【作者】 王毅辉；

【导师】 吴世农； 李常青；

【作者基本信息】 厦门大学 ， 企业管理， 2009， 博士

【副题名】基于产权保护和公司治理视角的理论和实证研究

【摘要】 股利政策是财务学研究的经典课题,也是现代财务理论历经半个多世纪的发展仍然悬而未决的难题。文献表明,股利政策不仅受到公司财务特征的影响,还受到公司内部微观治理层面制度安排的影响。近年来,随着委托代理理论的进一步发展,公司外部中观层面上市场势力也是影响股利政策的重要因素;而跨国比较公司治理文献表明,投资者保护法律及其执法体系这个宏观层面的制度因素也影响上市公司股利政策的制定。与此同时,股利政策作为上市公司在特定制度背景和治理结构下做出的一揽子制度安排,它的恰当制定和有效实施有利于公司的长期发展,有利于实现公司价值的最大化。然而,近年来,随着研究的不断深入,越来越多的证据表明,股利政策正沦为终极控股股东侵占中小股东的“隧道”。终极控股股东由于股权分置的先天原因无法在在股票市场流通通过资本利得获利,股东回报的方式只能通过非理性分红、恶意派现、超能力派现等一系列异常股利政策,侵害了中小股东利益。深入研究上市公司股利政策的综合影响因素,如何有效遏制终极控股股东的侵占,强化上市公司对股东的回报意识,合理引导上市公司股利分配行为,保护中小投资者利益,已成为中国证券市场研究的前沿性课题。尽管上市公司股利政策研究十分重要,迄今为止系统性研究尚不多见,只是零散地探讨某一公司特征或者制度因素对股利政策的影响,未能形成完整适用的理论分析构架,缺乏严谨的实证研究方法和全面翔实的经验检验证据。本文立足于中国的制度背景与市场环境,率先提出了基于产权保护和公司治理视角的股利政策分析框架,并在此框架下全面系统地梳理了国内外股利相关研究文献,分析终极产权性质及其控制权结构、产品市场竞争度、投资者保护法律及其执法效率、地区法治水平等对我国上市公司股利政策的作用机理,以我国股票市场的上市公司作为研究样本,检验了映射于私力保护、中间层保护和公力保护这三个产权保护层面上的微观、中观和宏观公司治理制度安排对我国上市公司股利政策的影响。全文共分为七章,各章的具体内容如下:第一章介绍本文的研究问题、研究内容、论文框架以及研究的贡献和创新等。第二章率先提出基于产权保护和公司治理视角的股利政策分析框架,并在此框架下回顾和评述股利文献,追溯股利的研究渊源,指出微观、中观和宏观层面的制度安排是影响股利政策的重要因子。第三章在微观层面上考察我国上市公司的终极产权归属和对应的控制权结构特征,并检验它们是否影响我国上市公司股利政策制定。第四章在中观层面上检验产品市场竞争强度对股利政策的影响,利用2004年至2007年我国上市公司的样本数据,研究产品市场竞争度的强弱是否影响上市公司股利支付可能性和股利支付水平。第五章在宏观层面上检验投资者保护法律和司法体系等宏观制度安排是否影响上市公司股利政策的制定,利用宏观制度在一国之内的时变性和地异性,研究投资者保护法律的建设和实施的加强是否造成股利支付可能性和股利支付水平的提高。第六章考虑微观、中观和宏观三个层面上公司治理与股利政策的互动和交叉影响,并试图控制终极控制人资金占用的影响来进一步考察我国上市公司股利政策和投资者利益保护的关系。第七章概括研究结果,得出研究结论,并指出本文的不足及未来的研究方向。本文研究的主要结论如下:第一,我国近八成的上市公司终极产权归属于国资委、地方国资委和个人,而国有终极产权性质的上市公司约占三分之二,民营终极产权性质的上市公司占到四分之一偏多。终极控制人平均需要38.88%的控股比例才能控制上市公司,较少采用交叉持股方式和扁平化控制权结构,主要采取垂直化控制权结构来实现对上市公司的控制。第二,上市公司的终极产权性质及其对应的控制权结构影响着股利政策。具体而言,国有终极产权性质的上市公司比民营终极产权性质的上市公司股利支付可能性和股利支付水平低;终极控制人的控制权和现金流量权比例越高,股利支付水平显著越高;而两权分离度、控制层级和控制链条数在不同模型设定下影响上市公司股利决策行为。第三,外部公司治理机制影响我国上市股利政策的制定。产品市场竞争度与股利政策呈负相关关系:投资者法律保护越弱,执法效率越高,股利支付水平越高:而地区法治水平在某些情形下影响上市公司股利决策,不过相比投资者法律保护水平和执法效率,地区法治水平不是影响上市公司股利决策的第一要素。第四,我国上市公司很可能考虑了终极控股股东的资金占用程度后才制定股利政策;终极控股股东通过股利政策侵占中小股东比较可能发生在执法效率低下时和地处法治水平低的上市公司;在不同时域,终极控股股东对资金占用和股利政策这这两种控制权私利表现形式存有不同偏好。以上的实证结果表明了基于产权保护和公司治理视角的股利政策分析框架的适用性,证实了我国上市公司股利政策制定受到终极控股股东性质及其偏好、控制权结构特征以及外部产品市场竞争和投资者保护法律制度等的影响。区别于其它的相关研究,本文的改进和创新工作将主要体现在以下几个方面:在文献评述上,本文首次基于产权保护和公司治理的视角系统地梳理了股利政策研究的相关文献。不同于现有文献的是,本文试图着重从代理成本视角分微观、中观和宏观三个层面糅合浩瀚的股利文献,展示了其不同的文献演进路径。在理论分析上,本文首次提出产权保护、公司治理和股利政策关系的分析框架。本文借鉴威廉姆森的社会分析四层级框架发展构建出产权保护、公司治理和股利政策三者关系的分析框架。这一分析框架显示了公司治理的服务本质,清晰展示了各种可能的公司治理维度对股利政策的影响。在实证检验上,本文首次利用一国之内的数据从微观、中观和宏观层面全面系统地检验公司治理与股利政策的关系,为股利政策研究增添了立足于中国实情的有意义的检验证据。第一,本文采取的终极产权和产品市场竞争视角,为改进我国上市公司监管效率、增强上市公司回报股东意识丰富了思维理论空间。第二,国内目前尚无检验股利政策与市场势力二者关系的研究,本文立足于中国上市公司的实际情况,对产品市场竞争的公司治理效应进行检验,为产品市场竞争的公司治理效应研究补充了来自中国的新证据。第三,国内研究探讨了投资者法律保护指数与股利政策的关系,但忽视了执法效率作为关键因素对我国上市公司股利政策的影响。本文借鉴相关研究,综合考察了投资者保护法律及其执法效率对公司股利政策的影响,为“法和财务”这一主题的财务新思潮提供来自中国的证据。第四,已有文献尚未有深入研究内外部公司治理机制交互影响对股利政策影响的检验,而且不少文献并未控制资金占用等其他利益输送渠道的影响。本文控制资金占用影响的基础上综合考察了终极控制人侵占、投资者保护和股利政策的关系。此外,针对OLS回归难以控制影响股利决策其他潜变量的影响,本文在实证研究手段上采用了面板数据模型,不仅控制了潜变量的影响,也使得解释变量系数的估计更科学有效。本文的主要不足之处是囿于本文研究样本期间的限制和数据的可获得性,投资者法律保护水平和执法效率找不到其他合适的代理变量进行稳健性测试,未来研究可以寻找更好的代理变量进行相关测试确保实证结果的稳健可靠。此外,新近的研究开始关注文化对股利政策的影响。关于文化与股利政策之间关系的研究是未来理论和实证研究的一个方向。更多还原

