【作者】 邓志强；

【导师】 罗新星；

【作者基本信息】 中南大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 经过三十多年的努力,我国已经建立了一整套较为完备的环保政策体系、管理体系和相关法律体系,但环境绩效仍不理想,工业污染防治与经济发展之间存在难以调和的矛盾,还一度陷入“违规排污—恶劣事故—整治—更大规模的违规排污”的怪圈。即便最近各级政府部门、企业与公众对工业污染表现出了的高度的重视,也很难从根本上化解这两者之间的冲突。因为引发冲突的一些关键因素其实与发展战略的失误有着紧密联系。因此,从“利益冲突”的视角出发,以我国工业污染防治体系为研究对象,探求工业污染防治中不同利益相关者之间利益冲突的形成原因及协调机制,就成为一项值得研究的工作,该问题也正是本论文的研究对象。本选题的现实意义在于:帮助有关部门超越技术层面的修补性工作,在战略层面上把握当前工业污染防治政策不能顺利实施的根源,以制定出更全面、更能切中要害的政策,从而实现环境与发展的可持续发展。当前的发展战略仍然是以GDP为导向,强调增长优先,因此可从体制转轨和预期绩效两条路径来研究工业污染防治绩效的影响因素,它会从以下二个方面造成并加剧上述冲突:宏观方面:为追求短期内的GDP高速增长,利益日益独立化的地方政府过于依赖粗放的经济增长方式。由此导致了地方政府在与中央(上级)政府的分利过程中以及地方政府之间存在的“政府竞争”过程中出现的环境恶化。可见体制转轨造成了“区域性环境利益冲突”。微观方面:为吸引更多的企业创造更多的GDP,地方政府在环境资源配置上向企业倾斜。由于公众与各级政府和环境监管部门之间存在委托—代理关系,在信息不对称情况下,代理人通过衡量预期收入与污染防治绩效后将作出理性选择,使得环境监管合谋成为常态,并引发了“地方性环境利益冲突”。这实质上是权力缺乏监督与制约的产物,因而属于治理结构的范畴。由此可见,我国污染防治与经济发展之间的冲突内生于增长优先的发展战略,要从根本上化解冲突,必须要进行制度创新。为协调工业污染防治中各级政府部门之间的利益冲突,应改革以GDP为核心指标的地方政府的考核机制,建立条块结合的污染防治行政管理体系,尽快试行开征环境污染税,加快排污权交易制度的推进,逐步建立基于卡尔多—希克斯改进的环保补偿与污染治理转移支付制度。为协调政府—企业—公众之间的利益关系,当务之急是建立垂直管理的环境监测系统,确保环境信息的公正性与真实性,最终保证污染防治政策的有效实施,同时应不断完善环保的公众参与机制,以充分地发挥公众和NGO在环保方面的作用。当然,必须清醒地认识到:制度创新和旧发展战略后遗症的“医治”都难以在短期内见效,这就决定了上述冲突的延续具有长期性。在理论方面,本论文的核心创新点在于:分别按中央政府—地方政府、地方政府—地方政府、政府(环境监管部门)—企业—公众之间等多个层次,应用利益冲突的分析框架,对我国工业污染防治中不同利益冲突的类型、利益冲突的形成、利益关系演化的路径以及演变后果进行了剖析,提出了只有制度创新才可能有效解决好发展与污染的矛盾。其他主要创新点包括:(1)利用历年来我国工业污染防治与经济发展方面的面板数据,运用计量经济学模型系统分析了以往我国污染防治体系、政策与治理绩效的关系,较好解释了我国的工业污染大都是“政府污染”,即政府允许、认同、支持的污染。(2)从环境信息产生的过程着手,根据环境信息失真产生的原因的不同,首次提出了环境信息失真的“三分法”,将其分为规范性失真、行为性失真和违规性失真,并提出的相应的制度安排方案。在实践方面,本文应用构建的利益冲突的分析框架,对我国火电二氧化硫污染现状进行了考察,提出了改进火电二氧化硫治理的政策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the efforts in more than 30 years, series of policies and laws have been set up on protecting environment. However, the performance of environmental protection is still not satisfied and some hardly irreconcilable conflicts still exist between the prevention and control of industrial pollution and the economic development, which has been trapped into the vicious circle from sewage violation to bad accident, to environmental remediation and to more large-scale sewage violation. Recently, governments, enterprises and the public have even attached a great importance to the industrial pollution, it did little to resolve the conflict because some key factors of triggering conflict have been closely linked with some mistakes of development strategy. Therefore, it becomes a worthy subject for studying to explore the causation and coordination mechanisms of interest conflicts between different stakeholders in the industrial pollution based on the perspective of interest conflict and the management systems of environment. At the same time, this subject is what the author study on.The practical significance and target of this topic is to help some public administration to go beyond piecemeal approaches on the technical level and grasp the root causation why the policy cannot be smoothly implemented on the strategic level, to formulate more comprehensive and more appropriate policies to achieve sustainable development on economy and the environment.The current development strategy is GDP-oriented and growth-priority, so that the influencing factors to the performance of the industrial pollution prevention should be studied from two parts, one is institutional transition, another is expected performance. The strategy will cause and intensify the above-mentioned conflicts through two aspects as follows:As for marco-aspects, in pursuit of a rapid short term growth of GDP, the local governments with their benefits of an increasingly independent depend on the extensive mode of growth. This led to the deterioration of the environment on the process of distribution of benefits between the local governments and central government (or higher levels of government) and on the process of government’s competition among local governments. Thus, it is obvious that institutional transition creates conflict of regional environmental interest.As for mirco-aspects: in order to attract more enterprises to create more GDP, local governments tilt toward enterprises on allocation of environmental resources. Because