公共选择理论视角下地方政府利益研究

【作者】 董少林；

【导师】 李慧中；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 政治经济学， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 我国社会和经济转型经过近30年的积累、深化，已经逐步触及经济制度的本质。不管是从改革攻坚还是从制度创新的角度看，社会和经济转型都已进入关键阶段，其中的一个重要标志就是我国地方政府的利益取向正在引起普遍的关注和讨论。因为伴随着经济和社会转型，地方政府作为社会系统的重要组成部分，总体上可以与地方利益协调一致，互相促进，但是也存在一些不和谐因素。这也意味着地方政府的利益取向在转型期间需要不断做出调整，不仅要考虑与上级政府和其他地方政府之间的关系，还要考虑与所辖地区企业和居民之间的关系。地方政府的利益取向究竟按照什么样的原则做出调整，如何最大程度提高整个社会的福利水平，如何摆正与其他利益主体之间的关系，所有这些问题一直困扰着地方经济和社会发展。本文的研究目标非常简单，运用公共选择理论的基本观点来分析我国地方政府的各个利益层次，运用系统分析方法、博弈分析方法和数据分析方法，最终得到这样一个结论，地方政府部门利益和地方政府官员利益必须服从和服务于地方利益这个大局的观点。主要内容如下：第二章到第五章主要运用公共选择理论的研究范式来分析地方政府的利益构成，并就每一个利益构成进行具体的理论上的阐述，有助于人们深入理解地方政府制定政策的本质。在对地方利益的阐述上，认为地方福利的最大化是整个地方利益的核心，并从地方性公共产品和公共服务型地方政府两个角度加以深层次分析，这就要求地方政府做出种种努力去实现地方福利的最大化，否则地方居民有可能采取“用脚投票”的方法。在对地方政府部门利益的阐述上，认为地方政府部门利益应该与地方利益保持一致，否则可能会产生地方政府部门的X-低效率、越位和缺位、自我扩张和膨胀、以及大量的设租和寻租行为，然而这并不符合地方政府部门的长远利益。在对地方政府官员利益的阐述上，认为理性的地方政府官员在提供公共产品时可能会采取搭便车行为和寻租行为，这就有必要在正式制度约束和非正式制度安排下规范地方政府官员的行为，并运用标尺竞争机制为规范地方政府官员的行为指引合理的方向。第六章从理论上对地方政府的经济活动进行分析，有助于人们理解究竟是什么原因造成了地方政府的失灵。在公共选择理论的视角下，认为市场的缺陷并不是将问题全部交给地方政府处理的充分理由，必须尽可能缩小地方政府的干预范围，提倡非政治化，将一部分公共服务生产移交给私营部门。即使最终需要地方政府的干预，也要严格规范地方政府的行为，将其行为集中指向改进和完善各种约束规则方面，通过完善规则来改进政治和经济绩效。第七章通过具体的地方政府活动对地方政府利益取向进行博弈分析，有助于人们深刻理解地方政府在政策制定和实施过程中的行为倾向。通过四方当事人三层委托-代理关系的博弈模型，不仅明确了地方政府官员与供应商的总体寻租规模和双方对租金的分配比例，而且规定了双方的寻租收益与风险；不仅肯定了寻租行为会给地方政府部门和地方居民带来相应的揭发和监督成本，而且给出了在给定监管力度与惩罚力度时各方的最优选择及均衡支付。而要对寻租行为形成有效威慑，并降低寻租行为的发生概率，要么地方政府部门和地方居民增加对寻租行为的监管力度，要么地方政府部门增加对地方政府官员与供应商寻租行为的惩罚力度。对地方政府有关活动进行博弈分析，特别是对地方政府部门与地方政府官员之间在信息对称或者信息不对称两种情况下的具体分析，有助于人们明白为什么地方政府引领地方经济发展必须依赖正确的利益取向。第八章依据有关具体的统计数字，分析作为一个特殊利益主体的地方政府利益取向的影响和决定机制。随着我国加大对权力寻租行为的打击力度，地方政府部门利益和地方政府官员利益会逐渐走向规范和透明，对地方利益的侵蚀和影响逐步减少，对经济体制和经济规则的破坏力不断缩小，对地方政府行为的决定和影响也会不断缩小。但是各种数据表明，腐败现象仍在一定范围内长期存在，地方利益不断遭到地方政府部门利益和地方政府官员利益的残剥。为此，地方政府要不断强化公共服务职能，提高地方利益的整体水平，为地方居民参与社会、经济、政治和文化活动提供保障和创造条件。再次从数据分析的角度证实地方政府部门利益和地方政府官员利益必须服务于并服从于地方利益这个大局。更多还原