【Abstract】 Dividend policy is one of the earliest topics in finance research and is still a much-debated topic over the last five decades. As the literatures indicate, dividend policy is not only affected by corporate financial characteristics, but also affected by the internal corporate governance merits from the micro-level. Recently, as further development of the principal - agent theory, the meso-level external market power is also an important factor. Moreover, as shown by international comparative corporation governance literatures, the macro-level institution like investor protection law and its implement system is also another important factor to influence the dividend policy of listed company.Meanwhile, dividend policy can be regarded as one kind of institutional arrangements made by the listed companies under Chinese special institutional background and corporate governance structure. Optimal dividend policy is good for further development of the corporation as well as to maximize the corporate values. However, in recently years, as the study goes deeper, more and more evidences shows that dividend policy is becoming the channel for ultimate controlling shareholders to occupy the minor shareholders. Since the equity are not tradable, ultimate controlling shareholders can not gain profits directly from stock market. They have to redound themselves by some abnormal dividend policies, such as irrational dividend pay-out, vicious cash dividend and ultra-ability cash dividends, which have infringed the rights and interests of the other shareholders. Making further study on the fundamental factors of dividend policy, promoting methods to prevent the embezzlement of ultimate control shareholder, strengthening the consciousness of the listed company to redound upon the shareholders, inducting the dividend distribution of listed company rationally, and protecting the rights of minor investors have become the prevailing topics of the Chinese stock marketing research.Despite of the overwhelming importance of dividend policy, systemic study is still rare so far. The existing literatures just emphasize one specific factor, which can’t converge to an integrated and applicable analytical framework theoretically and lacks of religious empirical research design as well as full and accurate empirical evidences.This dissertation, taking consideration of China-specific institutional background and economic environment, is the first one to bring forward a systemic analytical framework of the dividend policy based on theories of property rights and corporate governance. Under this structure, we survey on the dividend literatures home and abroad, and we analyze the impact of ultimate property rights characters and its control rights structure, the products marketing competition, investor protection laws and its implement efficiency, the regional law standard, etc, on Chinese listed company’s dividend policy. Using samples from listed company of Chinese stock market, we test the relationship among property rights, corporate governance and dividend policy from the micro-, meso- and macro-level, which corresponding to self-help, medium and judicial protection. This dissertation divides into seven parts as follows:Chapter one briefly introduces the issues, content, framework of this dissertation as well as its contribution and innovation to research in this area.Chapter two puts forward the analytic framework of dividend policy based on property rights and corporate governance theories, traces the origins and surveys on the dividend literatures under our framework, which points out that the micro-, meso-and macro- level institutional arrangements are the main factors to influence dividend policies.Chapter three investigates Chinese listed company’s ultimate property rights ownership and its correspondent control rights structure from the micro level, and also research on whether they can influence the dividend policy of Chinese listed company.Chapter four tests the product market competition’s influence