【作者】 王磊；

【导师】 林木西；

【作者基本信息】 辽宁大学 ， 规制经济学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 规制经济学理论认为,政府规制是利益集团博弈和规则冲突的产物。在一定程度上,政府职业安全规制过程也是规制机构的行政过程。作为一种行政过程,职业安全规制主要涉及规制机构、被规制企业和劳动者三者的关系。这三者在整个规制过程中也有着不同的地位和作用。其中被规制企业和劳动者是职业安全规制的当事人,规制博弈的主体,而政府在职业安全规制过程中的地位和角色,不仅取决于其作为规制机构所理应代表的社会公共利益,还取决于政府与被规制企业之间的关系。当规制的范围仅限于私人所有并控制的产业时,政府与被规制的对象没有财产上的瓜葛,规制机构不参加规制的博弈过程,而仅仅是规制过程中的公正的仲裁者,充当着企业和劳动者之间的博弈结果的代理人和规制政策的执行者;而当政府同时还是被规制企业的所有者时,规制机构可能也在一定程度上参与规制的博弈过程。职业安全规制过程中各个参与主体间的互动与博弈时刻影响着职业安全规制的博弈结果,特别是当规制参与者关系发生变化时,职业安全规制也要进行相应的改革与调整。正是基于职业安全规制过程中政府(规制机构)、企业以及劳动者之间的关系及其对职业安全规制发展与改革影响的思考,本文重点研究了以下三方面问题:(1)政府与企业的职业安全规制行为分析。这部分研究着眼于规制机构与企业没有合谋与合谋两者情况,通过构建委托—代理模型和政府规制俘虏模型对规制机构与企业关系进行博弈分析。(2)企业与劳动者职业安全规制行为分析。这一部分研究从我国劳动力市场供过于求的现状出发,通过构建劳资博弈模型分析劳动者之间的博弈以及企业职业安全投入的变异。(3)职业安全与工伤保险分析。这一研究主要分析不完全信息下,工伤保险对职业安全风险的分散作用,以及工伤保险对企业和劳动者在职业安全危险防范上的不对称影响。这些研究试图从职业安全规制参与者及其关系入手,揭示我国职业安全规制问题成因与规制改革的关键性制约因素。在研究这些问题的过程中,得出如下主要研究观点:(1)规制机构监督失责造成的损失越小,那么企业就越有可能降低职业安全投入水平。现实中众多违规的企业安全生产投入不达标,主要原因之一就是规制机构认为即使出现安全事故,对其所造成的损失水平也不会很高。(2)规制机构对被规制企业的监督成本越高,被规制企业越倾向于虚假上报自身的收入水平,以降低安全生产保障金的提取水平。特别是,当规制机构的监督成本与不监督时发生事故所造成的损失相等时,被规制企业的最优选择就是不进行安全生产的投入,而政府规制在此种情况下也就产生了灾难性的后果。(3)被规制企业行贿金额占其规定被罚款的比重越高,则规制机构越倾向于滥用职权进行寻租。已有的研究也表明在被规制者对规制产生需求时,规制机构进行抽租和创租的活动不完全是被动的。(4)规制机构对被规制企业的处罚越严厉,则被规制企业行贿的可能性越大。在规制机构具有自由裁量权的条件下,规制机构对违规企业实施高的违规处罚金相当于在委托—代理关系中对代理人实施了高强度的激励方案,而高强度的激励方案会给被规制企业留下较高的潜在租金,因此也给合谋造成了很高收益。(5)与不存在规制机构与企业合谋相比,合谋可以提高被规制企业的收益状况,因此,被规制企业与规制机构可能合谋情况下,被规制企业更倾向于违反职业安全生产投入的法规。(6)在信息不完全的条件下,高风险企业更倾向于蒙蔽工人从事危险的工作,工人可能会低估自己的风险,从而做出不利于自己的选择。因此,政府规制重点应在职业安全卫生领域企业私有信息的公开。(7)劳动者人力资本价值低,对高风险环境作业所要求的工资补偿较低是造成企业敢于铤而走险,以身试法,将劳动者的生命和健康权益置之不顾的重要原因。(8)提升劳动者的讨价还价能力是改变劳资博弈中劳动者弱势地位的关键。制度的形成与维持是“参与人”“策略互动”的结果,而这一规则的最主要的利益相关人与参与人就是劳动者,因此提高劳动者在这一规则制定与执行过程中的博弈能力才是最重要的。(9)强制工伤保险在工人低估事故风险时是不合理的。工人低估事故风险导致工人较高的风险暴露于强制性工伤保险的覆盖范围之外,结果依然是高的工伤水平和低的职业安全水平。因此,在进行合理的政府干预之前必须更多的了解工人对职业风险的评估情况。职业安全规制的经济学分析揭示了形成当前我国职业安全规制现状的深刻根源:规制主体之间分工不明确、职能分散;规制机构执法资源有限,执法力度不强;规制机构为企业所“俘虏”损害了劳动者权益;企业轻视职工生命,安全生产投入不足;劳动者素质较低,忽视职业安全。职业安全规制具有特殊性,又有一般性。市场经济条件下,我国职业安全规制改革需要借鉴国外的成功经验。本文通过主要发达国家职业安全规制的归纳分析,总结出这些国家职业安全规制经验,主要有以下几个方面:完善的法律法规体系是职业安全规制的前提与基础;严格执法是遏制伤亡事故、提高规制效果的关键;建立相对独立、专业化的执法机构;根据本国国情合理确定职业安全规制的侧重点;完善的工伤保险机制;注重培训教育,提高劳动者职业素质。建国以来,我国的职业安全规制体制几度变迁,职业安全规制的能力与水平也不断提高。在新形势下,我国职业安全规制的环境与条件以及规制参与者之间的关系都发生了的变化。本文分析表明,我国职业安全规制改革应该主要做好这些方面工作:完善职业安全立法,增加违法成本;建立独立规制执法机构,提高规制效果;强化工会力量,建立工会、企业、政府三方平等的协商机制;加大安全生产投入,保障企业安全生产;为劳动者提供充足的信息与职业安全培训;完善工伤保险制度,把职业安全规制与工伤保险有机结合;建立社会监督体系,充分发挥社会监督作用。更多还原

【Abstract】 According to the theory of economic regulation, government regulation is the result of game among special interest-groups and the conflict of rules. The implementation of occupational safety regulation by the government is actually the administrative procedure by the regulatory agency. As an administrative procedure, the occupational safety regulation involves in the relationship among regulatory agencies, regulated enterprises and the employee who have different status and role in the regulation, among them the employer and the employee are litigants involved in occupational safety regulation, and the regulatory agency serves as middleman of the game and the agent of the outcome of the game.The status and role of government in the procedure of occupational safety regulation not only rely on their role to protect the public’s interest, but also depend on the relationship between government and regulated sector. When the scope of regulation is limited to privately owned and controlled industry, government has no relationship with the regulated industry owning to ownership of enterprises, in this situation regulatory agency is just impartial arbitrator of the regulation, not involved in the game procedure, who act as agent of the game result