【作者】 张保柱；

【导师】 龚朴；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 企业管理， 2009， 博士

【摘要】 在中国的30年改革发展中，以政府主导的国有企业改革是一个重要的核心步骤。公有制企业是否改制是博弈的结果。当政府目标与企业目标不一致时，经营决策权和利润分配权的不同配置将直接影响企业行为，进而决定公有企业是否改制。因此，在改制过程中不能忽视政府干预的影响。本文在前人研究基础上，首先侧重分析政府干预对企业改制选择决策的影响，主要回答如下问题：中国企业的改制形式是如何被决定的?为什么有的地区会有较多的私营企业而有的地区则存在较多的政府控股的改制企业?改制企业和私营企业在经济效率和就业效率上有何不同?在回答了这些问题的基础上，本研究进一步分析政府干预对企业日常经营决策的影响，以求在宏观和微观层面上理解中国转型经济下政府干预与企业发展问题。关于宏观层面政府干预与企业改制决策的问题。本研究从分析Boycko,Shleifer和Vishny(1996)的模型(下文简称为BSV模型)入手，提出了我国企业改制内生决策理论模型；并选取我国2001-2005年的经济统计年鉴为数据基础，以不同地区间的地方政府行为和经济差异为切入点，实证分析决策模型的推论，以求在一个规范的理论框架下认识中国国有企业改制的内生决策问题。该研究的贡献主要体现在以下几个方面：首先，本研究给出了中国企业改制内生决策理论模型。其次，本研究结合中国分地区统计数据实证检验了该理论模型，并讨论了中国企业改制过程中的独特现象；再次，本研究从时间序列的角度分析了部分私有化企业和完全私有化企业二者的经济效率和就业效率的差异。最后，本研究进一步论证了Shleifer and Vishny(1994，1998)的“政府掠夺之手”理论，即本文发现在企业的构成形式的选择过程中，政府官员的政治收益渴望同样在发挥着重要作用。除了在企业改制阶段政府干预有着重要影响，在企业日常经营阶段，政府干预也发挥着重要作用。为了理解政府干预对于企业的成长性价值影响，本研究从分析和认识中国企业的成长性价值出发，其中重点分析企业和管理者的学习行为、企业的控制行为与企业的成长性价值的关系。这里的分析本研究引入了实物期权理论，以内嵌控制和学习行为的成长性期权价值研究为理论基础，提出研究假设。并结合中国上市公司2005-2006年的年报数据，实证剖析了中国企业的成长性价值(PVGO)的影响因素。在上述分析的基础上，本研究选取企业研发支出决策这一重要的行为特征(即企业的学习行为表现)，考察了政府干预对企业经营决策行为的影响及其经济后果。研究结果表明，地方政府控制的上市企业研发支出比例较低，而且地方政府干预经济越严重，研发支出比例则越低，进而导致企业的长期成长价值也就越低。其根本原因在于地方政府通过干预其控制的企业实现其政治收益的诉求导致了企业对其内部成长性投资的减弱，这种转嫁到企业的政治或者社会收益导致了企业不能完全从本身长期价值最大化的角度来做出经营决策行为，也在某种程度上造成了企业的短视；企业研发投入的不足直接导致了其长期成长价值的降低。更多还原

【Abstract】 The government-led state-owned enterprise reform is an important step in China’s 30 years of economic reforming process. Throughout the reforming process, the government intervention always plays an important role. In this paper, we investigate the endogenous choice problem of Chinese state-owned enterprises in their decision on whether to privatize or corporatize. Corporatization differs from privatization in the Chinese context, as in the former case, the state remains as a large shareholder, and in the latter case, the state has little or no ownership. We try to answer the following questions: how the endogenous choice of the Chinese state-owned enterprises’ restructuring is being made? Why in some areas there have more private enterprises and others have more corporatized enterprises? What are the differences between private enterprises and corporatized enterprises in economic efficiency and employment efficiency? After these questions above being answered, we continue our research to study the effect of government intervention in firms’ operational decision-making. And then we can have a clear understanding of the role of government intervention in the transition economic in the macro-and micro-level.On the macro level, we first extend the BSV model to describe the choice-making problem. Using a cross-section of provincial statistics (2001-2005), we show that the larger the local employment pressure, the less likely we see privatization; the more acute the local fiscal pressure, the more likely we see privatization; the more corrupted is the local government, the less likely we see privatization. Privatization also is found to yield consistently efficiency gains over corporatization measured in terms of both employment and firm profitability. The mainly contributions are: First, this research extends the BSV model to decision-making level. Secondly, this study give the empirical support of the extended BSV model using China’s sub-region statistical data, and we also discussed the unique phenomenon in the restructuring process of China’s enterprises. Lastly, this paper enriches the Shleifer and Vishny’s (1994,1998) "Government Grapping Hand" theory.What’s more, the effect of government intervention in firms’ operational decision-making is also significant. We continue our research to micro-level. The firm’s growth options value is an important part of firm’s value .We estimate the present value of growth options (PVGO) for a sample of China listed companies (2005-2006) based on real option theories. We find that a firm’s present value of growth options is positively related to the firm’s learning actions (based on firm’s R&D expense), manager’s learning actions (based on managers’ management experience and social relationship net) and firm’s control actions (based on firm’s advertisement expense). Further, we find that the importance of learning actions prior to control actions.Based on the research above, we discussed the effect of government intervention in the firms’ R&D expenditure decision-making. Chinese listed companies directly controlled by the government have lower R&D expenses, and the more seriously the government intervention; the more obvious the phenomenon appears to be. The companies have poor R&D expenses under the government intervention due to the deviation between the local government’s political and social goals and the companies’ long-term development objective, and the poor R&D expenses directly reduce the companies’ long-term growth value. This study enhances our understanding about the relationship between the company and government in the economic transition period, and also provides a new research perspective for studying the companies’ R&D activities in emerging markets.更多还原