on dividend policy from the meso-level. Based on the sample of Chinese listed company from 2004 to 2007, we study whether the market competition can influence the possibility for Chinese listed company to pay dividend and how much if they pay.Chapter five examines whether investor protection laws and its justice system can influence the dividend policy of listed company from the macro level. Based on the fact that the macro institutions have time serial changes and regional differences in one country, we study whether the improvement of investor protection laws and the aggrandizement of law enforcement can lead to the optimal dividend payment of listed companies.Chapter six analyzes the interaction and cross influences between corporate governance and dividend policy from the micro, meso and macro level systematically. Concretely speaking, we controls the influences of fund embezzlement by ultimate controlling shareholders and further exam the relationship among corporate governance, investor protection and dividend policy.Chapter seven summarizes the research results and draws conclusions, also points out the limitations of this article as well as future areas of the research.The main conclusions of this article are as follows:Firstly, almost 80% of Chinese listed companies are controlled by SASAC (State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission) , regional SASAC and individuals. Listed companies with stated owned ultimate property rights occupy almost two thirds of all, while that with private ultimate property rights are just over one fourth. The ultimate controlling shareholders need to hold 38.88% shares averagely to control the listed company. Few of them adopt the cross listing or flat controlling rights structures. They mainly adopt the vertical controlling rights structure to control the listed company.Secondly, the characters of ultimate property rights and its corresponding ownership structure have impacts on dividend policies indeed. Specifically speaking, listed companies with stated own ultimate property rights have lower dividend possibility and payment level than those with private ultimate property rights. The controlling rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder is higher, the dividend payment is obviously higher. And the cash flow rights, the discrepancy degree of ownership and control, the controlling hierarchy as well as the numbers of controlling chain have influenced the dividend policy of listed company in different ways.Thirdly, the external corporate governance mechanism influences the dividend policy of Chinese listed company. The relationship between product market competition and dividend policy grows negatively. As the investor protection law becomes weaker and the law implement efficiency becomes higher, the possibility and level of dividend payment becomes higher. The regional law also influences the dividend policy in some circumstances, but it is not the essential factor comparing to the investor protection level and law enforcement efficiency.Fourthly, listed company may set down the dividend policy only after taking the fund embezzlement degree of ultimate controlling shareholders into account. Infringement of the rights and interests of minor stockholders by ultimate controlling shareholders happens more probably in the lower competitive industry and in the case of weaker investor law protection and low implement efficiency. Ultimate controlling shareholders’preference to fund embezzlement or dividend policy