and executor of the regulation policy.; while the government is also the owners of enterprises, regulatory agency may take part in the game to some degree. As the game players of the regulation affect the result of game, especially when the regulatory environment changes, the occupational safety regulation need make the appropriate changes and adjustments.Based on the thought of the relationship among the government (regulatory agency), the enterprises, as well as workers and how they affect the regulation development and regulatory reform, this paper pay more attention on the following three questions:(1) Occupational safety regulatory acts analysis between the government and the enterprises. Through principal agent model and regulation captured model this part is studied from two aspects, one is the regulatory agency captured by the regulated firms, and the other is not. (2) Analysis the acts between regulated firms and the workers. Through building game model between the firms and the workers, this part analysis competition between the workers and the firms as well as the firms’variation in occupational safety input. (3) Analysis of occupational safety and industrial injury insurance. Under the incomplete information, this part analyzes the role of industrial injury insurance to reduce the risk of occupational safety, and the asymmetry impact on the firms and the workers. These studies try to begin from the relationship between the game players, and further reveal the causes of the occupational safety problem and the principle Obstacles of regulatory reform.In the process of solving these problems, we reach the following main research point of view:(1) The smaller the losses caused by the default of regulatory agency to regulate, the more likely the firms reduce the level of occupational safety input. In reality, lots of firms’irregularities in the safety production input is owning to that the regulatory agency believes that even if the safety incidents occur , its loss will not be great to them.(2) The higher the regulatory agencies’monitoring costs , the more likely the regulated firms report false income to reduce extraction of capital investment, especially when the monitoring costs equal the loss of an accident without monitored, the best choice for the regulated firms is default , while the regulatory agency will face disaster consequences.(3) The higher ratio of bribery, the more likely the regulatory agency misuse its authority to seek rent. Research demonstrated that when the regulated demand for the regulatory policies, it is not entirely passive for the regulatory agencies to make rent extraction or rent-seeking activities.(4) The more stringent penalties the regulated firms were given, the more likely the regulated firms take a bribe. If the regulatory agency has discretionary power, the higher penal sum means giving the agent higher incentive programs, while higher incentive programs will give the regulated firms more potential rent which means higher stakes in collusion.(5) Collusion can improve regulated firms’revenue compared with no collusion between the regulatory agency and the firms, so wherever the regulated firms can collude with the regulatory agency, the regulated agency will prefer to default the safety production input act.(6) Under the incomplete information, the high-risk enterprises will be more inclined to deceive the workers engaged in hazardous job; while workers may underestimate their risk to make the choices which are not conducive for them. Therefore, the government should regulate the fields where the firms have private information, especially in occupational health and safety fields.