of the principal-agent relations between the public and governments at all levels and environmental regulatory authorities, agents will make rational choices under asymmetric information after they compare expected income with pollution prevention performance to result in environmental regulatory collusion become normal state and render conflict of local environmental interest. To all intents it is a consequence because the power lack of supervision and constraints, thus it belongs to the scope of governance structure.From above, we can see that the conflict between pollution prevention and economic development in China comes from the growth-prioritized development strategy. Therefore, it’s necessary to resolve the conflict fundamentally by making institutional innovation.In order to coordinate the conflict of interest among the departments at all levels’ government in industrial pollution prevention and control, assessment mechanism of local government selecting GDP as one of core indicators, horizontal and vertical integration of administrative system for pollution prevention and control with should be set up, environmental taxes should be introduced as soon as possible, Emissions Trading System(ETC) should be strengthened accelerating, compensation for environmental protection based on Kaldor-Hicks Improvement and transfer payments systems of pollution controlling should be built gradually.In order to coordinate conflict of interest among government departments, enterprises and the public, it’s of great urgency that vertical management systems for environmental monitoring should be built to ensure the impartiality and authenticity of the environmental information and to guarantee the effective implementation of pollution prevention and control policy. At the same time the mechanism for public participation in environmental protection should be constantly improved, so that the public and NGO could play their full role in environmental protection.However, it must be clearly recognized that it be difficult to achieved results in the short-term for institutional innovation and after-effects eliminating of the old strategy. This determines that the above-mentioned conflict will last for a long time.In theory, the core of innovation in this paper is that the different types and formation mechanism of conflicts of interests, evolution’s path of interest relations and the consequences of evolution have been analyzed for industrial pollution prevention and control in China separately in accordance with the various levels, including between central government and local governments, local government and local government, the government(environmental regulatory authorities) and enterprises and the public, and with application of the analytical framework of conflict of interest. Then it is proposed that only institutional innovation can resolve effectively the contradiction between development and pollution.Other main innovations include:(1)It is the relationship of Chinese pollution control system, policies and environmental performance that been analyzed systematicly by using econometric models from panel data over the years industrial pollution and economic development in China. The conclusions can be better explained that most industrial pollution in China should be the government pollution, including permitted and identified with and supported pollution by governments.(2) The trichotomy of Environmental Information Distortion (TEID) was brought forward in this paper. TEID can be trichotomized into Rule Distortion (RD), Rule-violating Distortion (RVD) and Behavioral Distortion (BD). With the perspectives of information asymmetry, bounded rational respectively etc., causes of RD, RVD and BD were analyzed. In the final, this paper analyzed the relationship among RD, RVD and BD briefly and put forward some measures to improve environmental information quality.In Practice, the analytical framework of conflict of interest was used to analyze the actual state of sulfur dioxide pollution of thermal power in China and the policy recommendations have been put forward to it.更多还原