depends on periods of time and regions.The above points demonstrate that our dividend policy analytic framework based on property rights and corporate governance theories is feasible and applicable, and they also substantiate that the dividend policy of Chinese listed company is influenced by ultimate controlling shareholders and their preference, by control rights structures and exterior product marketing competition as well as investor protection law system, etc.Different from the existing literature, this article has some improvement as well as innovations. The main points are listed as follows:In the literature review, this paper is the first one to systematically survey on the dividend under the unique framework based on property rights and corporate governance theories. Different from existing literatures, this paper integrates the voluminous dividend literature on the basis of agency cost theory from micro, meso, and macro level, which shows the evolvement route of the dividend literature clearly.In the theoretical analyses, this paper is the first one to put forward the relationship framework of property rights protection, corporate governance and dividend policy, which was inspired from the four-level social analysis framework created by Williamson. This analysis frame work shows the essence nature of corporate governance, and it reveals all possible dimensions of corporate governance’s influence on dividend policy.In the empirical study, this paper is the first one to test the relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy systematically using the sample datum in single country, which has provided the good evidence to empirical dividend literature from China.First of all, the angles of view on ultimate property rights and product marketing competition this paper used provides novel ideas to improve the supervision efficiency of Chinese listed company and strengthens the listed company’s consciousness to rebound the shareholders.Second, there is no study on the relationship between dividend policy and market power of China so far. This paper tests the corporate governance’s effect of product market competition on dividend policy using Chinese listed companies as samples, which supplemented the literature with new evidence from China.Third, there is still no research investigating the influence of law enforcement efficiency as well as investor protection on Chinese listed company’s dividend policy. This paper does especially considering the law enforcement efficiency as well, which provides meaningful evidence to the research of the dividend policy and "Law and Finance".Fourthly, the existing literatures do not further study the effect of exterior and interior corporate governance mechanism on divided policy, and they have not seized the influence of other tunnels like fund embezzlement, which was successfully and clearly done in this paper. Furthermore, traditional OLS regressions can’t glean all possible influences by other latent variables. By using panel data model, we try to control them and let the coefficient estimation be more precise.The main limitation of this paper is that we need more robust tests due to our lacking of other substituted proxy for the investor protection and law enforcement efficiency. Further study is to find a better proxy. Moreover, the newly study is beginning to emphasize on culture influence to dividend policy. The relationship of culture and dividend policy will become the hot topic of future theoretical and empirical study.更多还原