【作者】 刘志强；

【导师】 夏新平；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 企业管理， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 20世纪90年代末，La Porta，Lopez-de-Silanes，Shleifer和Vishny(简称LLSV)开创的法律与金融研究，使我们认识到投资者法律保护是公司治理和金融发展最重要的影响因素之一，加强投资者法律保护是改善公司治理和促进金融经济发展最为根本的途径之一。然而，由于转轨经济国家，在投资者法律保护状况和立法改革方面均存在不少困难，企图在短期内迅速提高新兴市场国家的投资者法律保护水平，显然是不太现实的。因此，打破LLSV(1998)以来形成的关注法律制度的研究范式，而转向同时关注法律外制度，提出转轨经济中法律改革的原则和替代性措施，成为新近开创的研究领域。目前，对非法律治理机制的研究已成为继“法与金融”文献之后，国际公司治理研究的新热点。这一研究领域的出现对于一些投资者法律保护相对较弱的新兴市场国家(如中国)利用非法律治理机制(如产品市场竞争、媒体、税务等)来积极改进本国现阶段的公司治理，保护投资者利益，提高本国的金融发展水平具有重要的政策意义。结合中国的实际情况来看，如何在不断提高投资者法律保护水平的同时，设计和制定出行之有效的非法律治理机制是摆在中国学术界、实务界和证券监管部门面前的一个重大课题。目前，关于中国的非法律治理机制的研究尚处于起步阶段，相关研究还很少，仍然处于较为零散、缺乏系统分析的层面，亟待加强。因此，基于该问题的重要性及相关研究还较为匮乏的考虑，尽快开展有关中国非法律保护制度的理论和实证研究，无论是增强人们对非法律保护制度的了解和认识，还是填补该领域系统研究的空白，无疑都具有十分重要的意义。本文在借鉴国外文献的基础上，以产品市场竞争作为非法律治理机制的切入点，结合我国的制度背景，详细分析和检验了我国投资者法律保护和产品市场竞争对上市公司的现金股利支付、现金持有价值和资本配置效率的影响，以及产品市场竞争对投资者法律保护不足的弥补效应。本文获得了三个方面的研究发现：首先，随着投资者法律保护水平的改善和产品市场竞争程度的提高，上市公司的现金股利支付力度随之增加，并且当法律保护水平较低时，激烈的产品市场竞争可以弥补法律保护的不足，迫使公司管理层“吐出”多余的自由现金流，支付更多的现金股利给股东，但是当投资者法律保护水平较高时，产品市场竞争并不能对公司的现金股利支付力度产生显著影响。进一步的研究表明，当投资者保护法律制度和法制环境较好时，产品市场竞争对现金股利支付力度没有显著影响，而当投资者保护法律制度和法制环境较差时，产品市场竞争对现金股利支付力度有显著影响。其次，随着产品市场竞争程度的提高，企业的单位新增现金持有的价值不断提高；相对于非国有企业和法制环境较差地区而言，随着产品市场竞争程度的提高，国有企业和法制环境较差地区的企业的单位新增现金持有价值的提高更显著。最后，随着我国投资者法律保护的改善和产品市场竞争程度的提高，企业的投资不足和过度投资程度均得到有效降低，企业的投资效率得到明显提高。进一步研究发现，相对于投资者法律保护水平较高时，激烈的产品市场竞争在投资者法律保护水平较低时，对企业资本配置效率的提高影响更显著，激烈的产品市场竞争能够弥补法律保护的不足，保护投资者的利益。本文的研究说明，在我国投资者法律保护的完善将是一个长期的过程，而在短期内应该在坚持不断完善投资者法律保护的同时，充分利用产品市场竞争等非法律治理机制来改善和提高上市公司的治理水平，保护投资者利益。因此，本文的研究有着重要的理论意义和现实意义。更多还原

【Abstract】 At the end of the 20th century, legal and financial research created by La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny(LLSV), makes us realize that the legal protectionof investors is the most important one of factors that impact corporate governance andfinancial development,and strengthen the legal protection of investors is one of the mostfundamental way that improve corporate governance and financial development.However,In transition economy countries there are many difficulties in the situation of legalprotection of investors and legislative reform. Attempt to rapidly improve in the level oflegal protection of emerging market countries in the short term in, is obviously not veryrealistic. So to broke the research paradigm that concerned about the formation of the legalsystem since LLSV (1998), and at the same time steer system of laws concerned about theproposed legal reform and alternative measures in transition economy, as the pioneeringwork of research fields. At present, non-legal governance mechanisms research hasbecome the new hot spot about the International Corporate Governance Research after the"law and finance" literature. The emergence of this field of study has important policyimplications for some emerging market countries (such as China) with relatively weaklegal protection of investors,this country can use non-legal governance mechanisms (suchas product market competition, the media, tax, etc.) to actively improve their corporategovernance at this stage, protect investor interests, improve their level of financialdevelopment.Combined with China’s actual situation, how to constantly improve the level of legalprotection for investors at the same time, design and develop effective non-legalgovernance mechanisms in China are a major issue faced by the academic and practicalindustry and the securities regulatory departments. At present, the non-legal protectionmechanisms research in China is still in its infancy, research is also small, is still in a morefragmented and the lack of systematic analysis of the level, should be