and takeover etc.This thesis bases it research upon the specific institution and background of China, investigates the influence rule of managerial entrenchment on capital structure and corporate performance which were aroused from stock equity concentration and“incompletion”character of controlling shareholder. This study enriches the theory of control right of capital structure to some extent, and provided evidence for inhibiting benefit expropriation of listed corporations, resolving agency problem, optimizing capital structure and promoting corporate performance.更多还原