【Abstract】 After nearly 30 years of accumulation and deepening, social and economictransformation of our country has gradually been touched on the essence of economicsystem. From the perspective of reform and system innovation, transformation hasentered a critical stage, one of important indication of which exists in the interestorientation of local government is causing widespread concern and discussion. Alongwith the economic and social transformation, the local government as an importantcomponent of social system, can be coordinated with local interests and promote eachother, though there are some factors of disharmony. This also means that the interestorientation of local government need to constantly make adjustments in thetransformation period, not only to consider the relations of local government with thehigher-level government and other local government, but also to consider the relationsof local government with businesses and residents under the jurisdiction of the region.Which principle do the interest orientation of local government make adjust to, how tomaximize the level of benefits the community as a whole, how to deal with other interestsubjects, all these questions have haunted the local economic and social development.The aim of this study is very simple. By using the basic viewpoints of public choicetheory to analyze the various benefits of local government level, and using the methodsof systems analysis, game analysis and data analysis, this paper finally get to thisconclusion: the interests of local government departments and the interests of localgovernment officials must be subordinate to and give service to the local interests. Themain contents are as follows:From chapterⅡto chapterⅤ, making use of research paradigm of public choicetheory to analyze and expound the component of local government interests, help peopleunderstand the essence of local government policy. On the exponent of the localinterests, maximization of local welfare is the core of the whole local interests, which isdeeply analyzed from the local public goods and the public service-oriented localgovernment. This requires the local governments to make efforts to achievemaximization of local welfare. Otherwise, the local residents may have adopted "Votingby Feet".On the exponent of the interests of local government departments, the interestsof local government departments should be consistent with local interests, otherwise, thelocal government departments may be causing the X-inefficiency, the offside and absence, self-expansion, and a number of rent setting and rent-seeking behavior, but thisdoes not meet the long-term interests of local government departments. On the exponentof the interests of local government officials, in the provision of public goods, therational local government officials may be taken to free-riding and rent-seeking behavior,which is necessary to specify the behavior of local government officials under thearrangement of formal and informal institution institutional, and point out the reasonableguidelines of local government officials by using of yardstick competition mechanism.In chapterⅥ, theoretically analyzing of economic activity of local governments ishelp to understand the reasons of local government failure. In the perspective of publicchoice theory, the market defects do not become good reasons that all questions must behanded over to local governments to deal with, so we must minimize the scope ofintervention of local governments to promote apolitical trend, and hand part of thepublic service’s production over to the private sector. Even if eventually required theintervention of local governments, the conduct of local government should be strictlyregulated, focusing on their behavior to improve and perfect a variety of binding rules,and improving the political and economic performance through the perfecting of therules.In chapterⅦ, through specific activities of local government, the game analysis ofthe interest orientation contributes to a profound understanding of behavioral tendenciesof local government in the course of policy making and implementing. Not only theoverall rent-seeking scale and the rental distribution proportion between the localgovernment officials and suppliers, but also the benefits and risks of rent-seeking of thetwo sides, not only the corresponding disclosing and supervising cost caused by therent-seeking behavior bringing to local government departments and local residents, butalso the optimal selection of all parties and the balanced payment under the givensupervision and punishment, is affirmed by the four-party game model of three-levelcommission-agent relationship. In order to create an effective deterrent to preventrent-seeking behavior and reduce the probability of rent-seeking behavior, localgovernment departments and local residents intensify supervision of the rent-seekingbehavior, or local government departments increase penalties to rent-seeking behaviorbetween local government officials and suppliers. Game analysis of related activities oflocal governments, especially for the specific analysis between local governmentdepartments and local government officials under asymmetric Information or symmetricinformation, helps people understand why the local government must rely on the correct interest orientation to develop local economy.In chapterⅧ, in accordance with the relevant specific statistics, this paperanalysis the influence and decision mechanism of interest orientation looking upon localgovernment as a special interest body. With increasing the striking force to the behaviorof power rent-seeking, the interests of local government departments and localgovernment officials will gradually become standardized and transparent. Thus, theerosion to local interests, the destructive force to the economic structure and rules, andthe decision and infection to the behavior of local government will keep narrowing.However, various data show that corruption will still exist for a long time. At thesame time, the local interests are narrowed continuously by the interests of localgovernment departments and local government officials. Therefore, local governmentsshould continue to strengthen the public service functions, improve the overall level oflocal interests, and provide security, and create conditions for local residents toparticipate in social, economical, political and cultural activities. The opinion that theinterests of local government departments and the interests of local government officialsmust be subordinate to and give service to the local interests is confirmed again from theperspective of data analysis.更多还原