【作者】 包晓英；

【导师】 蒲云；

【作者基本信息】 西南交通大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 本论文的主题是研究逆供应链管理中的两个基本问题:回收再制造产品的定价策略以及逆供应链管理的协调问题。本论文首先研究了回收再制造产品的定价策略。基于独立制造商角度,建立了以期望利润最大化为目标,潜在顾客购买率服从泊松分布和保留价格服从指数分布的最优定价模型,得到了再制造产品的最优定价方程,并用解析的方法得到了最优价格完整、全面的性质,最后应用算例对性质进行验证和解释。然后从单一决策者的模型扩展到一个“单一制造商—单一零售商”组成的闭环供应链中,假定在同一周期中废旧产品的回收数量小于或等于新产品生产数量,在单周期环境中研究了新产品和再制造产品存在差别定价时,集中决策和分散决策的最优定价策略,并分析得出集中决策时再制造成本越节约,越能激发回收行为,回收更多的废旧产品进行再制造;同时再制造成本越节约,越能刺激决策者生产更多的新产品,从而能够提供更多的可回收产品,且增加闭环供应链的利润;分散决策时,再制造成本越节约,越能激发零售商的回收行为,回收更多的废旧产品进行再制造,增加零售商以及制造商的利润;同时再制造成本越节约,越能刺激零售商销售更多新产品,从而能够提供更多的可回收产品,增加零售商以及制造商的利润。同时对集中与分散两种模型进行了比较,发现分散决策使得新产品的销售量以及废旧产品回收量均损失50%,整个闭环供应链系统利润损失的相对值为25%,然后提出一种两部收费制契约协调定价策略,以谋求闭环供应链的整体收益最大。在废旧产品的回收量依赖零售商努力水平且废旧产品回收量随机情况下,研究批发价格契约、收入共享契约、回馈与惩罚契约以及两部收费制契约在“单一制造商—单一零售商”组成的逆向供应链环境下的协调问题。结论表明,批发价格契约以及收入共享契约由于在收益划分上的唯一性,而不能有效协调逆供应链;回馈与惩罚契约则弥补了收入共享契约,两部收费制契约则弥补了批发价格契约在收益划分上的唯一性,他们在划分逆供应链收益时所具有的灵活性,能有效协调制造商和零售商的行为。在废旧产品的回收量依赖零售商努力水平且产品回收量随机的环境中,研究存在信息不对称情况下“单一制造商—单一零售商”组成的逆供应链的协调问题。由于信息不对称的存在,制造商无法观测到零售商的回收努力水平,这样就会产生败德行为,影响逆供应链的协调。对此,利用委托代理分析框架,研究了逆供应链中制造商和零售商之间的利益博弈;分析了信息对称情况下,不同因素对回收努力水平的影响;并采用特例对非对称情况下保证线性契约机制有效的参数条件进行了分析。最后我们进一步将模型从“单一制造商—单一零售商”扩展到“单一制造商—两个零售商”组成的闭环供应链中,零售商负责产品的销售与废旧产品的回收,在正向渠道中,零售商之间存在价格竞争;在逆向渠道中,回收产品的数量由各零售商的回收努力水平决定。采用收益共享契约实现了逆供应链的协调以及各成员之间利润的合理分配。最后结合数值算例说明了所得结论,算例表明收益共享契约实现了多方收益的帕雷托最优。更多还原

【Abstract】 The main topic of this research is to study the reverse supply chain management in the two basic questions: return products pricing strategy and the cooperation of supply chain management.In this paper, researched initially on the return products pricing strategy. To gain maximum expected profit, the pricing model of remanufactured products is proposed from the perspective of remanufacturer. Then the optimized pricing equation is drawn under the condition that demand is a Poisson process and reservation price is exponential distribution, and use the analytic method to get the optimal price of a complete and comprehensive nature, and at last, use arithmetic example to verify and interpret the nature.And then from a single model of decision-makers to expand to a closed-loop supply chain composed of "a single re-manufacturers - a single retailer". And that, in a single cycle environment, studies the Optimal pricing strategy of the concentrate decision-making and decentralized decision-making, when there is difference between new product pricing and remanufactured product pricing. And by analysis, get the conclusion that return products have more cost savings, the more it can act to stimulate the return efforts and to increase the profit of the closed-loop supply chain members no matter concentrate decision-making or decentralized decision-making. At the same time, found that sales quantity of new products and return quantity of used products both lose 50%, and the relative value of the lost profits for 25% in the entire closed-loop supply chain system, and then a two-part tariff contract to coordinate pricing strategies in pursuit of the supply chain as a whole the greatest gains.Based on retailer’s effort dependent the product quantity of return, and the product quantity of return is stochastic, the coordination of the whole price contract, revenue sharing contract, rebate and penalty contract and two-part tariff contract coordinated the reverse supply chain were analyzed. It was proved that whole price contract and revenue sharing contract had the unicity of allocating the reverse supply chain profit and therefore could not coordinate reverse supply chain, rebate and penalty contract remedied the limitation of the whole contract and two-part tariff contract remedied the limitation of penalty contract, so they could coordinate the reverse supply chain effectively.In the case that return of used products rely on the retailers efforts and random collection of return products, studies the coordination issue of reverse supply chain composed by "a single manufacturer - a single retailer," under the existence of asymmetric information situation. Under Recovery quantity dependent on the efforts of retailers and the random circumstances, However, due to asymmetric information, the manufacturer couldn’t observe the retailer’s action, the immoral action came into being so as to affect the collaboration of the whole reverse supply chain. To deal with this problem, the game between manufacturer and retailer was studied from the point of principal-agency theory.Under symmetric information, different parameter’s effect on the collection effort level of the retailer was analyzed. And under asymmetric information, the parameters terms to ensure the validity of linear contract were discussed by the especial illustration.Finally, we will further expand to the reverse supply chain composed by "a single manufacturer - the two retailers," from the model of "a single re-manufacturers - a single retailer," and the retailer is responsible for product sales and return of used products. in Forward channels, existing price competition between retailers; in the reverse channel, return quantity of used products rely on the retailers efforts. Revenue-sharing contracts used to achieve coordination as well as rational distribution of profits among the members of the reverse supply chain. Finally, using the numerical example illustrates the conclusion; the results show a revenue sharing contract can realize Pareto optimal of the multi-parties.更多还原