strengthened.Therefore, consideration based on the importance of the issue and relatively scarcety aboutrelated research, as soon as possible on the theory and empirical research of non-legalprotection system of China’s listed companies, whether it is to enhance of understanding and knowledge of the system of the non-legal protection, or to fill the the field ofsystematic research gaps, no doubt of great significance.On the basis of literature abroad this paper combine the actual conditions of listedcompanies in China’s,use product market competition as an entry pointstarting of thenon-legal governance mechanisms, of from the legal protection of investors and productmarket competition with the listed companies to pay cash dividends, cash holdings andcapital allocation efficiency, analysising and testing in detail of the China’s legalprotection of investors and product market competition on the market the company’sfinancial behavior, the paper analysises and testes in detail how to China’s legal protectionof investors and product market competition impact to pay cash dividends, the value ofcash holdings and the impact of capital allocation efficiency, and how to product marketcompetition to make up for lack of legal protection for investors. The conclusions of thisresearch are as follows: Firstly, with the level of legal protection of investors and thedegree of product market competition to improve, cash dividends of listed companiesincreased. And when there is a lower level of legal protection, the intense competition inproduct markets can make up for lack of legal protection, force the company’s manager tospit out excess free cash flow, to pay more cash dividends to shareholders. But when thereis higher level of legal protection, product market competition should not have asignificant impact on the company’s cash dividend payments. Further research shows thatwhen investor protection legal system and legal environment are better, the product marketcompetition have no significant impact on cash dividend payments, and when investorprotection legal system and legal environment are poor, product market competition havea significant impact on cash dividends payments. Secondly, with the improvement in thelevel of product market competition, the value of a unit of cash holdings of corporatecontinuously improve. Vis-(?)-vis non-state-owned enterprises and poor legal environmentareas, with the improvement of the degree of product market competition, the value of aunit of cash holdings of the state-owned enterprises and corporate that lie in thedisadvantaged legal environment enhance more visible. Finally, as legal protection ofinvestors and product market competition in China to improve,the level ofunder-investment and over-investment have been reduced effectively, enterprisessignificantly improve investment efficiency. Further study found that, compared to higher levels of legal protection of investors, when there is a lower level of legal protection ofinvestors, the intense competition in product markets can more visible to improve theefficiency of the capital allocation, and the intense competition in product markets canmake up inadequate protection of the law.This study shows that in our country to improve the legal protection of investors willbe a long process, and in the near future we should adhere to constantly improve the legalprotection of investors, at the same time make full use of product market competition andother non-legal governance mechanisms to improve and enhance level of govemance oflisted companies to protect the interests of investors. Therefore, this research hasimportant theoretical and practical significance.更多还原