(7) It is because the value of human capital of workers is low and the risk compensation they require for high-risk workplace is lower that the employer dares to take risks to violate the law, entirely neglect the life and health right of workers.8) The critical path to change workers’disadvantaged position in the game is to enhance the bargaining power of workers. The formation and maintenance of the system is the outcome of "participant" "interactive strategy", so it is important to enhance the workers’enthusiasm in the policy or regulatory decisions, which in turn depends on the bargaining power of workers.(9) Mandatory work injury insurance maybe unreasonable when workers underestimate the risk in the workplace. Underestimate the risk led the workers expose to the risk that can not be spread by the insurance, w hich means the higher level of work injury and lower occupational safety. Therefore it is better to understand the employees’estimate to the risk, before the government involve in the regulation.Through economic analysis of occupational safety regulation, it has revealed the underlying causes that form the current situation of occupational safety regulation:There is no clear division of labor among the regulators and the public functions are decentralized. There are limited resources for regulatory agency to use, so the regulation is low intensity enforcement. When the regulatory agency is captured by the interested group, the right of employee will be damaged. Some firms ignore the life of employees and don’t make adequate input in safety production. The quality of employees is so low that they themselves ignore the occupational safety.Occupational safety regulation has both Specificity and Generality. In the market economy, China’s occupational safety regulatory reform needs to draw upon the successful experience of foreign countries. In this paper, we analyzed some developed countries’experience in occupational safety regulation, it is mainly summarized in the following aspects: Sound legal system is the foundation to improve occupational safety regulation; strictly enforcement of the law is critical to reduce occupational injuries and illnesses as well as to improve regulation performance; establish an independent and professional law enforcement agencies; according to the national condition, reasonably determine the focus on occupational safety regulations; improve the mechanism of injury insurance and well educated the employees to improve the occupational quality.Since the founding of the PRC, China’s occupational safety regulation system has changed several times, and the capacity to regulate the occupational safety and health has also enhanced. Under this new conditions, China’s environment and conditions on occupational safety regulation have undergone tremendous changes. This paper demonstrates that China’s occupational safety regulatory reform should do well in the following aspects: improve the occupational safety legislation and increase the cost of breaking the law; establish an independent law enforcement agencies and enhance the effect of regulation; strength the power of trade unions and establish an equal consultations mechanisms among trade unions, business and the government tripartite; increase the safety production inputs to protect production safety ; provide employees full information about the workplace and training on occupational safety; improve the industrial injury insurance system to make sure of the organic integration of industrial injury insurance and occupational safety regulation; establish a community supervision system and play the role of community supervision on occupational safety regulation.更多还原